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Abstract 
 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate three banking issues related to competition, 
which are switching costs, collusion, and the competitive conditions in the Hong 
Kong banking sector during the period 1997 to 2012. For this purpose, a database 
consisting of an unbalanced panel of annual observations for 18 licensed banks 
incorporated in Hong Kong is used. This thesis comprises three empirical essays 
as follows:     
    The first essay uses a structural model presented by Kim et al. (2003), which 
explores the significance and the magnitude of switching costs in Hong Kong’s 
bank loan market. Overall, I find that switching costs are significant in the Hong 
Kong bank loan market. The average point estimate of switching costs based on 
the entire sample is 0.1947. The results suggest that the existence of switching 
costs raises the price-cost margin by 52 basis points. Furthermore, the results also 
suggest that the estimated switching costs during the bad times are slightly higher 
than that in good times. On average, 2.54% of the customer’s added value is 
attributed to the lock-in effect generated by switching costs.  
The second essay measures the degree of collusion and the nature of the 
competitive conditions in the Hong Kong bank loan market using the conjectural 
variation approach. I jointly estimate a system of a log demand function, a pricing 
equation, and a trans-log cost system, and use the conjectural variation parameter 
to identify the degree of collusion. The estimated conjectural variation parameter 
is insignificant, which suggests that banks in Hong Kong operate in a competitive 
fashion in the loan market and the behaviour of the banks is consistent with a Nash-
Bertrand equilibrium in price, with no significant evidence of collusion on pricing.  
The third essay investigates the degree of competition in the Hong Kong 
banking sector using the Panzar-Rosse approach. The novelty of this essay is to 
solve the problem of the system’s residuals correlation in the Panzar-Rosse model 
by jointly estimating equations using the SUR approach. My results suggest that 
the Hong Kong bank market can be characterized as monopolistic competition and 
the level of competition of interest market is higher than competition level of the 
non-interest market.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
1.1 The nature of this thesis 
This thesis is an empirical study of banking performance in Hong Kong. It 
investigates three specific banking issues related to competition, which are: 
switching costs in the Hong Kong bank loan market, collusion in the Hong Kong 
bank loan market, and competition in the Hong Kong banking sector. This chapter 
offers a brief introduction and motivation for this thesis from following aspects: 
Section 1.2 describes the issue of competition in the Hong Kong banking sector 
and explains the motivation of this study; Section 1.3 outlines the research 
questions addressed in this thesis; Section 1.4 highlights the major contributions 
of this thesis; and, Section 1.5 shows the structure of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Background and motivation  
The issue of competition in the banking sector has been extensively studied over 
recent years. The global financial crisis that happened in 2007-2008 once again 
drew the attention of policy makers to bank competition and competition policies. 
Increased competition in the banking sector could lower costs, improve services 
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quality and encourage the banks to engage more in non-traditional income 
activities. Furthermore, it could provide greater access to finance, promote 
efficiency in financial intermediation, and provide better support for the economy 
(Sun, 2011). However, the benefits of increasing competition are not absolute. 
Excessive competition may increase the risks taken by banks, thereby undermining 
the robustness and stability of the banking system. As Shaffer (2004a) has argued, 
due to the uniqueness and influence of banks, any allocative inefficiency or other 
market distortions in banking will have significant impacts on the whole economy. 
Given the economic importance of bank competition, the present study is 
motivated mainly due to the uniqueness of Hong Kong. As one of the most 
concentrated1 but competitive (concentration and competition can co-exist in a 
contestable market as is discussed in Chapter 5) banking industries in the world, 
the stature of Hong Kong as a famous financial centre is built on its free market 
system, low tax, well-educated labour force, a sound legal and institutional 
frameworks, and dense international networks (Shen, 2004a; Yeung et al. 2006). 
According to the Index of Economic Freedom, Hong Kong has been ranked the 
world’s freest economy for the 20th consecutive year since the index was first 
published in 1995 (Government of Hong Kong, 2012). Due to the close 
geographical and political relationship between Hong Kong and Mainland China, 
Hong Kong has the irreplaceable and unique advantage to act as the bridge for 
linking Chinese mainland and international markets, so mainland enterprises that 
                                                          
1 Reflecting this, the 3-bank concentration ratio and the 5-bank concentration ratio of Hong Kong 
calculated by World Bank are high at 72.15% and 81.39% respectively in 2011. According to the 
half-year monetary and financial stability report from HKMA 2006, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of the banking sector in Hong Kong is around 0.14 in 2005. Section 2.2.3 (p.26) in 
Chapter 2 will discuss the degree of market concentration in Hong Kong in more detail.  
             
3 
 
seeking to engage in global operation can use Hong Kong’s professional service 
providers to expand their global business, and the international investors might 
prefer to invest in Hong Kong because of its proximity to China (Ho, 2013).  
Since the implement of the policy of reform and opening-up in 1978, Hong 
Kong has become the major fund raising centre for mainland companies. Many 
mainland banks and companies have been listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange 
after the 1997 handover (Lee and Poon, 2004). According to the statistics from the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, there were only 69 mainland companies (11.8% of 
the total number) were listed on the  Hong Kong Stock Exchange by the end of 
1996, with total market capitalization of HKD 294.8 billion (USD 38.03 billion, 
8.5% of the total market capitalization). Since the return of Hong Kong to China 
in 1997, the economic and trade integration between Hong Kong and Mainland 
China enters a fast-developing period. Especially after the Asian financial crisis, 
the number of mainland companies listed on the Hong Kong Exchange has 
accelerated since 2002. As of the end of 2003, there were 249 mainland companies 
listed in Hong Kong. The market capitalization of these mainland companies was 
HKD 1,680 billion (USD 216.72 billion). But by the end of 2013, there were 1,643 
listed companies on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, with a 
total market capitalization of HKD 24,042.8 billion (USD 3,101.52 billion). 
Among the listed companies, 797 (49% of the total number) were Mainland 
companies, comprising H-share, red-chip and Mainland private enterprises with 
total market capitalization of HKD 13,690.57 billion (USD 1,766.08 billion). The 
share of mainland companies’ capitalization in total market capitalization rising 
from 30% to 57% during 2003 to 2013. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
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(ICBC) is a significant case that Mainland banks listed in Hong Kong after 
handover. ICBC was simultaneously listed on both the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange on 27 October 2006. It was the world’s 
largest initial public offering at that time valued at USD 21.9 billion. These 
mainland banks and companies issue bond in Hong Kong market and seek trade 
finance from Hong Kong’s bank. Along with a rapid expansion of banking 
activities by these mainland banks in Hong Kong, the level of competition in Hong 
Kong bank market is changing. Competition from new entrants have resulted in 
the changing of market share. Compared with the banks owned by the other 
regions like Japan, US and Europe, the mainland Chinese banks now occupy the 
largest market share in terms of deposits and loans in 20132. Therefore, the study 
of bank competition in Hong Kong especially after its handover becomes 
meaningful.  
After Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997, the general public in Hong Kong 
expressed strong reservations about economic integration with Mainland China3 
(Shen, 2008). However, the Asian Financial Crisis happened in 1997 made people 
understand the need for careful economic planning in order to ease the transition 
and promote greater economic integration (Shen, 2004b). Therefore, a large 
number of cooperation at government level began especially after China’s entry 
                                                          
2 In 2013, the deposits from customers of  Mainland Chinese banks, Japanese banks, US banks and 
European banks in Hong Kong was HKD 2,760 billion, HKD 166 billion, HKD 440 billion, HKD 
1334 billion respectively. And the loans to customers of Mainland Chinese banks, Japanese banks, 
US banks and European banks in Hong Kong was HKD 2,052 billion, HKD 466 billion, HKD 230 
billion, HKD 983 billion respectively. (Data Source: HKMA Annual Report 2013) 
3 An examination of the broad money supply figures at the time of the handover in 1997 revealed 
the following patterns of deposit movements. Sight deposits fell by 11.45% in 1997 suggesting a 
withdrawal by Hong Kong residents because of the political uncertainty of the handover. However 
time deposits increased by 10.07 %, indicating an inflow of corporate deposits from the Mainland. 
Overall broad money increased by 9.95%. (Data source: Oxford Economics)  
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into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. Hong Kong is the largest 
foreign direct investment (FDI) source for Mainland China. But after the handover 
in 1997, the flow of FDI from Hong Kong to Mainland China declined in the period 
from 1996 to 2000. According to the statistics from National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, in 1996, Hong Kong invested USD 20.85 billion in the Mainland China. 
Due to the financial crisis and people’s expectation about the handover of Hong 
Kong, in 2000, the investment from Hong Kong declined to USD 15.50 billion. 
Figure 1.1 below shows the changes of share of Hong Kong in the total foreign 
investment received by Mainland China from 1996 to 2012. The share of Hong 
Kong in the total foreign investment received by Mainland China declined from 
49.49% in 1996 to 29.75% in 2005. But after 2005, this ratio began to rise. The 
close economic integration between Hong Kong and Mainland China and the 
changes of public expectation make the study of bank competition in Hong Kong 
after handover more important.  
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Figure 1.1 The share of Hong Kong in the total foreign investment received 
by Mainland China for the period 1996 to 2012. 
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0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
 
 
T
h
e
 s
h
a
re
 o
f 
H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
 i
n
 t
h
e
 t
o
ta
l 
fo
re
ig
n
 
in
v
e
s
tm
e
n
t 
re
c
e
iv
e
d
 b
y
 M
a
in
la
n
d
 C
h
in
a
Year
 
Data Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1996 to 2012. 
In the past two decades, the operating environment in the Hong Kong banking 
sector has experienced great changes. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) has implemented a series of financial reform measures to promote the 
market competition and efficiency after 1997, such as deregulation of the Interest 
Rate Rules (IRRs) in 2001, which allowed the banks in Hong Kong to set any 
interest rates on the deposits and loans that they wish to offer. Prior to deregulation, 
the banks in Hong Kong had to comply with a uniform lending rate (prime rate) 
and a set of uniform deposits rates under the regulated by the IRRs issued by Hong 
Kong Association of Banks (HKAB). In the same year, in order to provide a level 
playing field for all of the banks, HKMA removed the restrictions on the number 
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of branches and offices for foreign banks. Furthermore, HKMA have relaxed some 
of the market entry criteria since 2002, including reducing the asset size criteria 
for overseas-incorporated bank and shortening the requisite period of locally 
restricted licensed banks and deposit-taking companies to upgrade to licensed bank 
status. In 2012, the HKMA and the Treasury Bureau revised the Banking 
Ordinance again to update certain market entry criteria for the banking sector in 
Hong Kong. These amendments make it easier for domestic and international 
financial institutions to operate as fully licensed banks. There have been signs of 
increasing competition in the Hong Kong banking sector after these measures of 
market liberalization were implemented. According to the statistics from the 
World Bank, the net interest margins (NIM) of Hong Kong banks have declined 
from 4.48% in 2002 to 0.93% in 2004.  
Increased competition from domestic and global players, deregulation, financial 
innovation, and shareholder pressure to improve wealth have led to the 
consolidation process in Hong Kong (BIS, 2001). A number of bank mergers and 
acquisitions have taken place in Hong Kong during and after financial crisis 2008. 
For example, China Merchants Bank acquired Wing Lung Bank in 2009. After 
that, the Wing Lung Bank was delisted from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The 
Yuxiu Group acquired Chong Hing Bank, which was the second largest family-
run bank in Hong Kong in 2013. In addition, Singapore's Oversea-Chinese 
Banking Corporation Limited completed its buyout of Wing Hang Bank July 2014 
for HKD 38.4 billion (USD 4.95 billion)4.  
                                                          
4 1 HKD= 0.1290 USD. Data source: Bloomberg. Date: 4 June 2014. This exchange rate is used in 
the whole thesis.  
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Merger and acquisition has always been a significant force in the restructuring of 
the banking market. The number of banks in the market is the simplest measure of 
market concentration. Followed by the Structure- Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm (Bain, 1956), a more concentrated market will stimulate collusion 
among the banks and so reduce the degree of competition (increase market power) 
in the market. According to the Statistics from HKMA, the number of all 
authorized institutions in Hong Kong reduced by about 44%, or from 361 in 1997 
to 201 in 2013. Figure 1.2 below shows the changes in the number of all authorized 
institution in Hong Kong from 1997 to 2013. As can be seen from the figure, great 
changes have been taken place during 1997 to 2003. The decreasing number of 
banks in Hong Kong results in more consideration in bank collusion in Hong Kong. 
Some other indicators, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 5  also 
measure market concentration. According to Figure 1.3, the HHI of 18 licensed 
banks in Hong Kong6 indicates a relatively high degree of market concentration in 
Hong Kong. Although there was a sharp decrease in HHI after 2008, the value of 
HHI of 18 licensed banks in Hong Kong still retained a high level of around 0.19 
in 2012. Oligopolistic coordination allows the colluded banks to obtain higher 
profits; however, it hurts the interests of customers and other competitors, and it 
may also reduce economic efficiency. Therefore, the issue of collusion has caught 
the attention of policy maker in recent years.  
                                                          
5 The HHI is the sum of the squared of the market shares of the firms in the market. The number 
can range from zero to one. A huge number of very small firms lead to an HHI close to zero. A 
single monopolistic firm with 100% market share produces an HHI equal to one.  
6 In this thesis, I use a sample covers 18 licensed banks in Hong Kong for the period 1997 to 2012. 
I use the total assets of these 18 banks to calculate an HHI of my sample. This reflects the degree 
of market concentration in Hong Kong banking sector in some way.  
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Figure 1.2 The number of all authorized institutions in Hong Kong, 
1997 to 2012 
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Figure 1.3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 18 licensed banks in Hong Kong, 
1997 to 2012 
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Switching costs, which can be described as barriers to a customer’s changing of 
suppliers, affect market competition. These barriers include financial costs and 
nonfinancial costs (e.g., psychological costs). Klemperer (1995), and Farrell and 
Klemperer (2007) suggest a presumption that switching costs make markets less 
competitive. A large amount of theoretical literature has studied the impact of 
switching costs on price competition. In general, the existence of switching costs 
gives firms a degree of market power. Therefore, each firm faces a trade-off 
between increasing market share by charging low prices to attract new customers 
who will become repeat-purchasers in the future while gaining super-normal 
profits by charging high prices from locked-in customers (Klemperer, 1995). The 
extant literature has found that in infinite horizon games, prices are likely to be 
raised by the presence of switching costs in equilibrium (Farrell and Shapiro 1988, 
Beggs and Klemperer 1992, Padilla 1995, and Anderson et al. 2004). Consequently, 
in the long-run equilibrium, firms are found to be more likely to harvest their 
existing customers than invest in their market share. Due to the lack of appropriate 
data, the empirical literature on switching costs is sparse and more recent. Only a 
small number of studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between 
switching costs and prices in equilibrium; for example, Stango (2002) for the credit 
card market and Shi et al. (2006) for the wireless telecommunication industry. 
These empirical studies have verified the presumption that switching costs make 
markets less competitive. Although switching costs have become a recognized 
issue in the banking markets around the world, in many countries, including Hong 
Kong, regulators have so far given them limited attention. There is no research on 
switching costs of Hong Kong market, until now. The present study is motivated 
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by the above empirical gaps in the extant literature. It intends to explore the 
magnitude of switching costs in Hong Kong bank loan market.  
 
1.3 Research question 
The general purpose of this thesis is to shed some light on bank competition in 
Hong Kong. In this thesis I estimate the significance and magnitude of switching 
costs, the degree of bank collusion, and the level of competition in Hong Kong 
banking sector. I classify the research questions into three groups, according to the 
three empirical chapters (Chapter 3, 4 and 5). The main questions addressed in the 
thesis are as follows: 
1. What are the significance and magnitude of switching costs in the Hong 
Kong bank loan market? What are the impacts of switching costs on price? 
Do switching costs make markets less competitive in the sense that prices 
are higher with switching costs than without, as found in the theoretical 
literature? Are there any differences in the magnitude of switching costs 
during the good times and bad times?  
2. Is there any evidence of collusion between banks in Hong Kong bank loan 
market?  
3. How competitive are Hong Kong’s banks? Do switching costs influence 
bank competition in Hong Kong? If so, what is the relationship between 
them? 
In recent years, only a limited number of empirical studies have investigated these 
issues using data from Hong Kong. Some empirical studies focus on the 
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competitive condition of Hong Kong banking sector using the Panzar-Rosse (1987) 
approach, such as Jiang et al. (2004), Wong et al. (2006) and Chu et al. (2013). 
Other papers have attempted to infer the degree of market competition based on 
the conjectural variation approach, which was introduced by Iwata (1974), 
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982); for example, Wong et al. (2007).  Overall, their 
findings suggest that the Hong Kong banking sector remains highly competitive 
with no significant sign of collusion on pricing. However, no empirical studies 
have been carried out to estimate the significance and magnitude of switching costs. 
 
1.4 Contribution of this thesis  
In order to provide answers to the aforementioned research  questions, this thesis 
investigates a database consisting of an unbalanced panel of annual observations 
for the Hong Kong banking industry, spanning 16 years from 1997 to 2012. The 
sample covers 18 licensed banks in Hong Kong in that period. It is expected that 
this thesis can contribute to the extant literature in several ways.  
Firstly, the main contribution of this thesis is to fill several gaps in the empirical 
literature. This thesis identifies the switching costs in the Hong Kong bank loan 
market based on a model developed by Kim et al. (2003). This model is the only 
structural model available for econometric estimation of the magnitude and 
significance of switching costs that uses an aggregated panel data that does not 
contain customer-specific information. Overall, the point estimates of switching 
costs based on the entire sample are statistically significant. The effect of the 
             
13 
 
existence of switching costs is equivalent to a rise in the price-cost margin by 
52bps. In terms of size of loans, using the total loans of the whole sample in 2012 
for calculation, the existence of switching costs decreases the total loans by about 
26,512.52 HKD million7. The results also show that the magnitude of estimated 
switching costs during the bad times is slightly higher than that in good times. 
Chapters 4 and 5 contribute to the literature by extending the limited number of 
studies analysing the degree of collusion and competitive condition in the Hong 
Kong banking sector. This thesis also extends the sample period from 1997 to 2012, 
which includes the year 2008, when the global financial crisis happened. Chapter 
4 measures the degree of collusion and the nature of the competitive conditions in 
the Hong Kong bank loan market using the conjectural variation approach. 
According to the results of Chapter 4, Hong Kong remains competitive even after 
handover, there is no significant evidence of collusion on pricing during the period 
1997 to 2012. Using the Panzar-Rosse approach, the results of Chapter 5 suggest 
that Hong Kong bank market can be characterized as monopolistic competition 
and the level of competition in the loan market is higher than competition level of 
the bank financial services market.   
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the literature by improving the empirical 
models and estimation approaches. In general, two innovations in this thesis are 
worth mentioning.  The first one is the application of system estimation using both 
non-linear three-stage least squares (3SLS) and generalized method of moments 
                                                          
7 According to the results of Chapter 4, the own price elasticity,𝜑1, is negative and significant at -
1.0778 using non-linear 3SLS approach. Therefore the changes of aggregate loans can be calculated 
as 0.0052*(-1.0778) which is about -0.56%. Since the total loans of the whole sample is 4,730,545 
HKD million in 2012. Then, the existence of switching costs decreases the total loans by 
4,730,545*(-0.56%), which is about 26,512.62 HKD million. 
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(GMM) approaches for estimating the conjectural variation parameter, as shown 
in Chapter 4. This system contains a log demand function, a trans-log cost system 
including share equations, and a pricing equation. Most previous studies based on 
the conjectural variation approach do not employ the share equations in the system. 
Furthermore, Chapter 4 follows a non-linear 3SLS and GMM system estimation 
instead of applying the single-equation methods. The 3SLS estimator combines 
two stage least squared (2SLS) with seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) by 
taking account of the residual correlations between equations. Therefore, the 
estimator is asymptotically more efficient than other single equation estimators. 
The system GMM estimator is used as a robustness test.  
    The second methodological innovation is related to the Panzar-Rosse (P-R) 
approach, which has been applied to estimate the competitive condition in Hong 
Kong banking sector in Chapter 5. Due to the residuals correlation between 
revenue equation and equilibrium condition equation, I estimate the P-R model as 
a system using the SUR approach. Previous studies that were based on a single-
equation estimation did not take account of the residual correlations between 
equations.  
Thirdly, from the policy aspect, this thesis studies switching costs and 
competitive conditions in the banking sector in Hong Kong, providing insight into 
the current operating environment and overall effects of financial reform measures 
in Hong Kong. The empirical results may help policymakers to understand the 
evolution of the competitive condition, including the financial crisis period, in the 
banking sector in Hong Kong.  
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1.5 Outline of this thesis 
This thesis is structured into six chapters, which consists of an overview of Hong 
Kong banking industry in Chapter 2, and three separate empirical chapters related 
to the three different topics: switching costs, collusion, and competition, in 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively. All of the empirical chapters are self-contained. 
Each empirical chapter contains its own literature view. Below, I discuss the 
structure of my thesis in more detail. 
    Chapter 2 gives a very brief overview to the Hong Kong banking industry, 
especially after 1997. Although Hong Kong’s economy and banking system have 
remained in good health, they have not been totally immune to the Asian financial 
crisis and the global financial crisis. This chapter introduces the current state of 
Hong Kong banking industry in terms of the main regulatory and advisory bodies, 
the current structure of banking system, the market concentration, and the linked 
exchange rate system in Hong Kong. It also discusses how the banking system has 
development after the Asian and global financial crisis, and the policy responses 
that followed it. In addition, it presents the macroeconomic environment in Hong 
Kong after 1997.  
Chapter 3 estimates the significance and the magnitude of switching costs in 
Hong Kong’s bank loan market. It uses the model presented by Kim et al. (2003), 
which is a structural model, including: a first order condition for maximization 
banks’ present value, a market share equation, and a trans-log cost system. Both 
non-linear 3SLS and GMM approaches are applied to estimate the model. My 
findings suggest that switching costs are significant in the Hong Kong bank loans 
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market. The average point estimate of switching costs based on an entire sample is 
0.1947. The existence of switching costs increases the price-cost margin by 0.52% 
(52bps), which is approximately 8.26%8 of the average interest rate on the loans’ 
value. This provides empirical evidence that switching costs make the market less 
competitive in the sense that the prices are higher with switching costs than without. 
I also compare the magnitude of switching costs during good times and bad times, 
and find that the estimated switching costs are higher during the bad times due to 
the “Lemons Problem”. Furthermore, the GMM approach is applied to test the 
robustness of major findings. 
Chapter 4 examines the degree of collusion and competition in the Hong Kong 
banking sector based on the conjectural variation approach, which was established 
on the belief that rival banks may react if a bank varies its own output or price, this 
approach was introduced by Iwata (1974), Bresnhan (1982) and Lau (1982). The 
empirical model contains a log demand function, a trans-log cost system, and 
pricing equations follows Coccorese (2005). The system is jointly estimated using 
non-linear 3SLS and GMM approaches. The empirical results suggest that banks 
in Hong Kong operated in a competitive fashion in the loan market and this 
behaviour is coherent with a Nash- Bertrand equilibrium in prices, which is 
consistent with the previous literature, and there is no significant evidence of 
collusion on pricing.   
                                                          
8 The average interest rate on loans of my sample is equal to 6.30%, the details of how to calculate 
interest rate on loans are discussed in section 3.3.4.1 of Chapter 3. The number 8.26% is obtained 
by using 0.52% divided by 6.30%.   
             
17 
 
Chapter 5 investigates competition in Hong Kong banking market using P-R 
approach. The revenue equation and equilibrium condition equation are jointly 
estimated using a SUR approach. My findings suggest that the Hong Kong bank 
market can be considered as monopolistic competition. These results are consistent 
with those of the previous studies. Furthermore, the competitive condition of 
interest and non-interest market is estimated. By estimating the model for a six 
years rolling sample, the time evolution of competition for interest and non-interest 
market is presented. In addition, the relationship between switching costs and 
competition is discussed in this chapter.  
Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings of this thesis and discusses its policy 
implications. It also identifies some limitations of this study and makes 
suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Crisis and Responses: The Story of 
Hong Kong Banking Industry after 
1997 
2.1 Introduction 
Hong Kong, officially known as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People’s Republic of China, is located in the extreme southeast of China and 
is surrounded by the Pearl River Delta and South China Sea (Census and Statistics 
Department, 2007). After the First Opium War (1839-42), Hong Kong became a 
colony of the British Empire for nearly 155 years - it reverted to Chinese 
sovereignty on 1 July 1997. Under the principle of ‘one country, two systems’,9 
the city retains its own capitalist economic and political systems and enjoys a “high 
degree of autonomy” in all areas, except defence and foreign affairs (Basic Law: 
Chapter II, 1997). Since 1997, China has become Hong Kong’s largest trading 
                                                          
9 ‘One country, two systems’ is a policy originally proposed by Deng Xiaoping, the Paramount 
Leader of the People’s Republic of China, for the reunification of China during the early 1980s. 
He suggested that where would be only one China, but areas such as Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan could have their own capitalist economic and political systems, while the rest of China uses 
the socialist system. 
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partner. Its share of Hong Kong’s global trade has increased significantly from 9.3% 
in 1978 to 51.1% (HKD 3,891.4 billion or USD 501.7 billion) in 2013.10 
Hong Kong is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. At mid-
2012, the population of Hong Kong was 7.15 million11 (Census and Statistics 
Department, 2013) but the land area is only 1104 square kilometres (Census and 
Statistics Department, 2007). As a result, crowded Hong Kong has extremely high 
house prices. A large number of foreigners also live in Hong Kong, including 
Indonesians, Filipinos, and Americans.12 
In order to set the stage for the later empirical research, this chapter gives a brief 
introduction to the Hong Kong banking industry. Section 2.2 describes the current 
state of Hong Kong banking industry. Section 2.3 shows how the banking system 
has development after the Asia financial crisis and the policy responses that 
followed it. Section 2.4 gives an overview of macroeconomic environment in 
Hong Kong. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.   
 
2.2 The current state of the Hong Kong banking 
industry 
Hong Kong is one of the most important international financial centres in the world. 
The banking industry is an essential ingredient of the financial system of Hong 
                                                          
10 Data source: The Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong.  
11 This number is including 6.94 million Usual Residents and 0.22 million Mobile Residents. 
12 These are the three largest foreign groups in Hong Kong. In mid-2012, the population number 
of these three groups was 164,850, 160,850 and 28,290, respectively (Census and Statistics 
Department, 2013). 
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Kong. This section introduces the main regulatory and advisory bodies in the Hong 
Kong banking industry, the current structure of the Hong Kong banking system, 
the bank consolidation in Hong Kong, the degree of market concentration in Hong 
Kong banking sector, and the linked exchange rate system.  
 
2.2.1 The main regulatory and advisory bodies in Hong 
Kong 
2.2.1.1 Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) 
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) was established on 1 April 1993 by 
merging the offices of the Commissioner of Banking and the Exchange Fund. 
Although there is no central bank in Hong Kong, the HKMA is almost regarded as 
the central bank in Hong Kong and it reports directly to the Financial Secretary.  
The main responsibility of the HKMA is to maintain the stability of both the Hong 
Kong dollar (HKD) and the banking system. Its major functions can be divided 
into several aspects. Firstly, maintaining the stability of HKD under the Linked-
Exchange Rate system, which will be elaborated later. Secondly, directly 
supervising the three-tier financial system and also monitoring the operations of 
the banking industry. Banking licences are granted by the HKMA and authorized 
banks are required to submit monthly statements showing assets and liabilities to 
the HKMA. Thirdly, helping to maintain the status of Hong Kong as an 
international financial centre by the maintenance and development of the financial 
infrastructure. Lastly, managing the Exchange Fund.  
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2.2.1.2 Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) 
According to The Hong Kong Association of Banks Ordinance in 1981, the Hong 
Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) was established to replace the Exchange 
Banks’s Association. In contrast to the bank associations in many countries, all of 
the licensed banks in Hong Kong are required to join as part of the conditions for 
granting a bank license. The major roles of the HKAB can be described as follows. 
First, HKAB stands for the interests of fully licensed banks in Hong Kong and it 
makes rules for the conduct of banking business after consulting with the 
government. Second, HKAB acts as an advisory body to its members in matters 
concerning the business of banking. Thirdly, HKAB provides a sounding-board 
for the government and other relevant bodies on banking issues. Fourthly, HKAB 
binds on all member banks by offering a channel of communication. Fifthly, 
HKAB provides information services, such as issuing circulars. Lastly, HKAB 
also organises conferences on topical issues in banking.  
 
2.2.1.3 Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau (FSTB) 
The Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau (FSTB) is a part of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region government. It was created on 1 July 2002 by 
merging the Financial Services Bureau and Finance Bureau. The major 
responsibilities of the FSTB are to develop and execute government policy on 
finance and treasury to maintain an appropriate economic and legal environment 
for Hong Kong. It also provides a full range of advisory and administrative support 
to the government in relation to financial markets.  
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In addition to these three major bodies, there are also some other regulatory and 
advisory bodies in Hong Kong. For example, The DTC Association13, which was 
established in 1981 under the Companies Ordinance, has the objective of 
promoting the general interests of restricted lice banks and deposit-taking 
companies. 
 
2.2.2 The current structure of banking system and bank 
consolidations 
The banking system in Hong Kong is characterized by its 3-tier system of    
deposit-taking institutions made up of licensed banks, restricted licensed banks, 
and deposit-taking companies. Table 2.1 shows the difference between these three 
authorised institutions. As of February 2014, there are 157 licensed banks, 21 
restricted license banks, 23 deposit-taking companies, and 62 local representative 
offices of overseas banks in Hong Kong. A wide range of wholesale and retail 
banking services are provided by these authorised institutions under the control of 
the HKMA.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 The Hong Kong Association of Restricted Licence Banks and Deposit-taking Companies. 
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Table 2.1 Business scope of authorized institutions in Hong Kong 
Authorized Institution 
 
Business Scope  
Licensed Banks Operate current and savings accounts  
Accept any size and maturity deposits from public 
Pay or collect cheques  
Restricted Licence 
Banks 
Take deposits of any maturity of HKD 500,000 and 
above 
Deposit-taking 
Companies 
Consumer finance 
Securities business 
Take deposits of HKD 100,000 or above with an 
original term of maturity of at least three months  
 
Information source: HKMA 
The number of banks in the market is the simplest measure of market concentration. 
As can be seen from Figure 2.1, the numbers of these three authorized institutions 
have declined in the past few years. In 1997, there were 180 licensed banks, 66 
restricted licence banks, and 115 deposit-taking companies in Hong Kong. But in 
2014, the numbers of licensed banks, restricted licence banks, and deposits-taking 
companies decreased to 157, 21 and 23, respectively. The decline in the number 
of authorized institutions is mainly due to bank consolidations in Hong Kong. 
Table 2.2 summarises the major mergers and acquisitions activities taken place in 
Hong Kong after 1997. It can be seen from the table that the Hong Kong banking 
sector has experienced a high level of merger and acquisition activities after 2000. 
Some representative deals include the consolidation of the ten banks in Hong Kong 
that originally belonged to the Bank of China Group into the Bank of China (Hong 
Kong) in 2001 while the China Merchants Bank became the largest shareholder of 
Wing Lung Bank in 2008, and then acquired the remaining shares in 2009. It is 
generally believed that cost savings and revenue enhancement are significant 
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reasons for mergers and acquisitions (Fröhlich and Kavan 2000). Bank 
consolidations can lead to cost reductions for the reasons of economies of scale, 
economies of scope, improving efficient resources allocation, tax reduction. It can 
also increase revenues through increasing size and increasing product 
diversification (Bank of International Settlements, 2010). It would seem that the 
3-tier banking system resulted in the survival of the fittest in the banking industry. 
Although the large deposit-taking companies upgraded to restricted licence banks, 
the small companies that had a low anti-risk capacity were eliminated. Thus, the 
benefits of depositors can be protected. The 3-tier banking system plays an active 
role in developing the banking industry and it helps Hong Kong to maintain its 
status as an international financial centre.  
Figure 2.1 The changes in the number of authorized institutions in Hong 
Kong from 1997-2014 
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Table 2.2 Major consolidations in Hong Kong banking industry  
after 1997 
 
Information Source: HKMA 
                                                          
14 Bank of China (Hong Kong) combined the businesses of ten of the twelve banks in Hong Kong 
originally under the Bank of China (BOC) Group including Bank of China (Hong Kong), 
Kwangtung Provincial Bank, Sin Hua Bank Limited, China & South Sea Bank Limited, Kincheng 
Banking Corporation, Chia State Bank Limited, National Commercial Bank Limited, Yien Yieh 
Commercial Bank Limited, Hua Chiao Commercial Bank Limited and Po Sang Bank Limited.  
Year Bank Consolidation 
 
2000 1. The Bank of East Asia acquired the First Pacific Bank. 
2. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) acquired Union 
Bank of Hong Kong. 
3. Standard Chartered Bank acquired Chase Manhattan’s retail banking 
and credit card business  
2001 1. The Bank of East Asia merged with United Chinese Bank. 
2. The Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) acquired Dao Heng Bank 
and its subsidiary Overseas Trust Bank.  
3. The merger of ten member banks of Bank of China (BOC) Group14.  
2002 1. CITIC Ka Wah Bank acquired Hong Kong Chinese Bank and became 
a whole-owned subsidiary of CITIC International Financial Holdings.  
2003 1. DBS Bank merged Dao Heng Bank, DBS Kwong On Bank and 
Overseas Trust Bank to form DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited. 
2004 1. Wing Hang Bank merged with Chekiang First Bank. 
2. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) acquired the retail 
banking business of Fortis Bank Asia (Hong Kong). 
3. Hang Seng Bank acquired Industrial Bank. 
2006 1. China Construction Bank (Asia) acquired Bank of America.  
2. Public Financial Holdings Limited acquired Public Bank (Hong Kong) 
Limited.  
2007 1. Wing Hang Bank acquired Inchroy Credit Corporation, a financial 
institution engaged in the hire purchase and the lease financing 
business. 
2. Dah Sing Bank acquired Chongqing Commercial Bank. 
2009 1. China Merchants Bank acquired Wing Lung Bank. 
2. Fubon Bank acquired Xiamen City Commercial Bank. 
2013 1. Yuxiu Group acquired Chong Hing Bank. 
2014 1. Singapore’s Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation acquired Wing 
Hang Bank.  
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2.2.3 Market concentration in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong has one of the highest concentrations of banking institutions in the 
world. Reflecting this, Figure 2.2 describes the trend of 3-bank concentration 
ratio15 and 5-bank concentration ratio of Hong Kong, as calculated by the World 
Bank, over the period from 1997 to 2011.  The five largest banks in Hong Kong 
measured by total assets in 2011 are Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation Limited (HSBC), Bank of China (Hong Kong), Hang Seng Bank, 
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) and the Bank of East Asia.16 The 3-bank 
concentration ratio of Hong Kong was at 72.15% in 2011 and the 5-bank 
concentration is also high at 81.39% in 2011. Furthermore, according to the half-
yearly monetary and financial stability report of HKMA in 2006, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of Hong Kong banking sector is around 0.14 in 2005. The 
HHI of 18 licenced banks in Hong Kong calculated in Chapter 1 (p.9) also shows 
evidence of a relatively high degree of market concentration in Hong Kong.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 The k-bank concentration ratio is defined as the sum of the market shares measured by total 
assets of the k largest banks in the market.  
16 Data source: Bankscope. 
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Figure 2.2 K-bank concentration ratios from 1997 to 2011 
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2.2.4 Linked exchange rate system 
Hong Kong is one of the few places in the world implementing a linked exchange 
rate system. This type of exchange rate regime, which is in essence a Currency 
Board system, links the exchange rate of a currency to another. In contrast to a 
fixed exchange rate system that simply fixes a currency’s value against another, 
the government or central bank does not interfere in the foreign exchange market 
through monetary policies in order to affect the exchange rate. If the exchange rate 
begins to shift from the fixed ratio, then banknotes will be issued or taken out of 
circulation to bring the ratio back. However, new banknotes can only be issued 
when an equivalent value reserve in the linked currency are deposited into the 
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central bank. The Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the US dollar at an internal fixed 
rate of HKD 7.8 = USD 1.    
Several different types of exchange rates systems have been implemented in 
Hong Kong from 1863 until the present day. Table 2.3 summaries the history 
regarding Hong Kong’s exchange rate systems. The floating exchange rate regime 
raises investor’s risks and costs, which does not suit Hong Kong’s economy.   
Table 2.3 The history of exchange rate systems for the HKD 
 
 
Date  Exchange rate regime Reference rate 
1863- 4 November 1935 Silver Standard Silver dollars as legal 
tender 
December,1935-November 
1967 
Link to Sterling HKD16=GBP1 
November 1967-June 1972 Link to Sterling HKD14.55=GBP1 
6 July 1972-13 February 
1973 
Link to the US dollar with 
plus or minus 2.25% 
intervention bands around 
a central rate 
HKD5.65=USD1 
14 February 1973-24 
November 1974 
Link to US dollar  HKD5.085=USD1 
25 November 1974-16 
October 1983 
Free Float Exchange rates on 
selected dates 
HKD4.965=USD1  
(25 November 1974) 
HKD9.600=USD1 
(24 September 1983) 
17 October 1983-Now Link to the US dollar HKD7.80=USD1 
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Since the linked exchange rate system was implemented in 1983, Hong Kong’s 
markets have fluctuated many times, such as during the Asian financial crisis of 
1997 and the US subprime crisis of 2008. However, this exchange rate system has 
constantly operated smoothly, mainly because of the highly standard of market 
transparency and the public confidence that has persuaded the Hong Kong 
government to insist on this system. Hong Kong’s economy is highly externally 
oriented and prudent fiscal policies are applied by the Hong Kong government. 
The linked exchange rate system suits Hong Kong’s economic conditions. The 
banking system is strong and solvent, and it has the ability to deal with fluctuations 
in interest rates. In addition, Hong Kong has large foreign currency reserves. 
According to the statistics from HKMA, as of September 2013, Hong Kong’s 
foreign currency reserves (in convertible foreign currencies) had reached 
US$293,134 million. These large reserves were used to support the peg to the USD.  
 
2.3 The development of Hong Kong’s banking 
System after 1997 
Hong Kong’s banking industry can trace its history back to 1845. The Oriental 
Bank Corporation, which had its headquarters in London, became Hong Kong’s 
first bank and it was the first bank to issue banknotes in Hong Kong. In 1865, The 
HSBC was established in Hong Kong to finance the growing trade between Europe, 
India, and China. It became the first registered bank that was incorporated locally 
in Hong Kong and it was authorised to issue banknotes for Hong Kong in 1866. 
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HSBC is still one of the three commercial banks that are authorised to issue 
currency notes in Hong Kong. The other two are the Bank of China (Hong Kong) 
and the Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong). After over 100 years of 
development, Hong Kong has now become one of the most important international 
financial centres in the world. This section provides a brief account of the 
development of the Hong Kong banking sector following the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997 to 1998. It also discusses the policy responses to the crisis.  
 
2.3.1 Hong Kong’s banking industry after 1997 
In July 1997, the Asian financial crisis erupted in Thailand. This financial storm 
quickly swept through many Asian counties, including Malaysia, Singapore, Japan 
and South Korea. The Asian financial crisis almost paralyzed Asian economy and 
the banking systems in many Asian countries suffered catastrophic failure mainly 
because of the lack of supervision and regulation. The banks in these countries had 
granted excessive loans to risky projects, such as real estate lending that had poorly 
supervised the background of the borrowers. Therefore, the big drop of prices of 
property and stocks due to the Asian financial crisis led to the insolvency of many 
borrowers and the banks in turn faced a liquidity crisis.  
    Hong Kong was less affected during the crisis, mainly because the Hong Kong 
banking industry has a sound risk control and legal system. Hong Kong’s banks 
are well regulated; for example, the amount of assets in property should be less 
than 40% of total assets. Furthermore, the capital adequacy ratio of banks in Hong 
Kong is around 18%, which is much higher than the international requirement.  
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Although Hong Kong’s banking industry escaped disaster, they still had a 
difficult time during and after the Asian financial crisis. The economic imbalance 
problem was revealed during the crisis, especially in 1997. The property market 
expanded rapidly because of the growing public confidence in Hong Kong 
following the handover of sovereignty. In 1997, the average growth rate of 
property prices in Hong Kong reached to 48%. The main reason of asset price 
inflation was the increasing level of bank loans. In addition, the stock market 
became increasingly volatile. Figure 2.3 shows the Hang Seng Index in the Hong 
Kong stock market for the period 1997 to 2012. On 7 August 1997, the Hang Seng 
Stock Market Index reached a high of 16,820 points. Obviously, the soaring asset 
price and the explosion of bank loans could not be sustained. In late October 1997, 
Hong Kong’s stock market crashed, mainly due to high selling pressure from 
foreign funds and high interest rates. Between 20 and 23 October 1997, the Hang 
Seng Index dropped by 23%. The HKMA had to intervene in the market to protect 
the currency. In late January 1998, affected by a sharp depreciation of the 
Indonesian rupiah, the Hang Seng Index fell to a further low of 7,904 points. It 
then dropped again to 6,600 points on 13 August 1998. The stock market crash 
became an enormous drag on the property market. In May 1998 house prices in 
Hong Kong had decreased by 35% compared with the market high in 1997. Bank 
profits then declined significantly because of the drastic fall in the demand for 
loans. Therefore, the banks needed to cut their expenses and they tried to find new 
sources of income other than lending. Consequently, many banks expanded their 
services into insurance, financial products, etc. After the Asian financial crisis, the 
Hong Kong stock market also faced some other challenges, including the bursting 
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of the dot.com bubble in 2000, SARS in 2003 and, more recently, the global 
financial crisis that happened during 2007 to 2008. It can be seen from the Figure 
2.3 that in 2007 the Hang Seng index closed the year at 27,519 points but in 
November 2008 the index decreased by about 54% to 12,659 points.  
Figure 2.3 Hang Seng Index (Weekly, Close price), 1997 to 2012 
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Data Source: Bloomberg 
 
2.3.1.1 Major indicators of the balance sheet 
Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 provide some balance sheet details regarding retail banks 
in Hong Kong from 1997 to 2012. It can be seen from the figures, the Asian 
financial crisis and the global financial crisis has a certain impacts on the retail 
banks in Hong Kong. According to Figure 2.5, following the Asian financial crisis, 
the total loans to customers in the retail market declined slightly after 1997, 
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reaching a figure of HKD 1,369 billion17 (USD 177 billion) in 2003. However, the 
total assets and the total deposits from customers increased steadily during 1997 
to 2003. This was mainly due to the attraction from high domestic interbank and 
deposit rates. This led to an increase of funding costs and a decrease of interest 
margins. After 2003, all of the indicators revealed a trend of fast increase. In 2012, 
the total assets of retail banks in the Hong Kong banking industry amounted to 
HKD 8,774 billion18 (USD 1132 billion ), the total deposits of retail banks in Hong 
Kong banking industry peaked at HKD 6623 billion (USD 854 billion), and the 
total loans of retail banks reached to HKD 3,632 billion (USD 469 billion). The 
rise in these numbers show that in recent years the Hong Kong banking industry 
has grown steadily under the 3-tier banking system. It also seems that the global 
financial crisis of 2007 to 2008 has had a limited impact on Hong Kong’s retail 
banks market.    
Interest-generating activities have been traditional in Hong Kong’s commercial 
banking sector for many years. Not surprisingly, most banks still rely mainly on 
income from traditional banking. Hong Kong banks invest relatively more in loans 
and less in securities. Take HSBC as an example, the ratio of net loans to total 
earning assets was 60.29% in 1997. Although this ratio decreased to 46.47% in 
2012, compare with the ratio of net fees and commission to total earning assets 
which was 0.89%, this ratio is much higher. In addition, except HSBC, Standard 
                                                          
17  1 HKD= 0.1290 USD. Data source: Bloomberg. Date: 4 June 2014. This exchange rate is used 
in the whole thesis.  
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Chartered, Shanghai Commercial and Fubon, the ratios of net loans to total earning 
assets of the other banks in the sample were higher than 50% in 2012.   
Figure 2.4 Total assets of retail banks, 1997 to 2012 (HKD billion) 
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Figure 2.5 Loans to customers of retail banks, 1997 to 2012 (HKD billion) 
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Figure 2.6 Deposits from customers of retail banks,  
1997 to 2012 (HKD billion) 
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2.3.2 Policy responses after the Asian financial crisis  
Hong Kong’s banking system has been undergoing major reforms following the 
Asian financial crisis, with the aim of increasing banking sector competition and 
improving safety and soundness of the banking system. In the light of the 1998 
Banking Sector Consultancy Study undertaken by KPMG and Barents, a Bank 
Sector Reform Programme has been undertaken by the HKMA since 1999. In 
particular, a package of policies were implemented in Hong Kong. In order to 
encourage market liberalisation and enhance market competition in Hong Kong’s 
banking sector, a two-phase plan to deregulate the Interest Rate Rules (IRRs) was 
announced by HKMA in 1999. The IRRs was established by Hong Kong Exchange 
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Banks Association19 in July 1964. This is a cartel type agreement between the 
banks, which prescribes the maximum rate of interests offered on certain Hong 
Kong dollar deposits. The IRRs are only applied to licensed banks in Hong Kong. 
Deposit-taking companies and restricted banks are subject to stricter rules on 
receiving deposits from the public. After the IRRs were abolished in 2001, banks 
in Hong Kong are allowed to set any interest rates on deposits so that they can 
compete and the interest rates on deposits are determined by competitive market 
forces.  
In order to provide a level playing field for all banks, the HKMA removed the 
restrictions on the numbers of branches and offices for foreign banks in 2001. In 
1999, this policy was partially relaxed by allowing foreign banks to open up to 
three branches instead of one. From 2001, there have been no restrictions on the 
number of branches and offices for foreign banks.  
For the purpose of settling Clearing House Automated Transfer System 
(CHATS) payments, restricted licence banks have been allowed to access the Real 
Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system since 1999. The RTGS system was 
introduced in 1996, and it ensures the safe and efficient settlement of interbank 
payments in the Hong Kong dollar. It also conducts payments arising from the 
HKMA’s monetary operations.   
    Since 2002, HKMA has also relaxed some of the market entry criteria, including 
reducing the asset size criteria for overseas-incorporated banks, and shortening the 
requisite period of locally restricted licensed banks and deposit-taking companies 
                                                          
19 Currently known as the Hong Kong Association of Banks. 
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to upgrade to licensed bank status. In 2012, the HKMA and the Treasury Bureau 
revised the Banking Ordinance again to update certain market entry criteria for 
Hong Kong’s banking sector. The amendments removed the restrictions on 
applying for a bank license which stated that a bank licence must have total 
customer deposits of not less than HKD 3 billion and total assets of not less than 
HKD 4 billion. They also removed the restrictions on foreign banks who entered 
the market through establishing a locally incorporated subsidiary.  
 
2.4 Hong Kong’s Economy 
Hong Kong has the most competitive economy in Asia. It is a free market economy 
that is highly dependent on international trade and service sector. The traditional 
four key industries in Hong Kong are financial services, trading and logistics, 
tourism, and professional and producer services. These four industries drive the 
development of other industries, creating job opportunities in Hong Kong.  
According to the data from Census and Statistics Department (C&SD), in 2012 the 
value of Hong Kong’s total merchandise trade was HKD 7,346.5 billion (USD 
947.7 billion), which was more than three times the GDP in that year. The value 
of imports and exports has reached HKD 3,912.2 billion (USD 504.7 billion) and 
HKD 3,434.3 billion (USD 443 billion), respectively. It is worth mentioning that 
Hong Kong ranked in the ninth place in the global trading economy in 2012.20  
Apart from trading, the services sector also plays an important role in the Hong 
                                                          
20 This ranking is worked out based on trade values.  
             
38 
 
Kong economy. It contributed to 93% of the GDP and 88% of total employment 
in 2012.21 In order to meet the challenges posed by the rapid development of 
science and technology, as well as the fierce competition among countries because 
of globalization, Hong Kong’s economy has shifted toward to high value-added 
economic activities that are focused on providing high value-added services and 
knowledge-based activities. At the same time, the increasing economic integration 
between Hong Kong and mainland China results in boundless business 
opportunities for Hong Kong’s service industry. These developments have led to 
the sustained and rapid growth of the services industry in Hong Kong over the 
years.  
Over the past two decades, the economy of Hong Kong has developed rapidly. 
The average annual GDP growth rate reached to 4.5% in real terms (Hong Kong 
Economic Analysis Division, 2014), which is better than most economies in the 
world. The Hong Kong dollar is the eighth most traded currency in the world (Bank 
of International Settlements, 2010). Furthermore, Hong Kong has the sixth largest 
foreign exchange market, the seventh largest banking centre in the world and also 
has the second largest stock exchange in Asia22. All of the above achievements are 
creditable to the “appropriately proactive” governance. Hong Kong’s government 
adopts “appropriately proactive”23 economic policies to create a level playing field. 
                                                          
21 Data source: C&SD, Hong Kong government. 
22 Until 28 February 2014, there were 1,660 listed companies in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 
744 of which are from Hong Kong, 812 from mainland China and 104 from other countries (HKEx, 
2014).  
23 In his 2013 policy address Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, Chunying Leung, indicated that in 
order to promote economic development, the Hong Kong government must be “appropriately 
proactive”. He believed when the market is functioning efficiently, the government could limit 
intervention, and would only take action to ensure a level playing field. But when the market fails, 
the government should make a difference to solve the problems.  
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These polices aim to strengthen the international standing and influence of Hong 
Kong as a regional headquarters and logistics, shipping, aviation and tourism hub. 
The government will also reinforce cooperation with other countries, invest in 
infrastructure, enhance human resource and improve people’s living standards.  
 
2.4.1 The Economic success of Hong Kong  
The stature of Hong Kong as a famous financial centre is built on its economic 
freedom, low taxation and strong legal and institutional frameworks to supervise 
financial institutions prudently.  
 
2.4.1.1 Economic freedom 
According to the Index of Economic Freedom, Hong Kong has been ranked the 
world’s freest economy for the 20th consecutive year since the index was first 
published in 1995 (Government of Hong Kong, 2012). Milton Friedman (1990) 
also described Hong Kong’s economy as ‘the best example of a free market 
economy’ in his book “Free to Choose: A Personal Statement”. An extremely 
important manifestation of this free enterprise system is the freedom of contract 
and the private ownership of property.  
Hong Kong’s government does no differentiate between local and foreign 
companies and welcomes both to invest in Hong Kong. Although the policy of 
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“positive non-interventionism”24 has not been applied since 2006, the Hong Kong 
government still allows market forces to determine economic development, only 
with prudential supervision. Furthermore, Hong Kong has been a free port since 
1841, which does not levy a customs tariff and has limited excise duties. This has 
allowed Hong Kong to become an ideal platform for doing business in Asia, 
especially for small-and medium-sized firms.  
 
2.4.1.2 Low taxation  
Due to the simple and low tax system in Hong Kong, a large number of investors 
are attracted to register companies in Hong Kong. The profits tax is around 16.5%, 
the salaries tax is set to a maximum of 15%, and the property tax is 15%.25 These 
are the only three direct taxes imposed by the government. Compared with the tax 
rates in mainland China, Hong Kong’s main taxes rates are approximately only 
half of the tax rates of mainland China26. Moreover, Hong Kong does not impose 
a sales tax or VAT. This low taxation policy has accelerated economic growth. In 
2011 and 2012, Hong Kong overtook the US and the UK and was at the top of the 
World Economic Forum’s Financial Development Index.  
 
                                                          
24 Positive non-interventionism was the economic policy of Hong Kong implemented by former 
Financial Secretary Sir John James Cowperthwaite. He recognized the free markets power and 
believes the economy was doing well in the absence of government intervention. But sometimes 
proper physical infrastructure and regulations are also important to market decision marking.  
25 Data source: C&SD, Hong Kong. 
26 Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 
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2.4.1.3 Strong legal and institutional frameworks 
One of the most important features of Hong Kong’s economy is its high standard 
of market transparency, stringent requirements of disclosure, and prudent 
supervision of its financial institutions.  The banking sector has maintained a 3-
tier banking system since 1990.  
Hong Kong is also the world’s premier offshore Renminbi (RMB) business 
centre. The RMB business in Hong Kong started in 2004 and Hong Kong was the 
first offshore market to launch a RMB business. Banks and other financial 
institutions in Hong Kong now offer various kinds of RMB services, including 
deposit-taking, currency exchange, wealth management and so on. Hong Kong is 
currently the largest offshore RMB centre in the world. In Hong Kong, the average 
daily settlement of RMB has reached 400 billion yuan, it holds 75% of the world’s 
overseas RMB reserves, and total RMB deposits (including CDs) have amounted 
to 1 trillion yuan (HKMA, 2013).   
 
2.4.2 Hong Kong’s major Economic Indicators 
Figures 2.7 to 2.11 show Hong Kong’s major economic indicators. The slowing 
down of the economy seems to be due to the Asian financial crisis. As is shown in 
the figures, in 1998 Hong Kong’s economy experienced a large contraction. Real 
GDP shrank, inflation rate rose, unemployment increased, foreign currency assets 
decreased. After a short-lived recovery in 1999 and 2000, the real GDP growth 
rate fluctuated during 2001 to 2003: it was -0.6% in 2001Q4 and 6.1% in 2003Q3. 
The unemployment rate peaked at 7.9% in 2003 and it has been tending towards 
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stability in the recent years. After the Asian financial crisis, deflation continued 
from 1999 to 2004. Under the linked exchange rate system, the HKD cannot be 
devalued. Hence, deflation can be used as an adjustment mechanism when the 
currency is overvalued. Compared with the other Asian countries, the value of 
HKD became relatively stronger after the financial crisis. This reduced the level 
of Hong Kong’s exports. Consequently, prices had to be reduced in order to deal 
with this problem and soon wages also had to be cut. This caused a process of 
deflation, which will continue until prices and wages have fallen enough to make 
Hong Kong’s goods competitive again. Following great efforts by the HKMA, the 
foreign currency reserve assets in Hong Kong have maintained a momentum of 
fairly rapid growth, except for the year 1998. Hong Kong’s economy has also been 
hit by the global financial crisis. It can be seen from Figure 2.7 that, affected by 
the global financial crisis, the real GDP growth rate in Hong Kong fell from late 
2007, and the recovery began in 2009 Q3. According to Figure 2.8, the 
unemployment rate has a sharply increase from 3.6% in 2008 to 5.4% in 2009, and 
then reduced to 4.4% in 2010, which is lower than its level of 2005.   
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Figure 2.7 Real GDP growth rate (quarterly, %), 1997 to 2012 
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Figure 2.8 Unemployment rate (annual average, %), 1997 to 2012 
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Figure 2.9 Inflation rate (annual average, %), 1997 to 2012 
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Data Source: HKMA Annual Reports 
Figure 2.10 Foreign currency reserve assets (USD billion) 1997 to 2012 
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2.4.3 Hong Kong banking industry 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 describe the characteristic details of the Hong Kong banking 
industry using the collected data covers 18 licensed banks incorporated in Hong 
Kong in that period from 1997 to 2012. Figure 2.11 plots the natural logarithm of 
bank loans in the whole market. Figure 2.12 describes the trend of average lending 
rates from 1997 to 2012. Figure 2.13 shows the trend of T-bill rate over the period 
from 1997 to 2012. Figure 2.14 presents the market shares of loans for each bank 
in that period. 
    According the Table 2.4 and Table 2.5, after a considerable decrease occurred 
in 1998, due to the Asia financial crisis, the banks’ main indicators (including the 
total bank loans, the average loans per banks, total assets per banks and total 
customer deposits per bank) increased year by year from 1998 to 2012.  
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Table 2.4 Industry characteristics (1997-2004) 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Bank loans (mil.HKD)27 1,610,277.00 1,506,405.00 1,440,907.00 1,475,913.00 1,512,044.00 1,580,907.00 1,863,394.00 1,913,231.00 
Loans per bank 
(mil.HKD) 
       
— Mean 101,042.10 66,966.56 64,094.79 82,050.71 84,002.46 87,828.18 103,521.30 106,290.60 
— std. dev. 1,69,667.10 116,813.60 110,141.70 120,310.80 122,843.00 128,745.30 149771.50 149,464.20 
Total Assets per bank 
(mil.HKD) 
       
— mean 196,836.00 135,653.30 145,522.70 197,994.80 195,616.20 204,613.60 237,844.40 257,790.50 
— std. dev. 343,807.00 259,409.00 283,645.90 343,234.10 338,983.70 355,330.30 403,677.40 439,199.70 
Deposits per bank 
(mil.HKD) 
       
— mean 152382.90 111002.80 118478.30 159286.10 157104.70 163425.70 192691.20 209559.20 
— std. dev. 252492.60 205150.60 222509.10 273231.60 270455.80 279970.40 310946.40 344842.50 
Average lending rate28 9.50 9.00 8.50 9.50 5.13 5.00 5.00 5.00 
T-bill rate(pct.) 6.43 7.29 5.36 5.93 3.29 1.62 0.75 0.26 
— Exchange fund bill rate 
(pct.) 
6.22 7.29 5.30 5.89 3.42 1.62 0.79 0.25 
 
 
                                                          
27 Because of the missing data, the bank loans for some banks in some years are forecasted. I use the real data of bank loans for the other years to calculate the 
growth rate. Then, the values of missing observations can be calculated based on the growth rate. For example, for Bank of China (Hong Kong), the data of 
banks loans is missing from 1997 to 1999. First bank loans growth rate is calculated at about -4.6% in 2001, and the 2000 net loans is HKD 321,080 mil., then 
the net loans of 1997 can be obtained as 321,080/ (1-4.6%) 3= 369,802.2 mil.HKD. Similar, 1998 and 1999 net loans can be calculated as 352,790.93 mil.HKD 
and 336,562.2 mil.HKD respectively.  
28 Data Source: IMF 
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Table 2.5 Industry characteristics (2005-2012) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bank loans (mil.HKD) 2,099,919.00 2,223,533.00 2,586,184.00 2,843,280.00 2,937,416.00 3,804,305.00 4,366,856.00 4,730,545.00 
Loans per bank 
(mil.HKD) 
       
— mean 116,662.20 123,529.60 143,676.90 157,960.00 163,189.80 211,350.30 242,603.10 262,808.10 
— std. dev. 163,652.60 169,413.10 185,425.80 204,250.80 197,925.90 264,092.40 303,589.30 332,068.00 
Total Assets per bank 
(mil.HKD) 
       
— mean 273,730.30 315,962.90 378,420.80 411,899.60 420,342.30 490,592.40 545,066.80 588,556.50 
— std. dev. 463,397.30 542,524.50 657,915.00 741,052.70 707,414.10 807,834.50 876,765.00 943,980.90 
Deposits per bank  
(mil.HKD) 
       
— mean 217344.70 248590.70 289306.30 306945.60 322516.60 377186.30 420049.90 452702.00 
— std. dev. 350639.10 402534.60 462545.00 484416.30 497028.80 570555.30 613047.80 661953.20 
Average lending rate 7.75 7.75 6.75 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
T-bill rate(pct.) 2.69 3.64 3.13 0.71 0.07 0.23 0.14 0.12 
Exchange fund bill rate 
(pct.) 
2.54 3.67 3.16 0.85 0.05 0.21 0.14 0.13 
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Figure 2.11 Bank loans 
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Figure 2.12 Average lending rate 
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Figure 2.13 T-bill rates 
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According to these figures, the shock wave from the Asian financial crisis still has 
an effect on the Hong Kong banking industry. The banks’ funding, liquidity, loans 
growth and profitability are all inevitably affected. As can be seen from Figure 
2.11, the bank loans show a trend of slightly declining over the period from 1997 
to 2000, it hit a bottom at HKD 1,440,907 mil. in 1999. After that, the economy 
began recovering, especially after the second half of 2009, the market growth rate 
of loans reached to 29.51% in 2010. This recovery was helped by significant and 
timely government stimulus programmes, supported mainly by private 
consumption, government investment and net exports.  As a result of improved 
customer confidence and labour market conditions, domestic demand strongly 
recovered in 2010. According to the statistics from HKMA, in 2010 the private 
consumption growth rate reached to 5.8% and the government consumption also 
             
50 
 
grew by 2.7%. Meanwhile, supported by strong economic performance in 
Mainland China and other emerging market economies, external demand also 
recovered in 2010, which is reflected by the growth of merchandise exports, 
exports of services and imports of goods and services. The conditions of the labour 
market also improved after 2009.  
    Under the linked exchange rate system, which was established in 1983, the 
Hong Kong dollar is pegged with the US dollar at an internal fixed rate of HKD 
7.80 = USD 1. Therefore, the US plays a dominant role in Hong Kong monetary 
conditions and the HKD interest rates should track closely those of the US. As 
shown in Figure 2.12, the average lending rate increased at 9.5% affected by the 
Asian financial crisis. The Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) is the 
benchmark rate is used for loans between banks. According to the statistics from 
HKMA, at the beginning of 1997, the 3-month HIBOR was 5.41% per annum. As 
the Asian financial crisis swept over the Hong Kong banking industry, the 3-month 
HIBOR continues to show an upward tendency, and rose to 10.49% in November 
1997. Although the rates fell to 9.25% in December 1997, the crisis in Indonesia 
pushed it up again to a new record at 11.51% in January 1998. As the result of the 
higher cost of funds, commercial banks had to raise the Best Lending Rates (BLR) 
twice at that time. After 1998, the average lending rate decreased steadily until 
2005. Over the period from the end of 2003 to 2005, owing to the dollar weakness 
while there was a strong economic recovery in Hong Kong, and also market 
speculation about revaluation of the RMB, huge amounts of hot money flocked 
into Hong Kong. Although the interest rates of HKD were below the USD interest 
rates for a long period, there was no evident outflow. As a result, the aggregate 
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balance expanded sharply, to a peak at about 55 billion HKD in early 2004, 
pushing HIBOR downward to almost zero. In May 2005, HKMA introduced the 
“Three Refinements” of the Hong Kong dollar Linked Exchange Rate System,29 
overseas hot money left Hong Kong quickly and the aggregate balance 
experienced a considerable reduction. HIBOR raised by 170 basis points (bps) to 
around 3% in two days. It is clear from Figure 2.12 that the average lending rate 
increased from 2005, along with the interest rates increase in the US. Since the 
subprime crisis broke in August 2007, an influx of hot money into Hong Kong has 
followed the Federal Reserve (Fed)’s quantitative easing policy. The lending rate 
then began to decline.  
Figure 2.14 Market shares measured by bank loans in 2012 
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29 The HKMA (2005) introduced the three refinements to the LERS on 18 May 2005: establishing 
a strong-side Convertibility Undertaking (CU) at HK$7.75/US$, shifting the week-side CU from 
HK$7.80/US$ to HK$7.85/US$, and creating a Convertibility Zone defined by CUs, with which 
the HKMA may conduct market operations consistent with Currency Board principles.  
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As can be seen from Figure 2.14, HSBC (Hong Kong) is the largest bank in the 
Hong Kong banking industry and it had the largest market share. The market share 
of HSBC (Hong Kong) has fluctuated over the years, it peaked at 32.69% in 1997 
and bottomed out at 25.62% in 2009. HSBC (Hong Kong) has an extensive branch 
and ATM network across Hong Kong. For the year 2012, it operates more than 
450 branches30 in Hong Kong. Bank of China ( Hong Kong), Hang Seng, , Bank 
of East Asia, Standard Chartered Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (Asia) Limited all have a good market share, which captures 17.32%, 
11.33% ,8.57% ,8.63% and 5.57%, respectively, in 2012. The other banks have a 
market share that is smaller than 5%, some are even smaller than 1%.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of Hong Kong’s banking sector, especially 
after 1997. Although the Hong Kong’s economy and banking system have 
remained in good health, they have not been totally immune to the Asian financial 
crisis and the global financial crisis.  Hong Kong’s banking system is already well 
regulated and competitive. The Bank Reform Programme undertaken by the 
HKMA may not have led to revolutionary changes in Hong Kong’s banking sector, 
but it has helped to improve market efficiency and competition. In addition, a large 
number of bank mergers and acquisitions activities have taken place in Hong Kong 
since 1997. Therefore, the research of bank competition issues, which include the 
                                                          
30 Data Source: HSBC (Hong Kong) Annual Reports 2012. 
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crisis period, appear to be important in the development of Hong Kong’s banking 
industry.    
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Chapter 3 
Switching Costs in the Hong Kong 
Banking Industry 
3.1 Introduction 
It is not uncommon to hear people complaining about their current service supplier. 
According to a report on banks’ brand performance and “switching”, which was 
undertaken by Industry (2013), a strategic brand consultancy, in 2013, 20% of 
bank customers in the UK are considering switching banks. These results are based 
on a survey of 2,017 bank customers from around the UK in 2013. Although many 
customers express a strong desire to switch, they have not put this desire into 
practice. The final report from Independent Banking Commission (IBC) in the UK, 
which was published in September 2011, reveals that in 2010 only 3.8% of bank 
customers changed bank accounts and, on average, personal account holders only 
switch banks every 26 years (Vickers, 2011). This is not the only evidence of low 
switching rates in the UK. Morgans (2010) finds that over 17% of current account 
consumers (equating to eight million people) in the UK have thought about 
switching bank accounts but only less than half (equating to 3.3 million people) 
have done so within the year 2009 and 2010. Why then did they not switch? Is it 
easy for them to switch?  
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One of the most important reasons for these persistently low switching rates is due 
to concerns about switching costs. These costs can be described as a barrier to a 
customer’s changing of suppliers. These barriers include financial costs and 
nonfinancial costs, such as time and psychological costs. Take the switching costs 
of mobile users who switch from iPhone to Samsung, for example. In this case, 
the financial costs include the price of a new mobile phone and the applications 
that they will use, while the nonfinancial costs include the time and effort spent on 
learning new mobile system. In many cases, consumers are forced to suffer these 
costs when switching from one provider of goods or services to another. Normally, 
different customers of the same firm suffer different switching costs, even when 
they have same switching decision (Kim et al., 2003). The existence of switching 
costs gives firms a degree of market power. Therefore, each firm faces a trade-off 
between increasing market share by charging low prices to attract new customers 
who will become repeat-purchasers in the future while gaining super-normal 
profits by charging high prices from locked-in customers (Klemperer, 1995). 
Firms often like to create switching costs to encourage customer loyalty. Switching 
costs also have an impact on new entry and they then influence the market’s 
competitiveness. 
    Like other industries, it has long been recognized that the existence of switching 
costs have a significant impact on the banking industry. For example, in the 
lending market switching costs weaken the substitutability of loans provided by 
different banks. The “lock-in” effect allows banks to price discriminate between 
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new and old customers (Klemperer, 1995). It also enables incumbent banks to gain 
superiority over their competitors in terms of information. It is interesting to note 
that the attitudes of banks towards the magnitude of switching costs are conflicted. 
They wish to offer lower switching costs because customers from their competitors 
can easily switch to them. Meanwhile, they also want higher switching costs 
because they wish to “lock-in” existing customers (Matthews, 2013). Therefore, it 
is meaningful to test the significance and estimate the magnitude of switching costs 
in order to help banks lock in customers. 
Compared with the theoretical literature, the empirical literature on switching 
costs is sparse and more recent, mainly due to the lack of appropriate data. There 
are only a limited number of empirical studies on the measurement of switching 
costs. Kim et al. (2003) provides the only structural model available for 
econometric estimation concerns to the magnitude and significance of switching 
costs, which used an aggregated panel data that does not contain customer-specific 
information. However, there is no evidence of the significance or magnitude of 
switching costs in Hong Kong market. 
In this chapter, in order to fill the gap in empirical work, a study of the switching 
costs in Hong Kong bank loan market is discussed. The database consists of an 
unbalanced panel of annual observations for the Hong Kong banking industry, 
spanning 16 years from 1997 to 201231. The sample covers 18 licensed banks 
                                                          
31 The sample of this thesis covers 18 licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong for the period 
1997 to 2012. Until June 2013, there were 21 licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong. The main 
reason to choose these 18 banks and the period 1997 to 2012 was because the data availability is 
limited. In addition, the annual reports of banks incorporated outside Hong Kong are not released 
by HKMA. In the loan market, wholesale banks offer heterogeneous products for different people. 
In order to estimate the switching costs in the bank loan market, retail banks which offer 
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incorporated in Hong Kong in that period. In the bank loan markets, a borrower 
may face significant switching costs when switching between banks.  In general, 
these switching costs are considered to be caused by asymmetric information 
between borrowers and lenders. The magnitude of switching costs is estimated 
based on a model presented by Kim et al. (2003), which is a structural model 
including a first order condition for maximization banks’ present value, a market 
share equation and a trans-log cost system. My findings suggest that switching 
costs are significant in the Hong Kong bank loan market. The average point 
estimate of switching costs based on an entire sample is 0.1947. The estimates on 
the slope of the transition probability function for the entire sample are expected 
to be negative and significant at -4.7367. The existence of switching costs only 
increases the price-cost margin by 0.52% (52bps), which is approximately 8.26%32 
of the average interest rate on the loans’ value.  I also compare the magnitude of 
switching costs during good times and bad times, and find that the estimated 
switching costs are higher during the bad times due to the “Lemons Problem”. On 
average, 2.54% of the customer’s added value is attributed to the “lock-in” effect 
that is generated by switching costs. My empirical results also indicate that the 
                                                          
homogenous products are better choices. And the level of competition may also differ for the retail 
banking market and other banking market. Moreover, these 18 banks dominate the market. The 
statistics from HKMA show that the total assets of these 18 banks accounted for 78.62% of the 
whole market in 2012. Since these 18 banks dominate the loan market, if more financial institutions 
are included in the sample, the magnitude of switching costs and the level of competition in the 
loan market may have no significant impact. Based on Panzar-Rosse approach, Jiang et al. (2004) 
suggests that the market structure of the banking sector in Hong Kong can be characterized by 
perfect competition during 1992 to 2002. Therefore, if the sample is extended to cover the period 
1989 to 1996, the results suggest that the Hong Kong bank market can be characterized as 
monopolistic competition may change.  
32 The average interest rate on loans is equal to 6.30%, the details of how to calculate interest rate 
on loans are discussed in section 2. The number 8.26% is obtained by using 0.52% divided by 
6.30%.   
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Hong Kong banking industry is in the range of economies of scale. Furthermore, I 
show that all these results are robust using GMM approach. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 is a brief introduction of whole 
chapter. Section 3.2 provides the relevant literature on switching costs. The 
theoretical framework and the empirical methodology are also described here. 
Section 3.3 discusses the data and variables used in estimation. Empirical results 
are discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.  
 
3.2 Literature review and methodology  
3.2.1 Introduction  
Although there are a large number of theoretical studies of the effects of switching 
costs on price competition, due to data limitations the empirical literature on 
switching costs is sparse and more recent. This section will discuss the previous 
literature of switching costs. In addition, a structural model of a firm’s behaviour 
in the presence of switching cost that builds on the work of Kim et al. (2003) is 
introduced.  
 
3.2.2 Definitions of switching costs  
Switching costs are broadly defined. Porter (1980) firstly gives an authoritative 
definition of switching costs as a “one time cost”, as opposed to the ongoing costs 
when customers switch from one goods or service provider to another. Then, 
Jackson (1985) made this term popular and defined switching costs in many 
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aspects including economic, psychological and physical costs that arise when 
customers are willing to change supplier. Over the past 30 years, a growing number 
of scholars have paid  attention to this subject and have given similar definitions, 
such as De Ruyter et al.(1998), Dick and Basu (1994), Thompson and Cats-Baril 
(2002), Jones et al.(2002), Whitten and Wakefield (2006), Farrell and Klemperer 
(2007). If a consumer purchases a product repeatedly, then the presence of 
switching costs will result in economies of scale (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). 
Switching cost exists in many markets and they affect market competition, 
performance, and also firm behaviour. When the switching costs are large enough, 
such as when they exceed the difference between the prices of two suppliers, they 
may cause a “lock-in” effect where the rational consumer will repeat purchases 
from the same supplier and will be unwilling to switch to a supplier that is able to 
offer a lower price and better product quality. The famous “QWERTY” keyboard 
example (David, 1985) illustrates that the existence of a switching cost may cause 
consumers to stick to their choice in the future. Switching costs play a crucial role 
in winning customer loyalty. They reduce the customer’s sensitivity to price by 
reducing price elasticity. Klemperer (1987a) also explains the phenomenon that 
ex-ante homogenous products or services become heterogeneous after purchasing 
because of switching costs.   
 
3.2.3 Types of switching costs 
Switching costs are important in different industries and consumer contexts 
(Klemperer, 1995). They have an impact on higher profits (Beggs and Klemperer, 
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1992), and market entry and exit (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007; Farrell and Shapiro, 
1998; Wang and Wen, 1998). They are also associated with consumer behaviour 
to an inelastic response with price (Farrell and Shapiro, 1998). In order to manage 
switching cost efficiently, firms must understand the reasons behind switching 
costs. Klemperer (1987a) finds that there are at least three types of switching costs, 
which are: learning costs, transaction costs and artificial or contractual costs 
imposed by firms. In his later research, Klemperer (1995) further subdivided these 
three types, as follows   
1. Compatibility costs, which arise when customers need to purchase 
matching auxiliary products after purchasing the original products. Such as 
having to buy camera lenses that must be compatible with the camera. 
2. Transaction costs, which can be defined as the costs incurred by the 
customers when they change supplier. In a broad sense, except learning 
costs, the other costs described here are all kinds of transaction costs. 
3. Learning costs are typically the costs of the consumer having to learn to 
use new brands, such as learning to use a new computer system.  
4. Costs that are due to uncertainty about the quality of interested brands. If 
the quality of the product can only be known after consumption, then the 
consumer will be loath to switch to a new brand since there is a risk that 
they will not like the new brand.  
5. Contractual switching costs, such as frequent flyer programs that 
encourage customers to travel on the same carrier, loyalty cards and so on 
(Klemperer and Png, 1986; Banerjee and Summers, 1987). 
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6. Psychological costs of switching, which appear when the consumer’s 
change their preferences after using a product or service and then 
emotionally stick to it so that they find it difficult to switch supplier. 
 
Fornell (1992) agrees with Klemperer’s (1987a) ideas and concludes that 
“switching barriers can be caused by search costs, transaction costs, learning costs, 
loyal customer discounts, customer habit, emotional cost, and cognitive effort, 
coupled with financial, social, and psychological risks on the part of buyer” (p.10). 
Based on the previous literature, Burnham et al. (2003) also classified switching 
costs into three categories, which are: procedural costs, financial costs and 
relational costs33. The empirical work of Burnham et al. (2003) shows that these 
costs are highly negatively correlated with the consumers’ intention to switch 
service providers. 
Switching costs can be distinguished as exogenous and endogenous (Nilssen, 
1992; Klemperer, 1995). The presence of exogenous switching costs has nothing 
to do with the firm’s decisions (e.g. transaction costs and learning costs) but it does 
with endogenous switching costs induced by firm’s actions directly (e.g. loyalty 
rewards). Therefore, firms can decide the size of endogenous switching costs but 
not exogenous ones. Firms can obtain higher prices and profits because of 
                                                          
33 Procedural switching costs, which include learning (Alba and Hutchinson, 1987; Eliashberg and 
Robertson, 1988; Guiltinan, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1985), setup (Guiltinan, 1989; Klemperer, 1995), 
economic risk (Guiltinan, 1989; Klemperer, 1995; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) and 
evaluation costs (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Shugan, 1980), primarily arise because of the 
expenditure of time and effort. Financial switching costs consist of benefits loss (Guiltinan, 1989) 
and monetary-loss costs (Heide and Weiss, 1995; Jackson, 1985; Klemperer, 1995; Weiss and 
Heide, 1993). In most cases, these costs can be summarized as a financially quantifiable resource 
loss. Personal relationship loss (Guiltinan, 1989; Klemperer, 1995) and brand relationship loss 
(Aaker, 1992) are major causes of relational switching costs. This type of switching cost refers to 
psychological or emotional discomfort due to the breaking of a relationship. 
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switching costs. This will reflect on firms extending the size of switching costs 
and “lock-in” their customers (Klemperer, 1995). Compared with the literature 
related to exogenous costs (see Klemperer, 1995), there is less literature on 
endogenous costs. For example, Shi (2013) developed a game theoretical model to 
study the relationship between endogenous and exogenous switching costs, and 
finds that in the equilibrium the endogenous switching costs cause profit losses to 
competing firms and the size of profit loss decreases with the size of exogenous 
switching costs. Banerjee and Summers (1987) considered the case of endogenous 
switching costs by using a two-period duopoly model with homogenous products 
where both firms issue coupons in the first period. They found that the prices in 
period 1, and the effective prices in period 2, are consistent with the monopoly 
price. These results are that same as Klemperer’s (1987a) two period model with 
exogenous switching costs. The only difference is that with endogenous switching 
costs the old customers will face lower prices than the new customers. The results 
of Caminal and Matutes (1990) are in agreement with those of Banerjee and 
Summers (1987). Marinoso (2001) studied whether the endogenous switching 
costs created by product incompatibility can be used as a strategic tool by the firm 
to lock-in consumers and reduce the competition in aftermarkets for network 
industries. Haucap (2003) reviewed Marinoso’s (2001) work and comes to the 
same conclusions: producers are willing to achieve compatibility because 
switching costs are reduced by compatibility, which will allow the producers to 
charge higher prices on their products.  
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3.2.4 Theoretical literature  
The theoretical literature has largely demonstrated the impact of switching costs 
on pricing and industrial structure in a variety of markets. Klemperer (1995), 
National Economic Research Associates (2003) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007) 
present excellent literature reviews. Chen and Hitt (2006) survey prior literature 
on information technology and switching costs. 
In many markets, switching costs give firms a degree of market power. This 
means that the current market share will decide the profits in the next period. Under 
the assumption that firms cannot set different prices to different groups (old and 
new customers), firms are faced with a trade-off. On the one hand, firms would 
like to set a higher price to exploit the lock-in customers but, on the other hand, 
the firms also want to reduce their prices to attract more new customers who will 
become repeat purchasers in the future. How then can we know which effects will 
prevail in equilibrium? 
Villas-Boas (2014) presents a literature review of the effects of customers’ 
switching costs on equilibrium prices and profits. Their paper focuses on the 
effects of several market forces, including firms’ foresight, customers’ foresight, 
the degree of stability of customer preferences and the market time horizon in the 
switching costs literature. Klemperer (1995) summarizes several basic economic 
models of competition with switching costs and answers the question of what price 
strategies firms will use when suffering from switching costs.  
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3.2.4.1 Models with switching cost 
Based on the model of Von Weizsacker (1984), Klemperer (1987a) used a simple 
duopoly model (the numerical example of two airlines) to introduce the point that 
switching costs can lead to a non-cooperative equilibrium, which may be the same 
as the collusive solution in an otherwise same market without switching costs. 
Klemperer assumes that there are two firms (A and B) in the model, which 
produces homogenous products. The switching costs incurred by consumers 
changing firms are also homogenous and exogenous. Each of the firms has a 
sizeable customer base. The core assumption is that the firms must charge a single 
price to all customers. Klemperer (1987a) finds that, given all of the assumptions 
above, each firm serves only its old customers and acts as a monopolist against 
them. The reason for this is that neither firm can benefit by deviating from 
monopoly price to its old customers unless it sells to any of its rival’s customers. 
Therefore, in this model, there is no switching in equilibrium. But in nature these 
assumptions are always not satisfied. For instance, when the switching costs are 
heterogenous, there may be some switching in equilibrium. The prices and profits 
will also be higher than in the case without switching. 
The common model of the switching costs literature is the two-period model, 
which assumes that a firm cannot commit to future prices. There are two identical 
firms with different costs in the market. In the first period, both firms compete for 
customers. In the second period, the consumer faces a homogenous switching cost 
when changing supplier. There are no new customers. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) 
find that in the second period, firms with higher market shares charge higher prices 
than firms with lower market shares. The reason for this seems obvious: firms with 
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a higher market share can obtain a higher benefit from increasing prices to exploit 
their lock-in customers than the benefit it would obtain by reducing prices to attract 
uncommitted customers. Since the profits of the second period are appreciable, 
this leads to intense competition between the two firms in the first period. 
Therefore, firms are willing to price below cost in the first period to obtain 
customers and are able to price above marginal cost in the second period to get a 
higher profit. Klemperer (1987a and b), Klemperer (1995) and Padilla (1992) also 
conclude that, when compared with the case without switching costs, prices are 
lower in the first period and higher in the second period. This pattern of prices is 
presented as “bargains-then-ripoffs”. A lot of the literature related to the two-
period model of switching costs including Klemperer (1987a, 1987b, 1995), Basu 
and Bell (2000), Ahtiala (2006), Lal and Matutes (1994), Gehrig and Stenbacka 
(2002), Ellison (2005), and Lee and Png (2004), who have focused on this 
“bargains-then-ripoffs” pattern. 
In an ideal world, firms and customers can contract for the whole lifecycle of a 
product or service, and commit to future prices and qualities. Under such 
circumstances, customers will choose those firms that offer the lowest price 
throughout the whole lifecycle (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). Since this is a whole 
lifecycle contract, there would be no switching during the whole life time. We can 
then find those firms who do not have market power. The existence of switching 
costs would not lead to any economic inefficiency, which is the same as the case 
without switching costs. The consumers and economic welfare will not be 
diminished by switching costs. 
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Such a whole lifecycle contract becomes unrealistic in real life circumstances. This 
raises the question about the extent that switching costs can have an impact on the 
consumers’ welfare. This can be classified into two cases, where firms and 
customers sign a short-term contract and where they sign long-term contracts. 
Assuming that firms can set different prices to different customers (old and new), 
Farrell and Shapiro (1988) studied the behaviour of many identical firms who 
contend for customers in a market with switching costs. They illustrate that if 
switching costs are observable, then both short-term and long term contracts 
achieve the First Best, even when quality is not contractible. However, if switching 
costs are unobservable, then long-term contracts can outperform short-term 
contracts. However, these results can only hold within specific assumptions. In the 
situation of long-term contracts, incomplete long-term contracts can sometimes 
reduce the consumer’s welfare. This was called the Principle of Negative 
Protection by Farrell and Shapiro (1988). In a mature market, new customers will 
enter into a second period. This will create a trade-off for the firms in the market, 
who can either set a higher price to exploit their existing customers or set a lower 
price to attract new customers. We can find that firms with a higher market share 
will prefer to set a high price. Padilla (1992) shows that because firms want to gain 
new customers, prices will become lower when compared to a static market with 
switching costs. 
Klemperer (1987c) considers a two-period model with complete and perfect 
information, and suggests that the incumbents may raise their prices in order to 
deter entry. The idea is that switching costs hamper forms of entry, so that the 
firms must persuade their customers to pay these costs, which is particularly true 
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for a large-scale entry that seeks to attract other firms’ customers (for instance to 
achieve a minimum variable scale if the market is not growing quickly). The 
difficulty for a new entry is that it may be broadly efficient given switching costs 
but nevertheless there is still a social cost of switching. Gayle and Wu (2013) agree 
with Klemperer (1987c) on this point by providing empirical evidence of the 
incumbents’ response to the threat of entry using US domestic flight data for 2007. 
By extending the two-period model into a multi-period it can be seen that the 
firms face a trade-off to exploit lock-in customers or to reduce its prices to obtain 
higher future profits. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) analyse an overlapping-
generations model of duopolistic competition with infinitely many periods in the 
presence of consumer switching costs. With the assumption of a constant relative 
proportion of new and old customers in each period and homogenous switching 
costs, they found that firms without a customer base will be willing to price more 
aggressively than the “incumbent” in order to attract new customers. Firms with a 
higher market share will charge a higher price and concede new customers to their 
rival. Therefore, market leadership has tended to change over time since the market 
shares are transferred from a high price firm to a low price firm. In addition, 
average prices were higher than they were in the case without switching costs. In 
some markets, Switching costs encourage entry to serve new customers even when 
such entry is inefficient. Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and Padilla (1995) also 
found similar results by modelling a multi-period model in the presence of 
switching costs. 
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Klemperer (1995) concludes that there are three main reasons to explain why in 
equilibrium the prices are likely to be raised by the presence of switching costs. 
Firstly, because of the real interest rate, the same amount of money today is valued 
more highly than it will be tomorrow. This will induce firms to prefer harvesting 
today rather than investing in the future. Secondly, the pricing decision of firms 
today will influence how aggressive their rivals will be in future. If the number of 
locked-in customers of each firms is increased, then we will find in the next period 
that these firms will become less aggressive. Therefore, considering this effect, 
each firm will raise its price today to reduce the competitive power of its rivals in 
the next period. The last point is, if we take customers’ expectations into account, 
we can find that the presence of switching costs make a rational customer to 
consider the expectations of future prices when making today’s purchasing 
decision. If firms set a low price today, then customers will become less price-
sensitive and the firms’ elasticity of demand is also reduced. Many researchers 
have studied the impact of different customer expectations in markets with 
switching costs. Facing consumers who expect price reduction maintained in every 
periods, Von Weizsacker (1984) found that consumer demand is highly elastic in 
relation to price and the switching costs depress the prices when compared to a 
market without switching costs. However, this kind of consumer expectation is 
irrational. But, as Marinoso (2001) shows, if firms can set different price to locked-
in and new customers, then the role of switching costs on prices is not related to 
the consumer’s expectations. Cabral and Greenstein (1990), taking switching costs 
into account, compared two procurement regimes of US Federal Government and 
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found that when the consumers are able to influence the price they face then it is 
optimal for them to choose to partially or completely ignore the switching costs.  
    Most models of switching costs assume that firms cannot charge different prices 
to different customers. But Chen (1997) extends Klemperer’s case to allow firms 
to price discriminate between existing customers and new customers. They 
constructed a two-period duopoly model which assumed that firms can price 
discriminate between locked-in and uncommitted customers by offering a discount 
to encourage new customers to switch from previous suppliers. If demand is very 
inelastic, then society and consumers will generally be worse off because the 
burden from switchers will be large but the level of output will be the same. In 
contrast, if market demand is elastic, then society and consumers will generally be 
better off due to the expansion of output. Shaffer and Zhang (2000) extended the 
results of Chen by considering a model where the firms are no longer able to 
provide homogenous products and different customers have different preferences. 
They showed that with the assumption of price discrimination, prices will be lower 
than in the case of price uniformity. If the new customers have same preferences 
as the old customers, then it is optimal to offer a discount to attract the new 
customers. In contrast, if they have different preferences for each customer’s group, 
then it is better to offer a lower price to the locked-in customers to insure that they 
stay.  
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3.2.4.2 Aftermarkets 
The switching costs in an aftermarket are a special case of price discrimination 
between old and new customers. An aftermarket is a secondary market where 
consumers can buy follow-on products (such as a camera lens for a camera). Since 
the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision in the antitrust case of Eastman Kodak 
Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et al., considerable attention has been 
given to the issue of aftermarket. In this case, Kodak was sued by Image, who 
alleged that they had monopolized the maintenance market for its copiers and 
micrographic equipment by refusing to sell spare parts to alternative maintenance 
suppliers. Kodak finally lost the trial. There are also many other court cases, such 
as Cannon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Green Cartridge Company in 1999 of Hong Kong 
(Elzinga and Mills, 2001). Morita and Waldman (2010) provide an explanation for 
the reason why a durable goods producer with little or no market power would 
monopolize the maintenance market for its own product based on consumer 
switching costs and consumer preferences. An interesting point is that this practice 
increases both social welfare and consumer welfare. The price of spare parts and 
maintenance services today will affect the behaviour of consumers tomorrow 
(Shapiro, 1995). Therefore, if the firms would like to exploit customers today, then 
they will hardly attract customers tomorrow. Mackie-Mason and Metzler (2002) 
describe a “Surprise” theory, whereby durable goods firms with some customer 
base would like to increase the price of spare parts to profit from their locked-in 
customers. But, as Shapiro (1995) notes, these firms may be prevented from fully 
exploiting their locked-in customers when these customers have heterogenous 
switching costs. In Shapiro’s (1995) paper, another two theories (i.e. “lack of 
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commitment” and “costly information”) are used to explain how consumers may 
be exploited in the aftermarket.   
 
3.2.4.3 Market entry and exit 
As Farrell and Klemperer (2007) said, the most significant impact of switching 
costs is its effect on a firms’ entry. Aghion and Bolton (1987) analysed how an 
incumbent seller is able to deter entry to the market by new, same cost producers 
by signing long-term contracts. In many cases, under certain conditions, the 
existence of switching costs may encourage entry depend on the size of switching 
costs, the scale of entry, the market, and the existence of economies of scale. If the 
switching costs are very high in the markets, a new entrant has to price at a 
substantial discount to the incumbent’s price to attract customers, which would 
deter new entrants from entering the market. High switching costs will also reduce 
social welfare. Klemperer (1987c), and Farrell and Shapiro (1988) suggest that a 
moderate size of switching costs may make entry easier than lower or no switching 
costs. In fact, switching costs cause a surplus of entry. Wang and Wen (1998) even 
find that, although the new entrant has a higher marginal cost than an incumbent, 
it can still profit from entry if provided with sufficiently high switching costs. In 
general, switching costs encourage small scale entry but deter large scale entry 
(Gelman and Salop, 1983; Yoffie and Kwak, 2001). Market growth can also 
impact on entry opportunities in a market with switching costs. For example, a 
growing market may encourage entry since contending for locked-in customers 
lowers competitiveness. Although, in general, moderate switching costs are 
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conducive to small scale entry, they do not work when faced with strong 
economies of scale in the market. 
 
3.2.5 Empirical literature  
Compared with the theoretical literature, the empirical literature on switching costs 
is sparse and more recent, mainly due to the lack of appropriate data. There are 
only a limited number of empirical analyses on the estimates of switching costs 
and their effects in different markets. For example, Bucklin et al. (1995), Che et 
al. (2007) and Dubé et al., (2009) study brand loyalty and state dependent effects 
for packaged goods, Stango (2002) and Barone et al. (2011) for credit market, Shy 
(2002) for bank deposits, Kim et al. (2003) for bank loan market, Kim et al. (2004) 
for mobile telecommunication industry, Viard (2007) for the telephone market, 
and Chen (2011) for network industry. Chen (2011) also presents a series of results 
that describe the effects of switching costs on market concentration and prices.  
This section summarises the existing literature on identifying and measuring 
switching costs according to the methods used.  
 
3.2.5.1 Direct methods 
Direct methods use information on individual consumer behaviour. For instance, 
using data on the online brokerage industry, Chen and Hitt (2002) developed and 
implemented an approach for measuring the magnitudes of switching costs and 
brand loyalty for online service providers that was based on the random utility 
modelling framework (MacFadden, 1973). They found significant variation in 
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measured switching costs across brokers. Although the customer’s characteristics 
have little effect on switching, the system uses measures and system quality that 
are associated with reduced switching. In addition, firm characteristics reduce both 
switching and customer attrition. Epling (2002) studied competition in the long 
distance telephony market in the US after 1996. She found empirical evidence for 
heterogeneity in the subscriber switching costs and concluded that consumers with 
high switching costs end up paying higher prices. Shum (2004) estimated 
switching costs using panel data on household purchases of breakfast cereals. 
Greenstein (1993) analysed federal procurement of commercial mainframe 
computer systems during the 1970s, and found that an agency is likely to acquire 
a system from an incumbent vendor. The compatibility between a buyer’s installed 
base and a potential system also influences the choice of vendor.  
 
3.2.5.2 Indirect methods 
Actually, a direct measure of switching costs is difficult to obtain since switching 
costs are both consumer-specific and industry-specific, and they are not able to be 
directly observed by economists. Indirect methods use aggregate data to identify 
switching costs, usually by estimating reduced-form pricing equations. For 
example, Knittel (1997) analyzed the changes in prices for long distance telephone 
calls in the US after 1984, and found that the presence of search and switching 
costs causes price rigidity. Borenstein (1991) measured the magnitude of 
switching costs in the US retail petro market and found that gas stations 
discriminate against groups of customers who are less likely to switch to another 
station. This conclusion highlights the influence of shopping or search costs on 
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pricing decisions, even in a market that is thought to be quite competitive. In 
addition, Kim et al. (2003) provides the only structural model available for 
econometric estimation of the magnitude and significance of switching costs, 
which uses an aggregated panel data that does not contain customer-specific 
information. It estimates a first-order condition, a market share equation and a 
trans-log cost function jointly in a Bertrand oligopoly model, and finds that the 
point estimate of the average switching cost is 4.1%, which is about one-third of 
the market average interest rate on loans in value. The detail of Kim’s model will 
be introduced in the methodology part. Based on the Kim’s model, Yuan (2010) 
estimates the magnitude of borrowers’ switching costs in the banking sector for 31 
OECD and developing countries for the years 1996 to 2004. She finds that the 
switching costs are significant for all countries in the sample and the magnitude of 
switching costs are higher in developing countries than developed countries. Her 
results also show that indicators of informational asymmetries between borrowers 
and lenders, such as bank penetration and market concentration, have strong 
impacts on switching costs. In contrast to other empirical studies, Shy (2002) 
develops a quick and easy way to estimate the magnitude of switching costs using 
observed data on market shares and prices under a set of assumptions. This method 
is based on the undercut-proof of property concept (Morgan and Shy, 1996). He 
applies this method for both the Israeli cellular phone market and the Finnish bank 
deposits market. Although this method has been widely cited, Shcherbakov (2008) 
points out that the assumptions include homogenous products and static behaviour 
on both demand and supply side that are very strong, which is likely to be violated 
regardless of the product type. Zhu et al. (2011) argues that Shy’s (2002) model 
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only considers the behaviour of firms rather than the behaviour of consumers and, 
therefore, the calculated results of switching costs are inaccurate. In addition, they 
do not agree with Shy’s (2002) argument that even in the duopoly model a Nash-
Bertrand equilibrium in pure prices does not exist. Using the undercut-proof 
equilibrium method presented by Shy (2002), Carlström (2010) estimates the size 
of switching costs in the Finnish retail bank market and finds that switching costs 
amount to about 50% of the interest rate for both cooperative and saving banks in 
the lending market.    
 
3.2.6 Methodology 
3.2.6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes an empirical model of firm behaviour in the presence of 
switching cost for loans across time. The model builds on Kim et al. (2003), who 
provide the only structural model available for econometric estimation concerns 
to the magnitude and significance of switching costs that uses highly aggregated 
data lacking information on customer-specific transition history. In Kim et al.’s 
(2003) paper, the model is applied to a panel data of Norwegian banking industry 
to estimate the switching costs in the market for bank loans. The novelty of this 
model is that, by introducing the definition of “transition probabilities”, the 
customer specific switching behaviour can be implied from the changes in each 
bank’s market share. Therefore, without observing individual switching decision, 
switching costs can still be found based on the change of bank’s market shares. 
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Another attractive property of Kim’s model is that it allows customers to switch 
between banks at any period. 
 
3.2.6.2 The model’s framework 
The empirical model is based on the research of market conduct with the existence 
of customer switching costs (Klemperer, 1987c). Following Kim et al. (2003), I 
consider an oligopoly lending market with n banks competing in interest rate on 
loans.34 Here, the customers (i.e. borrowers) are assumed to have an inelastic 
demand for loans in order to focus on the customers’ decisions on the choice of 
bank.35 The demand quantity of each customer is fixed in each of the infinite 
discrete periods.36 The customers maximize their utility by deciding from which 
bank to borrow, and take the interest rates charged by all banks in the market as 
given. Although the customers are allowed to switch at any period, the switching 
between banks is costly and the magnitude of the switching cost is common 
knowledge to both the banks and customers. The customer behaviour that 
generates probabilities of switching between banks (i.e. transition probabilities) 
are functions of the interest rate on loans and switching costs. The demand faced 
by each bank can be obtained by aggregating the transition probabilities over all 
customers. Therefore, although the customer switching behaviour is not 
                                                          
34 This is a multiple-stage price (Bertrand) competition model in which the firms are allowed to set 
the prices. 
35 Because the demand of loans are not significantly altered by the change of interest rate on loans, 
the assumption is that a given bank and its rivals have the same sensitivity of the transition 
probability of randomly selected borrowers to changes in the interest rate on loans. 
36 This assumption is not held subsequently and the quantity of customer demand is changing at an 
exogenously determined rate.  
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observable, we still can find the magnitude of switching costs by using the market 
share of each bank.  
 
3.2.6.3 Demand side 
The customers compare the interest rates on loans charged by different banks in 
order to choose from which bank to borrow. I model the customer’s borrowing 
decision in terms of the probability of borrowing from different banks. Different 
customers have different borrowing decisions. The probability of borrowing from 
a specific bank represents the proportion of customers who decide to borrow from 
that bank in aggregation.37 If the customer wants to switch, then the switching cost 
is added to the interest rate of loans charged by the bank.  Following Kim et al 
(2003),  𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡 denotes the probability that a customer who borrowed in period t-
1 from bank i will continue to borrow from the same bank in the subsequent period. 
We can also define 𝑃𝑟𝑗→𝑖,𝑡 to be the probability that a customer who previously 
borrow from bank j will switch to borrow from bank i in the subsequent period. 
Since the transition probabilities are functions of interest rate on loans and 
switching costs, I use 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 to denote the interest rate charged by bank i in period t. 
Similarly, the (n-1) vector 𝒑𝑖 𝑅,𝑡  is used to denote the alternative interest rate 
charged by bank i’s rivals.38 Customers suffer switching costs when they change 
the banks. In fact, switching costs are likely to differ among customers. Here the 
switching costs are assumed to be constant over time and over customers. 
                                                          
37 Since the presence of switching costs, transition probabilities are assumed to be Markovian, as 
long as the transition probabilities are between 0 to 1, the switch exists.  
38 I use bold letters to denoted vectors. 
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Therefore, the mean switching costs are denoted here by s. The probability of 
continuing to borrow from the same bank i is: 
                   𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓{𝑝𝑖,𝑡, 𝒑𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 + 𝒔}                                             (3.1) 
where s ≡ s I, here I is an (n-1) unity vector.  
    The (conditional) probability of switching to bank i from bank j is formulated 
as follows: 
                          𝑃𝑟𝑗→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓 {𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑠, 𝒑𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 + 𝒔𝑗}                                   (3.2) 
where 𝒔𝑗 is an (n-1) vector in which each of the elements equals s , except for the 
jth element, which is zero. In aggregate data, the individual decisions from which 
bank to borrow are unobserved. So we need to formulate the probability of 
switching to borrow from bank i unconditional of the rival’s identity. Therefore, 
the probability that the borrower who borrowed from one of bank i’s rivals in the 
previous period switches to borrow from bank i in current period is: 
                     𝑃𝑟𝑖 𝑅→𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ (𝑓{𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑠, 𝒑𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 + 𝒔𝑗} ∗𝑗≠𝑖
𝑦1,𝑗,𝑡−1
∑ 𝑦1,𝑘,𝑡−1𝑘≠𝑖
)             (3.3) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑅→𝑖,𝑡 is the probability that a customer who borrowed from the bank i’s 
rivals will switch to borrow from bank i in current period. 𝑦1,𝑗,𝑡−1 is denoted as 
bank j’s total loans in period t-1. 
𝑦1,𝑗,𝑡−1
∑ 𝑦1,𝑘,𝑡−1𝑘≠𝑖
 denotes the probability that a 
randomly selected rival’s borrower is one who borrows from bank j in the previous 
period.  
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    Since a higher relative interest rate on loans charged by bank i will lower the 
probability that any customer will borrow from it, the partial derivative of Equation 
(3.1) and Equation (3.3) should have the following properties: 
                                     
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝑡
< 0, 
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝒑𝑖 𝑅,𝑡
> 0.                                       (3.4) 
and 
                                     
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑖 𝑅→𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝑡
< 0, 
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑖 𝑅→𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖 𝑅,𝑡
> 0.                                     (3.5) 
Then, the total demand of bank i at time t is formulated as follows,  
                          𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦1,𝑖𝑅,𝑡−1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑅→𝑡                         (3.6) 
where y1,i,t is the bank i’s total demand of loans at period t.  
    By applying the law of large numbers, the first term on the right hand side of 
equation (3.6) shows the number of the bank i’s “loyal” customers who continue 
to borrow from it. The second term on the right hand side of equation (3.6) 
approximates the number of the rivals’ customers who choose to switch to borrow 
from bank i.39 
    Taking into account the market growth rate, 𝑔𝑡 =
∑ 𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡−1
, the function of total 
demand of loans becomes: 
                  𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦1,𝑖𝑅,𝑡−1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑅→𝑖,𝑡)𝑔𝑡                   (3.7) 
By taking a first-order (linear) approximation on the transition probabilities, the 
transition probabilities becomes the functions of the interest rate on loans charged 
                                                          
39 We assume the number of customers is fixed.  
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by bank i, the average interest rate on loans charged by bank i’s rivals and the 
switching cost.  
                      𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2(?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 + 𝑠)                        (3.8) 
where 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is the interest rate charged by the bank i, ?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 is the average interest 
rate charged by the rival banks and s is the switching cost.  
                     𝑃𝑟𝑗→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑠) + 𝛼2
∗𝐼′(𝒑𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 + 𝒔𝑗)                (3.9) 
where 𝒔𝑗 is an (n-1) vector of switching costs, in which each of the elements equal 
s, except jth element, which is zero. Equation (3.9) can be written as: 
                 𝑃𝑟𝑗→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑠) + 𝛼2
∗(∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑗≠𝑖 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑠)       (3.10) 
For 𝛼2
∗ =
𝛼2
𝑛−1
 
                 𝑃𝑟𝑗→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑠) + 𝛼2 (?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 +
𝑛−2
𝑛−1
𝑠)            (3.11) 
This equation is not a function of bank j, thus it is also the transition probability of 
a randomly selected rivals’ customer: 
                          𝑃𝑟𝑖 𝑅→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑠) + 𝛼2 (?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 +
𝑛−2
𝑛−1
𝑠)          (3.12) 
where 𝛼0
𝑖 , 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 from equation (3.8) and (3.12) are coefficients. 𝛼0
𝑖  represents 
the bank-specific heterogeneity. 𝛼1  measures the sensitivity of the transition 
probability to the bank’s own interest rate. It is assumed that 𝛼1 < 0 since the 
higher probability of borrowing form bank i, the lower interest rate on loans 
charged by the bank. 𝛼2 is the cross-price sensitivity.  
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We know the transition probability that the borrower borrows from bank i should 
be decreasing in the interest rate charged by bank i and increasing in the average 
interest rate of its rivals. Then, the partial derivatives of equation (3.8) and (3.12) 
should have the following signs: 
                                           
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝑡
=
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑖 𝑅→𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼1 < 0                               (3.13) 
and  
                                            
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡
𝜕?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡
=
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑖 𝑅→𝑖,𝑡
𝜕?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡
= 𝛼2 > 0                              (3.14) 
Because the borrowers are assumed to have an inelastic demand for loans, a small 
increase of 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 should have the same effect on the transition probabilities as the 
same size decrease of ?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡. This implies  𝛼2 = −𝛼1. Hence, we can rewrite the 
function of transition probabilities: 
                                 𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 − 𝑠)                       (3.15) 
and 
                               𝑃𝑟𝑖 𝑅→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 −
𝑠
𝑛−1
)                  (3.16) 
From equations (3.15) and (3.16), we take the partial derivatives with respect to 
switching cost s, we know 
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡
𝑠
= −𝛼1 > 0 and 
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑖 𝑅→𝑖,𝑡
𝑠
=
𝛼1
𝑛−1
< 0. Hence, the 
higher the switching cost, the higher the proportion of the bank’s customer will 
stay, but the lower the proportion of its rivals’ customers will choose to switch to 
the bank i.  
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Then, by substituting (3.15) and (3.16) into the total demand equation (3.7), and 
dividing by the market demand in the period t, the market share of bank i in period 
t 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is : 
                  𝜎𝑖.𝑡 = −𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝛼1 + 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 +
𝑠
𝑛−1
)         (3.17) 
Since 𝛼1 is negative, the lock-in effect can be represented as  
                                          
𝜕𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
= −
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝛼1 > 0                                  (3.18) 
The positive lock-in effect shows that the more that a customer bases the bank 
lock-in during the last period, the more customers this bank has in the current 
period. It can be also known that the lock-in effect is increasing by the magnitude 
of switching costs because of, 
                                          
𝜕(
𝜕𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
)
𝜕𝑠
= −
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝛼1 > 0                                (3.19) 
The switching-cost effect can then be shown as: 
                       
∂σi.t
∂s
= (
1
n
− σi,t−1)
n
n−1
α1{  
< 0 if σi,t−1 < 1/n
> 0 if  σi,t−1 > 1/n
             (3.20) 
The switching-cost effect is the effect of switching costs on market shares. This 
effect favours larger-than-average banks relative to smaller-than-average banks. 
This intuition is that the larger the bank’s market share is, the more the customers 
will be “locked-in” with it.  
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3.2.6.4 Supply Side 
Bank i maximizes the present value of its profits in every period 𝜏: 
                                             𝑉𝑖,𝜏 = ∑ 𝛿
𝑡−𝜏𝜋𝑖,𝑡
∞
𝑡=𝜏                                       (3.21) 
where 𝛿 is the one-period discount factor and 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 is the bank’s profit in period t. 
The profit is  
                                                𝜋𝑖,𝑡 ≡ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡                                    (3.22) 
where 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶{𝒘𝑖,𝑡, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡} is the total costs of loans, which is a function of its output 
supplied and a vector of input prices. Taking first order condition with respect to 
𝑝𝑖,𝜏 will get the optimal interest rate charged by bank i at period τ: 
                                             
𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
= ∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝜏
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
∞
𝑡=𝜏 = 0                                  (3.23) 
As shown in Kim et al. (2003), the above optimal interest rate strategy can be 
expressed as follows (for the derivation of equation 3.24 refer to Appendix A.1): 
                              𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = −𝛿 ∙ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝑔𝑡+1 −
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝛼1
                         (3.24) 
where 𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is the price-cost margin in period t.  
    Equation 3.24 shows the relation between the price-cost margin of loans (𝑝𝑐𝑚), 
the market shares (𝜎), and the switching costs (s). The price-cost margin is usually 
taken as an indicator of market power because the larger the margin, the larger the 
difference between the price and the competitive price will be. The first term on 
the RHS represents the benefits to the bank from capturing customers in period t 
who will be “locked-in” in future periods. The larger this benefit is (a higher s or 
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𝑔𝑡+1), the lower will be the optimal period t price-cost margin, in an attempt to 
capture these customers. The second term on the RHS of this equation represents 
the current period oligopoly power of the bank. The larger the current market share 
is, the larger will be the price-cost margin. When switching costs exist, the bank 
charges a lower interest rate on loans than indicated by the pure oligopoly power 
(−𝛿 ∙ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑛−1
<0 then 𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑡 < −
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝛼1
) which they use as “investments” to lock 
in customers. Therefore, the market share ( 𝜎𝑖,𝑡) is larger than it would be without 
“the investment” (Yuan, 2010).  
 
3.2.7 Empirical methodology 
Kim et al. (2003) provide two equations to estimate 
                      𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = −𝛿 ∙ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝑔𝑡+1 −
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝛼1
+ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                       (3.25) 
where 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is an error term. 
and 
        𝜎𝑖.𝑡 = −𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝛼1 + 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1 (𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 +
𝑠
𝑛−1
) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡      (3.26) 
where 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is an error term. 
    To eliminate the numerous fixed effects (𝛼0
𝑖 ), the market share equation (3.26) 
is first- order differenced: 
                      ∆𝜎𝑖.𝑡 = −∆𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝛼1 + 𝛼1(∆𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − ∆?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡′           (3.27) 
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where ∆ denotes first-order difference. 𝜖𝑖,𝑡′ is an error term. 
   To obtain the price-cost margin in equation (3.25), we estimate the margin costs 
implied by the trans-log cost function and its associated input cost share equations.  
   Using the second-order Taylor-series approximation, bank i’s time-variant trans-
log cost function (one output, three inputs) is as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑘
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2
(∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑙,𝑖,𝑡
𝑙𝑘
 
                     +𝛿11(𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡)
2) + ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡                          (3.28) 
where 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 is an error term, k=1,2,3 and l=1,2,3 
    From Shephard’s lemma, the input cost share equations can be written in 
deterministic form as 
  𝑆ℎ𝑘,𝑖 =
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑥𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑙,𝑖,𝑡𝑙 + 𝛾1𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡          (3.29) 
where 𝑆ℎ𝑘,𝑖 is the share of the kth factor in bank i’s period t production cost. Ci,t is 
the total cost of bank i in period t, and y1,i,t is bank i’s loans in period t. wl,i,t are 
exogenous input prices of bank i in period t.  
    The following restrictions for symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices are 
imposed on the trans-log cost system: 
𝛽𝑘𝑙 = 𝛽𝑙𝑘, ∀𝑘, 𝑙 ;  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 = 1; ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 = 0 ;  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙 = 0, ∀𝑘.          (3.30)                  
Then, the marginal cost can be written as  
𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑡 =
𝜕𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
=
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
(𝛿1 + 𝛿11𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡)           (3.31) 
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The first order condition (equation 3.25), the market share equation (equation 3.27), 
and the trans- log cost system including inputs share equations40 (equation 3.28 
and 3.29) are jointly estimated using the non-linear 3SLS approach41. A GMM 
approach42 is used as a robustness test. A positive s is our basic indication for the 
existence of customer switching costs in the market for bank loans. Since demand 
should be downward sloping, then α1 must be a negative sign to ensure the validity 
of this model.  
 
3.2.8 Summary  
This section has reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature of switching costs. 
In order to estimate the magnitude and significance of switching costs, a structural 
model that builds on Kim et al. (2003) is applied. In this structural model, the first 
order condition equation (equation 3.25), a market share equation (equation 3.27), 
and the trans- log cost system including inputs share equations (equation 3.28 and 
3.29) are jointly estimated using the non-linear (3SLS) approach. A GMM 
approach is used as a robustness test. 
                                                          
40 Since the sum of three input shares is equal to unity, one share equation is deleted from the 
system to avoid singularity problem. 
41 3SLS is the combination of 2SLS and SUR. It can be used in a system of equations which 
contains endogenous variables and the residuals in each equation are also correlated.  
42 The estimation procedure of GMM is as follows: Let z= (z1,z2…zn) be a set of instrumental 
variables used in each equation, for example, z1 are the instruments for Equation 3.43 (the first 
order condition equation). z is exogenous and not correlated with error terms. Utilizing the 
conditions E(𝑧𝑖𝜀𝑖) = 0, where ε is the error term in each equation and i=1,2…n, the moment 
equations are m = [
𝑧1
′ 𝜀1
⋮
𝑧𝑛
′ 𝜀𝑛
] . Then the general method of moment (GMM) estimator 𝜃 is defined as 
min
𝜃
𝑚′(𝑧′Ω𝑧)𝑚, where Ω is the optimal weighting matrix.  
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3.3 Data and variables 
3.3.1 Introduction 
My empirical strategy makes an inference about the magnitude and significance 
of switching costs based on observations on bank-level data from 18 licensed 
banks incorporated in Hong Kong during 1997 to 2012. In this section, the data 
and summary statistics are discussed in Section 3.3.2. Section 3.3.3 presents the 
key characteristics of Hong Kong banking industry. Section 3.3.4 introduces the 
data cleaning rules in detail. In addition. And Section 3.3.5 concludes the whole 
section 3.3.   
 
3.3.2 Data      
The Asian financial crisis was in many ways a nightmare for many Asian countries. 
It induced a particularly destructive affect in many Asian countries’ banking 
systems. By coincidence, it happened at the same time as the handover of Hong 
Kong back to Chinese control. Under the Basic Law, a “one country, two systems” 
policy was formulated, which meant that Hong Kong retained its own political and 
economic systems. Although the banks in Hong Kong escaped disaster, the Hong 
Kong banking industry passed through a difficult period during and after the Asian 
financial crisis (Chiu, 2003). Hong Kong’s financial sector was hit again by the 
global financial crisis of 2007 to 2008. In order to study the switching costs for 
this interesting period, I have collected an unbalanced panel of Hong Kong bank 
level data for the period of 1997-2012 from Bankscope and the banks’ own Annual 
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Reports.43 The data are annual and cover 18 licensed banks in Hong Kong44. A 
sample of the banks is given in Appendix A.2. According to the statistics reported 
in the Hong Kong banking survey by KPMG (2013), these 18 banks have the 
largest market share in the Hong Kong banking industry. For the year 2012, the 
total assets of these 18 banks was HKD 11,681,441 million (which at that time was 
equal to USD 1,506,699 million)45 which accounted for 78.62% of the whole 
market. The gross loans and advances of these banks was HKD 5,268,304 million 
(is equal to USD 679,518 million), which accounted for 94.6% of the total loans. 
Meanwhile, the ratio was 96.03% for the case of deposits46. All of the nominal 
data used for estimating the switching costs are deflated by the CPI (2009M10-
2010M9=100) collected from DataStream. 47  Macro data (including real GDP, 
inflation, three- month Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HKBOR) and wage 
                                                          
43 The panel data is unbalanced because data for some banks are missing for some years. The data 
for 1997 is missing for the banks including ICBC (Asia), DBS Bank (Hong Kong ) Limited, 
Nanyang Commercial Bank Ltd, Wing Hang Bank Ltd, Wing Lung Bank Ltd, Chong Hing Bank 
Limited and Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Limited. The data of 1997 to 1999 is missing for the Bank 
of China (Hong Kong) Limited and Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited. The 
unavailability of these observations is mainly because these banks are required to comply with the 
listing rules on disclosure set forth by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Therefore, these financial 
data are not released to public.  
44 Until June 2013, there were 21 licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong, they are: Bank of 
China (Hong Kong) Limited, Bank of East Asia Limited, China Citic Bank International Limited, 
China Construction Bank (Asia) Corporation Limited, Chiyu Banking Corporation Limited, Chong 
Hing Bank Limited, Citibank (Hong Kong) Limited, Dah Sing Bank Limited, DBS Bank (Hong 
Kong) Limited, Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Limited, Hang Seng Bank Limited, Hong Kong & 
Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) 
Limited, Nanyang Commercial Bank Limited, Public Bank (Hong Kong) Limited, Shanghai 
Commercial Bank Limted, Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited, Tai Sang Bank Limited, 
Tai Yau Bank Limited, Wing Hang Bank Limited and Wing Lung Bank Limited. I exclude 
CitiBank (Hong Kong) Limited, Tai Sang Bank Limited and Tai Yau Bank Limited mainly because 
of the low availability of the data in the Banks’ Annual Reports. In addition, the available data in 
Bankscope for these banks is inaccurate which inconsistent with the Banks’ Annual Reports.  
451 HKD= 0.1290 USD. Data source: Bloomberg. Date: 4th June 2014. This exchange rate is used 
throughout this thesis.  
46 According to the HKMA Annual Report (2012), in 2012, the total assets of all authorized banks 
in Hong Kong is HKD 14,859 billion, the total loans to customer is HKD 5,569 billion and the total 
deposits from customers is HKD 8,297 billion.  
47 Data Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong.  
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rate) were also collected from DataStream.48  Financial data (including 3-month 
Treasury bill rates and 91-day exchange fund bill rates) are drawn from the 
International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Hong Kong Monetary Authority49. 
The definition and measurement of the variables used for estimating switching 
costs are presented in Table 3.1. In order to solve the endogeneity problem, the 
endogenous variables in the models, the time differences of the market shares (σi,t-
1, σi,t, σi,t+1), the interest rate on loans, and the bank loans are instrumented by 
various lags of the market shares up to 3 years,50 one time period lag of the interest 
rate on loans, real GDP, inflation rate, Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) 
rate and the wage index of Hong Kong 51 . A Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions is applied to check the validity of instrumental variables and the results 
suggest that all of the instrumental variables are valid. Table 3.2 provides the 
definition and measurement of instrumental variables, which are not presented in 
Table 3.1. A summary of all the variables is given in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 Inflation Rate and Wage Rate is calculated based on annually CPI and wage index. 
  Data Source of real GDP: Oxford Economics. Data Source of inflation rate: IMF. Data Source of 
wage index:   Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong. 
  Data Source of HKBOR: Hong Kong Monetary Authority.  
49 T-bill rates are weekly data and Exchange fund bill rates are daily data. I transfer all the data into 
annually by taking the average of the observations each year.  
50 Kim et al. (2003) also use various lags of the market shares as instrumental variables.  
51 Ho (2010) also uses a set of instrumental variables includes HIBOR and wage index when 
estimating marginal costs using trans-log cost function for Hong Kong banking industry.  
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Table 3.1 The definition and measurement of variables 
 
Variable name Definition of each variables 
ti,C  The total cost of bank i at time t. Where ti,C =Total operating 
expenses+ interest expenses. 
tiy .,1  
The loans of bank i at time t.52 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 The number of labour of bank i at time t. 
𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The fix assets of bank i at time t. 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 The deposits of bank i at time t. 
tiw ,,1  The exogenous input prices on labour. where tiw ,,1 = personal 
expenses/ numbers of labour 
tiw ,,2  
The exogenous input price on capital.  
where tiw ,,2 = non personal expenses/fix assets 
=(total operating expenses-personal expenses)/fix assets 
tiw ,,3  
The exogenous input price on deposits.  
where tiw ,,3 =Interest expenses/total deposits  
iSh ,1  
The labour costs share in bank i’s time t.  
Where 𝑆ℎ1,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝐿𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 
iSh ,2  
The capital costs share in bank i’s time t. 
Where 𝑆ℎ2,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 
iSh ,3  
The deposits costs share in bank i’s time t. 
Where 𝑆ℎ3,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑖,𝑡/𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 
  3-month Treasury bill rates. 
tg  
The market growth rate on loans at time t. 
where  𝑔𝑡 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡/ ∑ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1. 
n The number of banks at time t 
ti,  The market share measured by value of loans of bank i at time 
t. 
tip ,  
The interest rate on loans of bank i at time t. 
tiRp ,
_
 
The average interest rate on loans of bank i’s rivals at time t.  
  
 
                                                          
52 Due to data limitations, the types of loan cannot be distinguished. For instance, consumer and 
corporate loans.   
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Table 3.2 The definition and measurement of instrumental variables (apart 
from presented variables in Table 3.1) 
Variable name Definition of each variables 
𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 Real GDP in Hong Kong 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑡 Inflation rate in Hong Kong 
𝐻𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡 Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate 
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 Wage rate in Hong Kong 
 
Table 3.3 Summary statistics (HKD million) 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
ti,C  
275 8,240.21 13,597.22 339.53 87,402.99 
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 275 136,791.70 196,141.00 6,390.81 1,162,937.00 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 278 3,656.57 4,660.13 257.00 24,038.00 
𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 275 4,908.95 8,434.44 48.08 48,800.94 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 275 253,646.40 422,455.90 9,098.66 2,414,710.00 
tiw ,,1  
274 0.38 0.14 0.16 1.33 
tiw ,,2  
274 0.56 0.78 0.08 5.36 
tiw ,,3  
275 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.15 
iS ,1  
274 0.22 0.10 0.06 0.44 
iS ,2  
274 0.19 0.11 0.04 0.62 
iS ,3  
275 0.60 0.19 0.15 0.87 
  288 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.07 
tg  
270 1.07 0.08 0.93 1.27 
n 288 18 0 18 18 
ti,  
275 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.33 
tip ,  
275 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.16 
?̅?𝑖𝑅,𝑡 288 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.11 
𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 288 1,504,833.00 287,515.70 1,122,294.00 1,965,153.00 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑡 288 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.06 
𝐻𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡 288 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.08 
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 288 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.06 
Note: all the nominal data in the table are deflated by CPI.
             
92 
 
Table 3.4 Summary statistics- year 1999, 2007 and 2012 (HKD million) 
Variable  1999 2007 2012 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 7,769.42 15,101.08 13,841.15 20,864.78 8,380.26 10,169.25 
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 63.966.86 109,921.84 153,173.66 197,682.07 238,266.61 301,058.95 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 2,704.41 3,866.18 3,937.00 4,805.67 4,127.11 5,021.21 
𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 3,361.18 5,705.74 4,247.71 7,016.24 9,144.47 14,815.51 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 118,241.80 222,064.99 308,428.93 493,118.32 410,427.92 600,138.89 
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 0.29 0.05 0.42 0.09 0.53 0.25 
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 0.28 0.31 0.69 0.63 0.89 1.49 
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 
𝑆ℎ1,𝑖 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.27 0.06 
𝑆ℎ2,𝑖 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.24 0.11 
𝑆ℎ3,𝑖 0.80 0.03 0.74 0.06 0.49 0.14 
𝛿 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.0012 0.00 
𝑔𝑡 0.99 0.00 1.14 0.00 1.04 0.00 
n 18 0.00 18 0.00 18 0.00 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 
𝑝𝑖,𝑡 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.01 
?̅?𝑖𝑅,𝑡 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 
𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 1,150,426.00 0.00 1,735,703.00 0.00 1,965,153.00 0.00 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑡 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 
𝐻𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
Note: all the nominal data in the table are deflated by CPI.
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In order to find out the variation of all of the variables over time, I will break the 
whole period year by year. Table 3.4 shows the summary of all the variables for 
the years 1999, 2007 and 2012, which represent the early, middle and late parts of 
the sample, respectively. From the table, it seems that Hong Kong banking industry 
has grown steadily. In the year 1999, the average bank loans were HKD 63.966.86 
million (USD 8,251.72 million), the average fix assets was HKD 3,361.18 million 
(USD 433.59 million), the average customer deposits was HKD 118,241.80 
million (USD 15,253.19 million). After thirteen years of development, these 
numbers have grown about three times by the year 2012. In 2012, the average bank 
loans sharply went up to HKD 238,266.61million (USD 30,736.39 million), the 
average fix assets were HKD 9,144.47 million (USD 1,179.59 million) and the 
average customer deposits increased to HKD 410,427.92 million (USD 52,945.20 
million). It is worth noting that average total costs peaked at HKD 13,841.15 
million (USD 1,785.51 million) in 2007, and the numbers in 2012 were only 
slightly larger than that in 1999. This is mainly due to the increase of interest 
expenses, which come from the high average lending rate in Hong Kong in 2007. 
Since the subprime crisis broke in August 2007, an influx of hot money into Hong 
Kong followed the Fed’s quantitative easing policy, and then the lending rate 
began to decline.  In addition, both the average price of labour and the average 
price of capital increased steadily while the price of deposits decreased gradually.  
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3.3.3 Data cleaning rules 
The bank level data were collected from Bankscope and banks’ Annual Reports. 
Bankscope is a widely used database that provides comprehensive account 
statements and financial information of banks. Thus, the sample spans 16 years 
from 1997 to 2012. In some cases, data from the consolidated statement may 
contain redundant information. Therefore, when an unconsolidated statement and 
a consolidated statement are both available, the unconsolidated statement is 
selected. However, for most banks in the Hong Kong market I will keep the 
consolidated data because there are large numbers of unconsolidated data that are 
missing. All of the data collect from Bankscope are checked with the banks’ 
Annual Reports.53 I have replaced incoherent data which differs from the Annual 
Reports. I also have eliminated observations that have negative and missing values 
for the needed variables.54  
 
3.3.3.1 Interest rate on loans 
Since the interest rate on loans are not reported in bank statements and other 
databases, I calculate the interest rate on loans by using following equation 
(Matthews and Zhang, 2010)55. 
                                                          
53 All the data of Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC) is collected from 
Annual Reports because the data in Bankscope is consolidated statements of the bank and its 
subsidiary and associated companies of Asia-Pacific region. The personal expenses in Hong Kong 
region are unavailable and can be calculated using personal expenses in Asia-Pacific region times 
the ratio of employees in Hong Kong by the total employees in Asia-Pacific region.  
54 For instance, the observation of 2001 personal expenses for Chiyu Bank (Hong Kong) is missing.  
55 The derivation of equation (3.32) is as follows. 𝑟𝐸 =
𝐼𝐸
𝑇𝐸
=
𝐼𝐿+𝐼𝑂
𝑇𝐸
=
𝐼𝐿
𝑇𝐸
+
𝐼𝑂
𝑇𝐸
=
𝐼𝐿
𝑦1
∗
𝑦1
𝑇𝐸
+
𝐼𝑂
𝑂
∗
𝑂
𝑇𝐸
=
𝑝 ∗ (
𝑦1
𝑇𝐸
) + 𝑟𝑂 ∗ (
𝑂
𝑇𝐸
) where 𝑟𝐸 is interest rate on earning assets, IE is interest earning, TE is total 
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                                           𝑝 = [(𝑟𝐸 − 𝑟𝑂 ∗
𝑂
𝑇𝐸
)] ∗
𝑇𝐸
𝑦1
                                 (3.32) 
where  p is the interest rate on loans, 𝑟𝐸 is the interest rate on earning assets, 𝑟𝑂 is 
the interest rate on other earning assets (in calculation, 91-day exchange fund bill 
rates are treated as interest rate on other earning assets), O is the other earning 
assets, TE is the total earning assets, and 𝑦1 is the loans. O, TE and 𝑦1 can be 
obtained from the bank balance sheet.  
Figure 3.5 below plots the interest rate on loans for 3 bank groups. 
Figure 3.5 Interest rate on loans for 3 banks groups 
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earning assets, IL is interest earnings on loans, IO is interest earnings on other earning assets,  𝑦1 
is loans, O is other earning assets, p is the interest rate on loans and 𝑟𝑂 is the interest rate on other 
earning assets. 
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I have classified all of the banks into three groups according to their market share, 
as measured by bank loans in 2012. I use average the interest rate on loans of the 
top three banks (i.e. HSBC, Bank of China and Hang Seng) to represent the lending 
rate of large banks, the average interest rate on loans from three banks in the middle 
group (i.e. Nanyang Commercial Bank, Wing Hang and CITIC) to represent the 
lending rate of middle banks, and the average interest rate on loans from three 
banks in the bottom group (i.e. Fubon, Chiyu and Public) to present the lending 
rate of small banks. Figure 3.5 illustrates the changes of interest rate over the 
period from 1997 to 2012. In general, there is no great difference in interest rate 
on loans between these three groups. The only exceptions are for some particular 
years, such as 2000 and 2008, when the interest rates on the loans from small banks 
were slightly lower than those of large and middle banks. 
 
3.3.3.2 The number of employees 
Due to the lack of data on the number of employees, I have calculated the number 
of employees using following methods (Matthews et al., 2007). 
    For bank i, if the observations are only unavailable for certain years, then I have 
calculated the growth rate of prices of labour for other years. I have then taken an 
average and forecast the price of labour for the missing data years. After which, 
the unknown observations can be calculated using forecasted price labour divided 
by the personal expenses56. If data is unavailable for bank i over the whole period, 
                                                          
56 For example, the number of labor of SCB (Hong Kong) is missing from 2008 to 2012. In order 
to calculate the 2008 staff number, I firstly calculate the growth rate of price of labor for each year 
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then I assume that in a competitive market, bank i and j, which are the same size,57 
should have a similar price for labour. Then, the following equation should hold: 
                                         𝑝𝑙,𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
𝐿𝑗,𝑡
= 𝑝𝑙,𝑗,𝑡                                    (3.33) 
where 𝑝𝑙,𝑖,𝑡 is the labour price of bank i at time t, 𝑝𝑙,𝑗,𝑡 is the labor price of bank j 
at time t, 𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the personal expenses of bank i at time t, 𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡 is the personal 
expenses of bank j at time t, 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the number for labour of bank i at time t, 𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is 
the number for labour bank j at time t. 
    Therefore, the number for labour of bank i, 𝐿𝑖,𝑡, is
58 
                                                     𝐿𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡∗𝐿𝑗,𝑡
𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡
                                             (3.34) 
 
3.3.4 Summary 
My database consists of an unbalanced panel of annual observations for the Hong 
Kong banking industry, spanning the 16 years from 1997 to 2012. The sample 
covers 18 licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong in that period. These 18 
banks occupy a large proportion of the market share of the Hong Kong banking 
                                                          
by using the following formula, 𝑔𝑙 =
𝑃𝐸𝑡+1
𝐿𝑡+1
𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐿𝑡
− 1 , where gl is the growth rate of prices of labor, PE 
is personal expenses, L is the number of labor. Then I take average of each year to obtain the 
average growth rate which is 0.15878. Since the price of labor for 2007 is 0.63939, the price of 
labor for 2008 is equal to 0.63939*(1+0.15878) = 0.7408. After that, the number of labor for 2008 
can be calculate as Personal expenses of 2008 divided by the price of labor 2008 which is about 
5466.  
57 Total assets or net loans are used for comparison.  
58 The numbers of labor for the following banks are calculated using Equation (3.34): Chiyu 
Banking Corporation Limited, Chong Hing Bank Limited, DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited, 
Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Limited, Nanyang Commercial Bank Limited and Public Bank (Hong 
Kong) Limited.  
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industry. Among these banks, HSBC (Hong Kong) is the largest and it has the 
largest market share. The main characteristics of the Hong Kong banking industry 
during the sample periods have also been introduced. It has been shown that the 
shock wave from the Asian financial crisis still has an effect on the Hong Kong 
banking industry, which can be seen in the major indicators of bank performance, 
such as the amount of banks loans and deposits. Data cleaning rules have also been 
introduced in detail in this section.   
 
3.4 Empirical study and results 
3.4.1 Introduction 
In this section, the unbalanced panel of Hong Kong bank level data for the period 
1997 to 2012 is used to estimate the magnitude and significance of switching costs. 
The results from the joint estimation of a first-order condition (equation 3.25), 
market share equation (equation 3.27), and cost system (equation 3.28 and 3.29) 
using non-linear 3SLS are presented. The results of a robustness test using a GMM 
approach is also shown in this section.  
 
3.4.2 Empirical results     
The first order condition (equation 3.25), the market share equation (equation 3.27), 
and the trans-log cost system including inputs share equations (equation 3.28 and 
3.29) are jointly estimated using the non-linear 3SLS approach. In contrast to Kim 
(1985), bank loans 𝑦1 (output) are treated as an endogenous variable since they are 
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correlated with the shock  𝑢𝑖,𝑡  in equation 3.25. The reason for this is that the 
unobserved supply shocks are captured by the error term and the bank loans 
depend on this unobserved supply shock. In order to solve the endogeneity 
problem, the endogenous variables in these models use the time differences of the 
market shares (σi,t-1, σi,t, σi,t+1), the interest rate on loans, and the bank loans, which 
are instrumented by various lags of the market shares up to 3 years,59 one time 
period lag of the interest rate on loans, real GDP, inflation rate, Hong Kong 
Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) rate and the wage rate of Hong Kong60.  
Table 3.7 shows the estimated results of trans-log cost system and switching 
costs equations from 1997 to 2012 using non-linear 3SLS. The first, second, and 
last column of this table describe the variables in the model, the parameters and 
the coefficients of estimation, respectively. In a trans-log cost system, all of the 
variables are in logarithmic form. All of the explanatory variables are normalized 
by their sample means. According to the results, the coefficient of bank loans 𝛿1 
is positive and significant at 0.8942. This refers to the elasticity of total cost w.r.t. 
bank loans, at the means of the data (the derivation can be seen in Appendix A.3). 
By looking into the influence of bank inputs prices on total costs, it can be found 
that all of the coefficients of exogenous input prices are positive and significant. 
The coefficient of input prices on labour is 0.1581. The coefficient of the input 
prices on capital is 0.1591 and the coefficient of the input prices on deposits, which 
is higher than the other two, is equal to 0.6828.    
                                                          
59 Kim et al. (2003) also use various lags of the market shares as instrumental variables.  
60 Ho (2010) also uses a set of instrumental variables includes HIBOR and wage index when 
estimating marginal costs using translog cost function for Hong Kong banking industry.  
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Table 3.7 System estimation of trans-log cost system and switching costs 
equations using non-linear 3SLS. Included observation=275. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis 61 
Variable Parameter Coefficient 
Equation (3.28): Dependent Variable 𝒍𝒏𝑪 
Constant 𝛽0 9.1098*** 
(0.0496) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛿1 0.8942
*** 
(0.0581) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛿11 0.0109
 
(0.0103) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾11 -0.0447** 
(0.0211) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾12 -0.0426*** 
(0.0187) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾13 0.0873*** 
(0.0329) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽1 0.1581*** 
(0.0170) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽2 0.1591*** 
(0.0140) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽3 0.6828*** 
(0.0270) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽11 0.0869*** 
(0.0180) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽22 0.0760*** 
(0.0191) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽33 0.2037*** 
(0.0167) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽12 0.0204 
(0.0181) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽13 -0.1073*** 
(0.0102) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽23 -0.0964*** 
(0.0084) 
Equation (3.25) and (3.27): Dependent Variable pcm and ∆𝛔 
Parameter Coefficient 
s 0.1947*** 
(0.0675) 
α1 -4.7367*** 
(0.6638) 
                                                          
61  Note: 1: * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, ***indicates 1%    
significance level. Note 2: The restrictions for symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 =
1; ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 = 0 ; ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙 = 0 are imposed. Note 3: Since the above restrictions are imposed directly into the 
Eviews files, therefore the standard errors of 𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝟏
𝟐
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝟏,𝒊,𝒕
𝟐 ,
𝟏
𝟐
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝟐,𝒊,𝒕
𝟐  𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝟏
𝟐
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝟑,𝒊,𝒕
𝟐  are 
calculated by hand. In the Eviews, the standard errors of the reported coefficients are the square roots of the 
diagonal elements of the coefficient covariance matrix. The formula of calculating standard error for sum of 
two variables is se1+2 = √𝑠𝑒1
2 + 𝑠𝑒2
2 + 2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒1,2. The covariance matrix is shown in Appendix A.4. 
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The point estimate of the switching costs s, based on the entire sample, is 0.1947, 
which is statistically significant at the 1% significant level. The positive s indicates 
the existence of switching costs in the bank loans market in Hong Kong. This 
model prices all kinds of switching barriers into switching costs. There are two 
major switching patterns in the market. One is that a borrower may terminate the 
loan agreement when sufficiently better loan contract are provided by a rival bank. 
Another is that a borrower may consider switching to other banks after maturity of 
the loan. The switching costs may be underestimated because the model assumes 
that all of the changes in the market shares are driven by switching behaviour. This 
assumption overestimates the number of switchers and then, therefore, 
underestimates switching costs. These results are consistent with Yuan’s (2010) 
study of 32 OECD and developing countries, which presents the maximize value 
of switching costs in Hong Kong is significant at 0.15. Compared with the results 
of Kim et al. (2003) in their study of the Norwegian banking industry, in which 
the average point estimate of switching costs is about 4.1% in Norway, the result 
of switching costs in Hong Kong bank loans market are higher.  
    The parameter estimates on the slope of the transition probability function for 
the entire sample, α1, is negative and significant at the 1% significant level, which 
is -4.7367. Since the loan demand function should be downward sloping, it is 
known that the lending rates and the demand of bank loans have a negative 
relationship. Then, it would seem that α1 needs to be negative to ensure a 
downward sloping demand curve. Since α1 measures the sensitivity of the 
transition probability to the bank’s own interest rate, the estimated value of α1 
indicates if bank’s own interest rate increases by one unit, while the probability 
             
102 
 
that a customer will continue to borrow from the same bank will decrease by 
4.7367 units.  
 
3.4.3 The effect of existence of switching costs on price-
cost margin  
In the absence of switching costs, the first order condition (equation 3.25) can be 
simplified as  
                                                𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = −
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝛼1
                                            (3.35) 
Then, by using the point estimates of α1 and the average market share  𝜎𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ , which 
is equal to 0.0545, the average price-cost margin when switching costs have been 
eliminated can be calculated equal to 0.0115. The average price-cost margin when 
switching costs exist is 0.0167. The difference between them is only 0.0052. 
Therefore, the existence of switching costs only raise the price-cost margin by 
0.52% (52bps), which is approximately 8.26%62 of the average interest rate on the 
loans’ value. This is mainly due to the competitive banking environment in Hong 
Kong. Furthermore, banks are also cross selling, which may increase the price of 
the other financial products to lock in customers. This low value of price-cost 
margin just satisfies the Bertrand behaviour of the market. Although the loan 
                                                          
62 The average interest rate on loans is equal to 6.30%, the details of how to calculate interest rate 
on loans are discussed in section 2. The number 8.26% is obtained by using 0.52% divided by 
6.30%.   
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market has a certain level of market power, the price-cost margins are still very 
low, due to competition.  
 
3.4.4 Switching costs during good times and bad times  
In order to compare the magnitude of switching costs during the good times and 
bad times, two time periods have been picked up. One is year 2002 to year 2007, 
the other is year 2007 to year 2012. In 2002, Hong Kong economy entered a 
recovery phase after the Asian financial crisis, when the economy rebounded 
sharply from 2003. The average real GDP growth rate was around 6%63during this 
period. Thus, this period can be considered as a good time. Then, for the period 
2007 to 2012, as a result of global financial crisis, economic activities notably 
slowed. Unemployment in Hong Kong rose and the growth rate of real GDP 
declined. Therefore, this period can be considered as a bad time. It can be seen 
from the Table 3.8 that the estimated switching costs based on period 2002-2007 
is 0. 1771 and the number of period 2007-2012 is 0. 1988. Both coefficients are 
positive and significant, but the magnitude of estimated switching costs during the 
bad time is slightly larger than that of in good time. During the bad times, the issue 
of the “Lemons Problem” is more serious. Banks will be more willing to lend 
money to creditable customers. For the new borrowers, banks will charge a much 
higher risk premium or even reject their application. It is most likely that a higher 
estimated switching cost exists during the bad times.      
                                                          
63 Data source: HKMA Annual Reports.  
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Table 3.8 A contrastive analysis of switching costs during good times and 
bad times64 
 
Periods 2002-2007 2007-2012 
𝛼1 
(transition probability slope) 
-7.7564 *** 
(1.6216) 
-4.1670*** 
(0.7682) 
  s 
(switching costs) 
0.1771** 
(0.0883) 
0.1988* 
(0.1067) 
  
 
3.4.5 The contribution of customer’s added value to the 
lock-in phenomenon generated by switching costs  
The value of customer lock in can be clarified by the firm’s optimization. Define 
the marginal value of a locked-in customer, mvli,t, which is the increase of firm’s 
present value due to an addition locked-in customer beyond the increase in profits 
generated by the current sales to that customer, then  
                                              
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦𝑖,𝑡
=
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑚𝑣𝑙𝑖,𝑡                                    (3.36) 
 In a steady state, the market size remains constant, and then the contribution of 
lock-in customer as a proportion of the added value is  
                                   
𝑚𝑣𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
= −𝛿
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝛼1                               (3.37)  
(Appendix A.5 shows the derivation).  
                                                          
64 Note:  * indicates 10% significant level, ** indicates 5% significant level and *** indicates 1% significant 
level. 
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Based on the estimated switching costs s and α1, the value of 
𝑚𝑣𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
 is around 
2.54%.65 This reveals that 2.54% of the customer’s added value is attributed to the 
lock in effect generated by switching costs. 
 
3.4.6 Multi-outputs trans-log cost functions  
The bank loans are treated as output in trans-log cost function. There are several 
reasons to give up the other outputs such as bank other earning assets and bank net 
fees and commissions. The main reason is due to the multicollinearity problems 
between the regressors. Fee and commission income in the cost function requires 
a measure of the off-balance sheet output. Fee income is price times output. And 
the price is difficult to measure. Recent studies find that fee income is procyclical 
and positively correlated with interest earning assets and complementary and 
therefore will results problem of multicollinearity. As is shown in the Table 3.9, 
the correlation between 𝑙𝑛𝑦1  and 𝑙𝑛𝑦2  is highly reached to 0.9324, and the 
correlation between 𝑙𝑛𝑦2 and 𝑙𝑛𝑦3 is extremely high to 0.9525. This suggests the 
presence of a muticollinearity problem. Under this situation, OLS estimators may 
be imprecise because of large standard errors. The large standard error will 
generate low t-statistics and it may affect coefficients fail to attain statistical 
significance. A reversal sign of coefficients might exist and addition or deletion of 
few observations may result in substantial changes in the estimated coefficients. 
Furthermore, Kim (1986) provides evidence that a composite measure of output 
                                                          
65 Average 3 month Treasury Bill Rate of Hong Kong for period 1997 to 2012 is used as discount 
rate.  
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fails to provide a proper explanation of banking technology and he suggests a 
single output to be used in banking research. In addition, Hou and Dickinson (2007) 
shows other earning assets are the complementary for loans. Therefore include the 
other earning assets and fees and commissions into the trans-log cost system will 
not have significant impact on the marginal costs of loans. Hence, the magnitude 
of switching costs estimated by the Kim et al. (2003)’s model will have no 
significant change if multi-outputs trans-log cost function is applied.  
Table 3.9 Correlation between bank loans (𝒍𝒏𝒚𝟏), other earning assets 
(𝒍𝒏𝒚𝟐) and net fees and commissions (𝒍𝒏𝒚𝟑)  
 
 𝑙𝑛𝑦1 𝑙𝑛𝑦2 𝑙𝑛𝑦3 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1 1 0.932448 0.958728 
𝑙𝑛𝑦2 0.932448 1 0.952576 
𝑙𝑛𝑦3 0.958728 0.952576 1 
 
 
3.4.7 Marginal costs 
Figure 3.6 presents the general trend in marginal costs of three bank groups from 
year 1997 to year 2012. There are not many differences in the overall pattern of 
marginal costs between groups. However, great changes have taken place in 
marginal costs over the years. Before 2001, the marginal costs remained at a 
relevant high level, for instance the marginal cost of HSBC reached a high point 
at 16.94% in 2000. It appears that big banks with large market shares have slightly 
higher marginal costs than small banks. In 2002, the numbers sharply went down 
and then hit a bottom in 2003. From the year 2004 to 2007, the marginal costs 
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steadily increased year by year, but it started to drop down in 2008. Until 2011, 
the marginal costs rose again. It would seem that the marginal costs are higher 
when a financial crisis happens. The main reason for this is that high interest 
payments increase marginal costs. The average lending rate in Hong Kong is 
shown in Figure 3.7. This figure provides some interesting phenomenon that the 
marginal costs and average lending rate has a similar trend. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the fluctuation of interest rate will lead to changes of marginal costs.     
Figure 3.6 Marginal costs of three banks groups using non-linear 3SLS 
approach 
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Figure 3.7 Average lending rate in Hong Kong from 1997 to 2012 
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Data Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
 
3.4.8 Economies of scale  
According to the results of 3SLS, the coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡  is positive and 
significant at 0.8942, which is less than 1. This implies that there are overall 
economies of scale. In order to evaluate the economies of scale, AC-MC is 
calculated. Figure 3.8 shows the difference between average costs and marginal 
costs for different bank groups. It seems that, although the difference is not big, 
banks are operating where average costs are higher than marginal costs. This states 
that banks are in the range of economies of scale and means that the banks can 
reduce the average cost of lending by expanding the amount of loans, especially 
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for the small banks. This finding is consistent with Ho (2014), who examines the 
economies of scale in Hong Kong’s banking industry using a panel data of 23 
banks for the period 2004 to 2010. His findings reveal that scale economies exist, 
especially in smaller categories of banks. 
Figure 3.8 AC-MC (unit: million HKD) 
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3.4.9 Robustness test using GMM approach  
As a robustness check, I estimate the models using a GMM approach. The results 
are shown in Table 3.10. Similar results are obtained using the GMM method. All 
of the estimated coefficients have the same signs as the non-linear 3SLS and the 
parameters are even more significant when using GMM. The coefficient of bank 
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loans is 0.8360, which is smaller than the number using non-linear 3SLS. Using 
GMM, the coefficients of input prices on labour and capital are smaller but the 
coefficient of input prices on deposits is larger. The switching cost is positive and 
significant at 0.1980, which is slightly larger than using the non-linear 3SLS 
method. The parameter estimates on the slope of the transition probability function 
for the entire sample, α1, is negative and significant at -6.2626. 
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Table 3.10 System estimation of trans-log cost system and switching costs 
equations using GMM. Included observation=275. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis66 
Variable Parameter Coefficient 
Equation (3.28): Dependent Variable lnC  
Constant 𝛽0 9.0278*** 
(0.0472) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛿1 0.8360*** 
(0.0427) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛿11 0.0362*** 
(0.0096) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾11 -0.0640*** 
(0.0191) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾12 -0.0578*** 
(0.0174) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾13 0.1218*** 
(0.0298) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽1 0.1413*** 
(0.0158) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽2 0.1374*** 
(0.0134) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽3 0.7213*** 
(0.0259) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽11 0.0866*** 
(0.0166) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽22 0.0714* 
(0.0393) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽33 0.2136*** 
(0.0376) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽12 0.0278 
(0.0169) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽13 -0.1144*** 
(0.0092) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽23 -0.0992*** 
(0.0353) 
Equation (3.25) and (3.27): Dependent Variable pcm and ∆σ 
Parameter Coefficient 
s 0.1980*** 
(0.0353) 
α1 -6.2626*** 
(1.2369) 
                                                          
66  Note: 1: * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, ***indicates 1%    
significance level. Note 2: The restrictions for symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 =
1; ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 = 0 ; ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙 = 0 are imposed. Note 3: Since the above restrictions are imposed directly into the 
Eviews files, therefore the standard errors of 𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝟏
𝟐
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝟏,𝒊,𝒕
𝟐 ,
𝟏
𝟐
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝟐,𝒊,𝒕
𝟐  𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝟏
𝟐
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝟑,𝒊,𝒕
𝟐  are 
calculated by hand. In the Eviews, the standard errors of the reported coefficients are the square roots of the 
diagonal elements of the coefficient covariance matrix. The formula of calculating standard error for sum of 
two variables is se1+2 = √𝑠𝑒1
2 + 𝑠𝑒2
2 + 2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒1,2. The covariance matrix is shown in Appendix A.4. 
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Figure 3.9 describes the trend of marginal costs of three bank groups using GMM 
estimation. Although some of the values are higher than non-linear 3SLS 
estimation, the overall trend of marginal costs remain the same.  
Figure 3.9 Marginal costs using GMM approach 
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The results of GMM estimation confirms the existence of switching costs in the 
loan market of the Hong Kong banking industry, therefore the findings from the 
non-linear 3SLS estimation are robust.    
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3.4.10 Summary   
This section estimated an empirical model which is based on Kim et al.’s (2003) 
study. It examines the banking behaviour in the presence of switching cost in Hong 
Kong bank loan market during 1997 to 2012. I find that, when using the non-linear 
3SLS approach, the point estimates of the switching costs, s, based on the entire 
sample is significant at 0.1947. This indicates the existence of switching costs in 
the bank loans market in Hong Kong. The estimates that the slope of the transition 
probability function for the entire sample, α1, is negative and significant at -4.7367. 
The effect of the existence of switching costs only raises the price-cost margin by 
0.52% (52bps), about 8.26% of the average interest rate on the loans’ value. 
Compared with the results of Kim et al. (2003) for the Norwegian banking industry, 
switching costs are higher in the Hong Kong bank loans market. I also compare 
the magnitude of switching costs between good times and bad times for the Hong 
Kong market. The empirical results suggest that the magnitude of estimated 
switching costs during the bad time is slightly larger than that of in good time. 
Moreover, on average, 2.54% of the customer’s added value is attributed to the 
lock in effect generated by switching costs. Based on the results of marginal costs, 
the Hong Kong banking industry is in the range of economies of scale. All of the 
results are robust since the GMM approach has also been applied into the empirical 
model and similar results have been obtained.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have applied an empirical model of banking behaviour to estimate 
the significance and magnitude of switching costs in Hong Kong bank loans 
market using a non-linear 3SLS approach. The sample contains an unbalanced 
panel of annual data collected from 18 licensed banks in Hong Kong, spanning 16 
years from 1997 to 2012.  I have obtained evidence which suggests the existence 
of switching costs in Hong Kong banking industry. The average point estimate of 
switching cost based on entire sample is 0.1947. The existence of switching costs 
only increase the price-cost margin by 0.52% (52bps), which amounts to about 
8.26% of the average interest rate on the loans’ value. This is mainly due to the 
competitive banking environment in Hong Kong. In such a banking environment, 
there is no distinct difference regarding the lending prices between banks. In order 
to obtain more profits, the banks need to provide cross selling which may increase 
the price of the other financial products to lock in customers. Therefore, it seems 
that the switching costs are also priced into the other financial products prices.    
Moreover, I have also compared the magnitude of switching costs during the 
good times and bad times. It is most likely that a higher estimated switching cost 
exist during the bad times. It seems that during the bad times, the issue of the 
“Lemons Problem” is more serious. Banks will be more willing to lend money to 
creditable customers. For the new borrowers, banks will charge a much higher risk 
premium or even reject the application from them. On average, 2.54% of the 
customer’s added value is attributed to the lock in effect generated by switching 
costs. Estimated marginal costs are obtained from estimation, and I find that the 
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Hong Kong bank loans market is in the range of economies of scale. It means that 
banks can reduce the average cost of lending by expanding the amount of loans. 
Finally, a robustness check using the same models but GMM approach has also 
been estimated. Similar results have been obtained, which indicates that the 
findings from non-linear 3SLS approach are robust.  
Since switching costs offer banks a degree of market power, the possible 
implications of switching costs on competition mean that switching costs are also 
an important issue for regulators. Klemperer (1995) suggests that in general the 
existence of switching costs raise prices, increase deadweight loss, and discourage 
market entry. So should government make policies that encouraging lower 
switching costs and reduce entry barriers? Although significant switching costs 
have been found in Hong Kong’s bank loans market, they may not necessarily be 
anti-competitive or welfare reducing because this is a partial analysis. The 
empirical model based on Kim et al.’s (2003) study only take the loan market into 
account. As a result, government policies should try to figure out the size of 
welfare losses in Hong Kong due to the switching costs before encouraging 
activities that reduce switching costs.  
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Chapter 4 
Testing for Collusion and 
Competition in Hong Kong’s Banking 
Sector: Conjectural Variation 
Approach 
4.1 Introduction  
As the wave of global economic integration has risen, almost every nation has tried 
their best to enhance the degree of openness and improve their national welfare. In 
order to adapt to the requirements of economic openness, financial regulation is 
increasingly becoming relaxed and competition in the banking industry has 
gradually been intensified. However, competition in the banking industry of both 
developed countries and emerging market countries has not always been smooth, 
and they have suffered financial crises as well as growth. In particular, since 
August 2007, the US sub-prime crisis has triggered a new round of global financial 
turmoil and a number of large-scale integrated banking institutions (such as 
Citigroup, UBS and HSBC Group) have suffered serious losses. With the further 
evolution of the sub-prime crisis during the global financial turmoil, market 
pessimism has been increasingly intense and the world’s banking industry has 
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plunged into panic and turmoil, which has caused serious losses for the 
development of the entire global economy. Therefore, the question of how to 
achieve workable competition in the banking industry is becoming an urgent focus 
of study. 
The main reasons for choosing the Hong Kong banking industry for the present 
study are three-fold. First, Hong Kong has one of the highest concentrations67 of 
banking institutions in the world.  The banking industry dominates the financial 
system in Hong Kong. However, the Hong Kong banking industry has gone 
through many hardships during its development; for instance, the Asian financial 
crisis and the sub-prime financial crisis. Researchers are interested in the 
competitive condition for Hong Kong banking industry in order to obtain a stable 
monetary and financial environment. Second, Hong Kong is the world’s premier 
offshore RMB business centre. The increasing economic integration between 
Hong Kong and mainland China reflects the importance of Hong Kong in 
providing funding for investment in China. Third, only a limited number of 
empirical studies have investigated the degree of collusion and competitive 
condition in Hong Kong banking market. In order to fill the gap in the empirical 
work, I aim to study the degree of collusion and the level of market competition in 
Hong Kong bank loans market using a conjectural variation approach. Consistent 
with the database used in Chapter 3, the empirical estimation is based on an 
unbalanced panel of annual observations from 18 banks incorporated in Hong 
Kong during 1997 to 2012.  
                                                          
67 As discussed in Chapter 2 (p.27), the 3-bank concentration ratio of Hong Kong is at 72.15% in 
2011 and the 5-bank concentration ratio is 81.39% in 2011 (Data source: World Bank). 
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This chapter measures the degree of collusion and the nature of competitive 
condition among the 18 Hong Kong banks during 1997 to 2012 using conjectural 
variation approach.  This approach was introduced by Iwata (1974), Bresnhan 
(1982) and Lau (1982), which was established on the belief that rival banks may 
react if a bank varies its own output or price. The conjectural parameter is often 
defined as the bank’s expectation about its rivals’ prices responses to changes in 
its own price. The theoretical model used to estimate the conjectural variation 
parameter is based on Coccorese (2005). The system contains a log demand 
function, a pricing equation and a trans-log cost system, which is jointly estimated 
using non-linear 3SLS and GMM approach. The estimated conjectural variation 
parameter λ is insignificant at 0.3452 using non-linear 3SLS approach. And the 
parameter is equal to 0.6001 using GMM approach which is also insignificant. The 
empirical results suggest that banks in Hong Kong operated in a competitive 
fashion in the loan market and the behaviour is coherent with a Nash- Bertrand 
equilibrium in prices with no significant evidence of collusion on pricing. These 
findings are consistent with Wong et al. (2007) and Ho (2010). The trend of 
marginal costs and price-cost margins of banks presented in this section are 
consistent with the results in Chapter 3.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides the 
literature reviews on bank competition especially focus on conjectural variation 
approach. The theoretical and empirical methodologies are also presented here. 
Section 4.3 discusses the data and variables. Section 4.4 shows the empirical 
results. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.  
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4.2 Literature reviews and methodology 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Market power and competition is an important field of study in the banking 
industry. This section will discuss the previous literature of measuring banking 
competition, especially that using the conjectural variation approach. In addition, 
an empirical model using a conjectural variation approach that builds on Coccorese 
(2005) is introduced. In this chapter, the conjectural parameter is defined as the 
bank’s expectation about its rivals’ prices responses to changes in its own price. 
 
4.2.2 Literature reviews 
4.2.2.1 Measures of competition  
4.2.2.1.1 Structural approach  
 
In order to measure the degree of competition in the banking market, the literature 
can be usually divided into structural and non-structural approaches. Bikker and 
Haaf (2002b), Degryse et al. (2009) and Arrawatia and Misra (2012) present 
excellent reviews on the methodological approaches and empirical research related 
to competition, especially in the banking industry. The structural approach (or the 
traditional industrial organization (IO) approach) measures banking competition 
from market structure, which is based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP) paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977), 
as well as some other formal approaches that originated from industrial 
organisation theory. The SCP model was developed by Bain (1956) and it links 
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market concentration with competition. It was quite popular until the beginning of 
the 1990s. The SCP model assumes a stable causal relationship among structure, 
conduct and performance. It explains how an exogenous market structure that 
influences a bank’s conduct can affect their market performance. According to the 
SCP paradigm, market structures influence the conduct of banks in the industry. It 
assumes that a more concentrated market will stimulate collusion among the banks 
and then reduce the degree of competition (increase market power) in that market. 
It then assumes that the conduct of the banks’ influences their market performance. 
Although the less competitive behaviour of the banks leads to higher profitability, 
it lowers the social efficiency. A number of indicators have been used as a proxy 
for market concentration; for instance, n-bank concentration ratio68 or Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). 69  Assuming that the market structure is exogenous, 
researchers often regress a measure of bank performance; for example, bank 
profitability on market concentration indicators and some other control variables 
that may affect the bank’s profits. 70  The SCP hypothesis implies a positive 
relationship between market concentration and bank profitability. Furthermore, the 
SCP hypothesis also assumes that greater barriers to entry will increase the 
exercise of market power. There is a vast body of literature that has used the SCP 
                                                          
68 The n-bank concentration ratio can be calculated as the sum of the market shares of n largest 
firms in the industry.  
69 HHI can be measured as the sum of the squares of market shares for all firms in the industry. It 
ranges from 1/N to 1. The higher HHI, the more concentrated in the industry. The industry is 
monopoly when HHI equal to 1. 
70 It should be noted that most studies using SCP approach to the banking industry do not put a 
measure of bank conduct into the model, the only exception is Calem and Carlino (1991) (Bikker 
and Haaf, 2002b). 
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approach to study the relationship between market concentration and market 
performance.  
Some earlier researchers have summarised the literature that has used an SCP 
approach, for instance, Gilbert (1984), Molyneux et al. (1996) and Weiss (1974). 
Weiss (1974) reviewed 46 published studies that used the SCP model to address 
the relationship between concentration and profits before the early 1970s. Most of 
these studies found a positive relationship between market concentration and 
market power or profitability (Church and Ware, 2000).  Berger and Hannan (1989) 
studied the relationship between deposit rate and concentration for the US retail 
deposit market using quarterly data from 1983Q3 to 1985Q4, which can be 
considered as a representative paper using the SCP approach. They verify the SCP 
hypothesis and finds that higher market concentration means that higher market 
power will lead to lower deposit rates.  
The SCP paradigm has been criticized by many researchers due to its theoretical 
and empirical problems. For an overview, see Berger et al. (2004) and Degryse et 
al. (2009) and Church and Ware (2000). For example, the assumption of the 
traditional SCP paradigm that the market structural is exogenous is questionable. 
The efficiency hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977) suggests that the 
market structure is endogenous, which can be influenced by conduct and 
performance. In addition, concentration is due to the higher degree of efficiency 
of banks. In an oligopoly framework, the market shares and the exercise of market 
power are endogenous, which is determined by the firm’s conduct and some other 
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factors. Finally, an endogenous concentration can be seen as a reason for the 
barriers to entry (Baumol et al., 1983).  
 
4.2.2.1.2 Non-structural approach  
In order to solve the problems with the structural measures of competition, the 
non-structural approach was developed in the 1980s. This approach is also called 
the new empirical industrial organisation (NEIO) approach. The aim of the non-
structural approach is to obtain the firms’ conduct directly without taking market 
structure or market shares into account. The innovation of new empirical industrial 
organisation can be summarized by the following three points. Firstly, the 
traditional industrial organisation approach only pays attention to market structure 
analysis framework, while the NEIO approach turns away from market structure 
to market behaviour. Secondly, the traditional IO approach follows a static 
paradigm, but the NEIO establishes a bi-directional and dynamic research 
framework. Finally, it breakthroughs the neo-classical theoretical assumptions of 
the IO approach and establishes a research approach under the condition of 
incomplete information. Several models and indicators are popularly used in bank 
competition literature; for example, the Panzar-Rosse (1987) model, Lerner Index 
Lerner (1934), the Boone (2008) Competition Indicator, structural demand models 
(Dick, 2008) and Conjectural Variation approach (Iwata, 1974; Bresnhan, 1982; 
Lau, 1982).  
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4.2.2.1.2.1 Literature of the Panzar-Rosse model  
The Panzar and Rosse (1987) model has been widely used in the empirical 
literature related to bank competition. This approach estimates a reduced form 
price function or revenue equation using cross-section data to access the 
competitive behaviour of banks. An H-statistic, which is a measure of bank 
competition, can be obtained as the sum of the elasticities of a bank’s revenue with 
respect to its input prices. Rosse and Panzar (1977), Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987) 
show that when the H-statistic is negative or zero, the structure of the market can 
be considered as monopolistic. This case includes collusive oligopoly and may 
include conjectural variation short run oligopoly (Shaffer 1982, 1983). An increase 
of input prices which shifts average cost curve and marginal cost curve upward 
will result in no change or a decrease in revenue. When the H-statistic is equal to 
one, the market is under perfect competition. In this case, an increase in both 
average cost and marginal cost due to an increase in input prices will lead to a one-
to-one increase in revenues without altering the optimal output of individual firms. 
Finally, when the H-statistic is between zero to one, the market is characterized by 
monopolistic competition.  An important condition to get accurate results is that 
the market should be in long-term equilibrium. The Panzar-Rosse approach has 
both limitations and advantages. For instance, it only requires firm-level data, such 
as revenues and input prices, which can be easily obtained. In addition, the Panzar-
Rosse approach is robust in a small sample. Further details of the literature related 
to the Panzar-Rosse approach will present in Chapter 5. 
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4.2.2.1.2.2 Literature of the Lerner Index  
The Lerner index was proposed by Lerner (1934) to measure a firm’s market 
power. It can be calculated as the difference between price and marginal costs, 
divided by price. This index ranges from 0 to 1. A higher Lerner Index implies a 
higher market power. When the Lerner Index is equal to 0, where price is equal to 
marginal costs, the firm is considered as a perfectly competitive. The Lerner Index 
is equivalent to the negative inverse of price elasticity demand facing the firm. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Peria (2010) show that the advantage of Lerner index 
compared with Panzar-Rosse H statistic is that it is not a long-run equilibrium 
measure of competition. Therefore, it can be calculated at each point of time. 
However, the main limitation of this measure is that marginal costs are difficult to 
get. Hence, by focusing on this problem, Baker and Bresnahan (1988) present a 
method that used the residual demand elasticity to measure the size of market 
power, which simplifies the actual measurement of market power. Goldberg and 
Rai (1996) used the stochastic cost frontier regression, which was proposed by 
Aigner et al. (1977) to measure bank efficiency, and put it directly into Berger and 
Hannan’s (1997) testing model. They use the ratio of net interest income (the 
difference between deposits and loans) to total asset as one of the indicators to 
measure the bank performance. They then applied the method to the banking 
market using the data of 11 European countries for the period 1988-1991. Their 
findings suggest that concentration and profit margins are not significantly 
positively correlated, which does not support the SCP hypothesis. However, in 
those countries which have a low concentration in banking market, the efficient 
structure hypothesis is valid.    
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4.2.2.1.2.4 Literature of the Boone competition Indicator 
Although price cost margin is widely used as a measure of competition, there are 
some papers, such as Amir (2000), Bulow and Klemperer (2002), Rosenthal (1980) 
and Stiglitz (1989), that doubt the robustness of this measure. They find that more 
intense competition leads to higher price cost margin instead of lower. Boone 
(2008) introduces a new way to measure competition based on a firm’s Relative 
Profit Differences (RPD), which is theoretically robust as a measure of 
competition while the data requirements are simply as the price cost margin 
measure. This approach is based on the notion that in a more competitive market 
inefficiently firms are punished more harshly than more efficient ones. Therefore, 
efficiency can be defined as the possibility to produce the same output with lower 
costs. Then, comparing the relative profits between some random efficient firm 
and a firm with greater efficiency, it is found that a more competitive the market 
leads to a greater difference between efficiency and performance. Van 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) apply the Boone indicator to the bank loans market of 
five major countries in the Euro area in comparison to the UK, the US and Japan 
for the period 1994 to 2004. The innovation of their paper is to apply this method 
not only on entire banking market but also on separate product markets, such as 
the loan market, and for single types of banks. They also employ a trans-log cost 
function to estimate the marginal cost instead of average variable costs as a proxy 
(Boone et al., 2007). They find that different countries have different competition 
in the bank loans market. The Euro area is less competitive than the US market but 
more competitive than the UK and Japan. Van Leuvensteijn (2008) used the same 
dataset as Genesove and Mullin (1998) to show that the Boone competitive 
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indicator is better able to measure competition empirically. They use the data of 
the US sugar industry for the period 1890 to 1914. However, some researchers 
have queried its validity. Using a rich newly built data set for German 
manufacturing enterprises, Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke (2010) test the 
empirical applicability and robustness of Boone competitive indicator. Based on 
their findings, they argue that the Boone competitive indicator is not an empirically 
robust indicator to measure competition.  
 
4.2.2.1.2.5 Literature of structural demand models 
Some other papers have used a characteristics-based demand system, such as Dick 
(2008). Following the discrete choice literature, Dick (2008) estimates a structural 
demand model for commercial bank deposit services using US data for the period 
1993-1999.  Her results indicate that consumers are sensitive to both account fees 
and deposit interest rates. But when compared with deposit rates it was found that 
the consumers respond a lesser extent to changes in account fees. Furthermore, she 
also showed evidence that staffing, geographic density, age, size and geographic 
diversification of banks have a positive relationship with consumer demand.  
 
4.2.2.1.2.6 Literature of the conjectural variation approach 
Iwata (1974), Bresnhan (1982) and Lau (1982) introduced a way to measure the 
degree of competition based on structural equations. This methodology is often 
called the conjectural-variations method, which is based on the belief that rival 
banks may react if a bank varies its own output or price. Therefore, a bank will 
take into account the variation in other banks’ price when choosing its own price. 
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This methodology often estimates a simultaneous-equation model, including a 
demand equation, a supply equation, which is derived from the first order 
condition of profit maximization, and a cost function, where a conjectural 
parameter expressing the degree of coordination of banks is included. The 
conjectural parameter is often defined as the bank’s expectation about its rivals’ 
prices responses to changes in its own price. In this chapter, I focus on the literature 
of measuring bank competition using a conjectural variation approach. 
Shaffer (1989) applies this method to a time series of aggregate data for the US 
banking industry from 1941 onwards, and rejects the collusive conduct hypothesis 
and finds that the US banking industry is consistent with perfect competition. He 
also uses this method to test the degree of competition in the Canadian banking 
industry and finds that conduct in the industry has resembled perfect competition 
for the period 1965 to 1989 (Shaffer, 1993). The attractive feature of this paper is 
that he extended the model to allow for heterogeneity with and between different 
sectors and countries, and included bank heterogeneity. Similar with Shaffer 
(1993), Berg and Kim (1998) estimates the conjectural variation parameter for 
different output sectors including retail and wholesale sectors of the loan market 
for Norwegian banking industry. They also found that the retail loan market has 
strong market power whereas the wholesale loan market is characterized by a 
competitive structure.  
Ruiz-Moreno et al. (2010) suggests that the main problem of conjectural 
variation approach is that the high number of firms in some industries may affect 
the availability of degrees of freedom that lead to extremely difficult or impossible 
estimation of conjectural variation models. Because of this problem, most of the 
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empirical literature using the conjectural variation approach does not analyse the 
competitive interactions between every firm in the industry. It often estimates a 
single parameter for all the banks in the market (e.g., Carbό et al., 2009 for Spain) 
or a single parameter for the group of the largest banks (e.g., Coccorese, 2005 for 
Italy). Most studies that apply the conjectural variation approach find little 
evidence of market power in European banking system (Liu et al., 2010). 
Coccorese (2005) studied the market conduct of the eight largest banks for the 
period 1998 to 2000 for the Italian banking industry. The results show there is no 
conflict between competition and concentration in the banking industry and these 
eight banks are consistent with a more competitive conduct than the Bertrand-Nash 
outcome. Based on Coccorese’s (2005) model, Aydemir (2013) examined the 
market conduct of the largest banks in the Turkish banking sector for the period 
1988 to 2009.  These results show collusive conduct in the loan market. 
Furthermore, the evidence verifies the view that high market concentration will 
lead to less competition, which is consistent with the SCP paradigm.  
 
4.2.2.1.2.7 The case of Hong Kong 
As one of the most important international financial centres in the world, the 
banking industry dominates the financial system in Hong Kong. In addition, Hong 
Kong has one of the highest market concentrations of banks in the market. 
According to the statistics from HKMA Annual Reports, from year 1997 to year 
2012, the number of authorized institutions in Hong Kong declined from 361 to 
200. The major reason for this was bank consolidation through mergers and 
acquisitions. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of Hong Kong banking 
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sector is higher than most developed countries (Jiang et al., 2004), which also 
indicates that Hong Kong has a high degree of concentration with enough potential 
room for market power by large banks. Such market behaviour may be considered 
as oligopolistic coordination, in which large banks may obtain a strong market 
power on prices.  
In order to maintain monetary and financial stability, a study of collusion 
behaviour and competitive conditions in the Hong Kong banking industry becomes 
meaningful. There has recently been a vast literature on measuring bank 
competition using a conjectural variation approach for different countries, such as 
Sjöberg (2004) for Swedish banks, Chaffai and Sellami (2014) for Tunisian 
commercial banks, Florian (2012) and Léon (2014) for west African banks, and 
Misra and Arrawatia (2013) for Indian commercial banks. However, only a limited 
number of empirical studies have investigated that competitive condition of, and 
concentration in, the Hong Kong banking market. Some empirical studies have 
been based on the Panzar-Rosse (1987) approach, such as Jiang et al. (2004), 
Wong et al. (2006) and Chu et al. (2013). These papers will be discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 5. Some other papers that have inferred the degree of market 
competition are based on the conjectural variation approach. For example, Wong 
et al. (2007) apply the model of Coccoresez (2005) and show that the Hong Kong 
bank loans market can neither be classified as monopoly nor perfect competition 
during the period 1991 to 2002, with no significant signs of collusion on pricing.  
Ho (2010) uses the data of 23 commercial banks in Hong Kong during 1997 to 
2004 and finds that the Hong Kong bank loans market is characterized by non-
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cooperative competitive behaviour in that period and the industry becomes more 
competitive after deregulation. 
 
4.2.3 Methodology 
The specification and estimation of the demand system follows Coccorese (2005) 
which use a price-setting model. The products are heterogeneous between firms 
and price competition. It then assumes that at any period t, the demand of loans for 
each bank depends on its own price, the price of rivals, and other exogenous factors 
(e.g., national income), as follows: 
                     𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡(𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑗𝑡, 𝑫𝑴𝒊𝒕), i = 1, … , 𝑛                           (4.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the quantity demanded, 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the interest rate on loans charged by 
bank i in period t, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 is an index of the alternative interest rate charged by bank 
i’s rivals in period t, 𝑫𝑴𝒊𝒕 is a vector of exogenous factors affect quantity demand, 
and n is the number of banks in the market. 
    The market is defined as the loan market of Hong Kong. There are 18 banks in 
the sample, therefore n is equal to 18. The market is treated as a duopolistic market, 
where each bank faces a single competitor, which is formed by the 17 remaining 
banks. The index of the rival banks’ interest rate on loans is calculated as the 
average interest rate on loans of the other 17 banks.  
    The cost function is affected by quantity of output and the exogenous input 
prices: 
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                     𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖𝑡(𝑦𝑖𝑡(. ), 𝒘𝒊𝒕)                                         (4.2) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the total costs of bank i in period t, and 𝒘𝒊𝒕 is a vector of exogenous 
input prices of bank i in period t.  
    The profit function of banks can be specified as  
                                𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡(𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 , 𝑫𝑴𝒊𝒕)𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑡(𝑦𝑖𝑡(. ), 𝒘𝒊𝒕)                (4.3) 
where 𝜋𝑖𝑡 is the profit of bank i in period t.  
    Then, maximising profit w.r.t. the 𝑝𝑖𝑡 
                       
𝜕𝜋𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖𝑡
= 𝑦𝑖𝑡 + (𝑝𝑖𝑡−𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡(. )) (
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖𝑡
+
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖𝑡
) = 0                 (4.4) 
where  𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡(. ) =
𝜕𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑡
 is the marginal cost of bank i in period t. After rearranging 
the above equation, the banks must satisfy the following first-order condition71: 
                                               𝑝𝑖 = 𝑚𝑐𝑖 −
1
𝜀𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑖
+𝜆
𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑝𝑗
                                             (4.5) 
By rearranging equation (4.5), the conjectural variation parameter is as follows: 
                                              λ = −
𝑝𝑗
𝜀𝑖𝑗
(
1
𝑝𝑖−𝑚𝑐𝑖
+
𝜀𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑖
)                                        (4.6) 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑖 =
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑖
𝑦𝑖
=
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖
 is the own-price elasticity of demand,  𝜀𝑖𝑗 =
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑝𝑗
𝑦𝑖
=
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑗
 is the cross-price elasticity of demand, and 𝜆 =
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑖
∈ [−∞, 1]  is the 
conjectural variation parameter of bank i. When 𝜆 = 1, the behaviours of the banks 
is  considered as perfectly collusive behaviour. When 𝜆 = −∞,  the market 
                                                          
71 The time subscript is omitted for notational convenience. 
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corresponds to the perfect competition. The intermediate value of 𝜆 corresponds 
to oligopolistic competition. In particular, when 𝜆 = 0, the behaviour is regarded 
as a Nash- Bertrand equilibrium in prices (Ho, 2010). The details of the 
explanation are discussed below.  
    Since demand should be downward sloping, then 𝜀𝑖𝑖 is expected a negative sign.  
And since loans between banks are substitute products, then 𝜀𝑖𝑗  is expected a 
positive sign. The conjectural variation parameter 𝜆  measures the degree of 
coordination of banks, which can be defined as the bank i’s expectation about its 
rivals’ price change responses to a change in its own price. 
A positive 𝜆 indicates that collusive pricing behaviour exists in the market, 
which means that a bank expects its rivals to match its own price. For instance, if 
a bank raises its own interest rate on loans, it seems that the quantity of loan will 
be reduced. If 𝜆 is positive, then the rival banks will also be expected to increase 
their interest rate on loan. Then, the equilibrium output will be reduced because 
the outputs of all of the banks are declining and the interest rates in the market will 
be increased. If the banks collude with each other, as in this case, then the banks’ 
joint profits will increase. The banks’ joint profits is maximised when 𝜆 = 1 
(perfect coordination), where banks are act as joint monopoly. They are perfectly 
matched in prices and the substitution effect in the market become not significant. 
A bank expects that all of the other banks act exactly same after it changes its own 
price.  
When 𝜆 = 0, the bank behaviour is coherent with a Nash equilibrium in price, 
where banks independently choose prices in order to maximize profits. A bank 
             
133 
 
expects its rivals to not response to any changes in its price. A negative 𝜆 implies 
that a bank expects its increase in price to be followed by a reduction in its rivals’ 
prices. Therefore, the extreme case when 𝜆 = −∞, corresponds to the perfect 
competition, in this case the first order condition (equation 4.5) can be written as 
P=MC. 
As shown in equation (4.6), the sign of the conjectural variation parameter λ is 
determined by the observed price-cost margin and its own price elasticity. If  
𝑝𝑖−𝑚𝑐𝑖
𝑝𝑖
>
1
|𝜀𝑖𝑖|
, in this case,  λ > 0, then the observed price cost margin is higher 
than that obtained from the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. This shows greater market 
power in the industry compared with that in the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium.  
 
4.2.4 Empirical model 
A system of demand function (equation 4.1), cost function (equation 4.2) and the 
first order condition (equation 4.5) is estimated simultaneously in order to obtain 
the conjectural variation parameter 𝜆 . A log-linear equation is applied to the 
demand function (equation 4.1)72: 
ln𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑙𝑛p𝑖,𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜑3𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝜑4𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖,𝑡   (4.7) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 and ln𝐹𝐴𝑡 are two exogenous factors affect the demand of loans. 
𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 is the natural logarithm of real GDP. 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑡 is the natural logarithm of 
the fix assets. This variable is a proxy of network size effect of the bank on its own 
                                                          
72 The log linear demand function is widely used in banking research. For instance, Coccorese(2005) 
uses log linear demand function to assess the market conduct for largest banks in Italy, Wong et al. 
(2007) investigates the degree of collusion in Hong Kong banking sector based on the model of 
Coccorese (2005), and Aydemir (2013) applies the same model for the Turkish banking sector.  
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demand.73 𝜗𝑖,𝑡 is a random error term representing demand shocks in period t. The 
estimated coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑡  ,𝜑1, is the own price elasticity and the estimated 
coefficient of  𝑙𝑛p𝑖,𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  , 𝜑2, can be interpreted as the cross-price elasticity. 
    Regarding the cost function, the same trans-log cost system (one output, three 
inputs) which Chapter 3 used is applied in this chapter. The trans-log cost function 
has previously been used in the literature of Hong Kong. For example, Kwan and 
Lui (2000), and Kwan (2006) used the stochastic frontier approach to analyse the 
cost efficiency of commercial banks in Hong Kong. Wong et al. (2007) used a two 
output, two inputs trans-log cost function to test collusion in the Hong Kong 
banking sector. Ho (2010) examines competition among commercial banks in 
Hong Kong following deregulation in a small open economy. 
    Then, bank i’s time-variant trans-log cost function (one output, three inputs) is 
as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2
(∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑙,𝑖,𝑡 +𝑙𝑘 𝛿11(𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡)
2) 
               + ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜅𝑖,𝑡                                                                        (4.8)                              
 
where Ci,t is total cost of bank i in period t and y1,i,t is bank i’s outputs in period t. 
Loans are treated as bank output.  𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 are three exogenous input 
prices on labor, capital and deposits, respectively. k, l=1,2,3. 𝜅𝑖,𝑡 is an error term. 
 
                                                          
73 Some papers, such as Coccorese (2005), use the number of branches of each bank as a proxy of 
network size effect. Since the data of the number of branches is missing for the Hong Kong banking 
industry, I will instead use fix assets.  
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From Shephard’s lemma, the input cost share equations can be written in 
deterministic form as 
              𝑆ℎ𝑘,𝑖 =
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑥𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑙,𝑖,𝑡𝑙 + 𝛾1𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡        (4.9) 
where 𝑆ℎ𝑘,𝑖 is the share of the kth factor in bank i’s period t production cost.  
    The following restrictions for symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices are 
imposed on the trans-log cost system: 
𝛽𝑘𝑙 = 𝛽𝑙𝑘, ∀𝑘, 𝑙 ;  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 = 1; ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 = 0 ;  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙 = 0, ∀𝑘.        (4.10) 
Then, the marginal cost can be written as  
𝑚𝑐1,𝑖,𝑡 =
𝜕𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
=
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
(𝛿1 + 𝛿11𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡)         (4.11) 
Then, by substituting equation (4.11) into (4.5), equation (4.5) becomes 
𝑝𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
(𝛿1 + 𝛿11𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑡) −
1
𝜑1
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+𝜆
𝜑2
𝑝𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡      (4.12) 
where 𝜇𝑖 is an random shock to bank i in year t.  
    Hence, the structural model contains the log demand function (equation 4.7), 
trans-log system including the share equations74 (equation 4.8 and 4.9), and the 
pricing equation (equation 4.12) are jointly estimated using non-linear 3SLS and 
GMM approach.  
                                                          
74 Since the sum of three input shares is equal to unity, one share equation is deleted from the 
system to avoid singularity problem. 
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4.2.5 The linkage between own price elasticity,  𝝋𝟏, and 
sensitivity of the transition probability to the bank’s own 
interest rate, 𝜶𝟏 
The function of total demand in Chapter 3 is given by equation 3.7 (p.79) as  
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦1,𝑖𝑅,𝑡−1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑅→𝑖,𝑡)𝑔𝑡 
Because the borrowers are assumed to have an inelastic demand for loans, a small 
increase of pi,t should have the same effect on the transition probabilities as the 
same size decrease of p̅iR,t. This implies α2 =−α1. Hence, the function of transition 
probabilities is shown in equation 3.15 (p.81) in Chapter 3 as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 − 𝑠) 
And the transition probability of a randomly selected rivals’ customer is (equation 
3.16 (p.81)): 
𝑃𝑟𝑖 𝑅→𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 −
𝑠
𝑛 − 1
) 
By substituting both equation (3.15) and equation (3.16) into equation (3.7), 
equation (3.7) can be written as: 
    𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡−1 (𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 − 𝑠)) + 𝑦1,𝑖𝑅,𝑡−1(𝛼0
𝑖 + 𝛼1 (𝑝𝑖,𝑡 −
                   ?̅?𝑖 𝑅,𝑡 −
𝑠
𝑛−1
))]𝑔𝑡                                                                             (4.13)         
Then, the price elasticity of demand 𝜑1 can be obtained as: 
              𝜑1 =
𝑑𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
= (𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡−1𝛼1 + 𝑦1,𝑖𝑅,𝑡−1𝛼1)
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑔𝑡                 (4.14) 
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Equation (4.14) shows the relationship between the price elasticity of demand 𝜑1 
and sensitivity of the transition probability to the bank’s own interest rate 𝛼1.  
 
4.2.6 Summary 
This section has reviewed the theoretical and empirical developments of the 
studies related to measure bank competition, especially those using the conjectural 
variation approach. A conjectural variation approach is applied in order to measure 
the degree of collusion and competition for the Hong Kong bank loan market. A 
structural model including a demand function (equation 4.7), a trans-log system 
(equation 4.8 and 4.9), and the pricing equation (equation 4.12) are jointly 
estimated to obtain the conjectural variation parameter 𝜆 . In this section, the 
linkage between own price elasticity and the sensitivity of the transition probability 
to the bank’s own interest rate in Chapter 3 is also presented. 
 
4.3 Data and variables 
4.3.1 Introduction  
In order to assess the reliability of the previous results in Chapter 3, the same 
dataset is used to examine the degree of competition in the banking sector of Hong 
Kong based on the conjectural variation approach. In this section, the data and 
summary statistics which are not presented in Chapter 3 are discussed. The details 
of the other data and variables can be found in Chapter 3.  
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4.3.2 Data   
Consistent with the dataset used in Chapter 3, the Hong Kong banking data are 
extracted from Bankscope and the Annual Reports of individual banks for the 
years from 1997 to 2012. The sample consists of balance sheet and income 
statement information of 18 licensed banks that are incorporated in Hong Kong. 
The panel data are annually and unbalanced. The sample of banks is listed in 
Appendix A.2, which also shows data availability of each bank. The bank-level 
data used in the estimation contains bank loans, bank total costs,75 number of 
labour, fix assets, customer deposits, and interest rate on loans. Table 3.1 in 
Chapter 3 provides the definition and measurement of these variables in detail. The 
data cleaning rules including the way to calculate the number of labour and interest 
rate on loans are also discussed in Chapter 3. All the nominal data are deflated by 
the CPI (2009M10-2010M9=100) collected from the DataStream.76 Macro data 
used for estimating the demand function, such as real GDP, is also collected from 
DataStream.77  
    In the model, the regressors tip ,   and tiy .,1  are positively correlated with the 
unobserved product characteristics that are captured by the error term 𝜔𝑖,𝑡  in 
equation 4.7. Therefore, the OLS estimator becomes biased. In order to solve the 
endogeneity problem, the endogenous variables in the model bank loans ( tiy .,1 ), 
the interest rate on loans( tip , and tiRp ,
_
) are instrumented by real GDP, inflation 
                                                          
75 Measured as the sum of total operating expenses and interest expenses. 
76  Data Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong.  
77  Data Source of real GDP and property price index: Oxford Economics. 
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rate, Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) rate, wage rate of Hong Kong, 
one lag of interest rate on loans, one lag of log interest rate on loans and average 
costs.78 . The Sargan test of over identifying restrictions has been applied to test 
the validity of the instrumental variables. The results suggest that all set of 
instrumental variables are validity. Table 4.1 shows the definition and 
measurement of variables including instrumental variables, which are not 
presented in Table 3.1 of Chapter 3. The summary of these variables is shown in 
Table 4.2. 
Table 4.1 The definition and measurement of variables (apart from 
presented variables in Table 3.1 of Chapter 3) 
 
Variable name  
(Instrumental Variables) 
Definition of each variable 
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 Average cost of bank i at time t. where  
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡/𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics (HKD million) 
 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 275 0.0672 0.0354 0.0184 0.1719 
 
Note: all the nominal data in the table is deflated by CPI.  
                                                          
78  To estimate the trans-log cost system, the same set of instrumental variables in Chapter 3 are 
applied. I use real GDP, inflation rate, Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) and wage 
index of Hong Kong as instrumental variables. To estimate demand function, I use average costs, 
one lag of log interest rate on loans as instrumental variables. I use one lag of interest rate on loans, 
real GDP, inflation, HIBOR and wage index of Hong Kong as instrumental variations in the pricing 
equation.  
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4.3.3 Summary 
Consistent with the database used in Chapter 3, this database consists of an 
unbalanced panel of annual observations for the Hong Kong banking industry for 
the period 1997 to 2012. The sample covers 18 licensed banks in Hong Kong in 
that period. The measurement and summary statistics of data that are not presented 
in Chapter 3 are discussed in this section.  
 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Using the conjectural variation approach, this chapter tests the degree of collusion 
and competition in the Hong Kong bank loan market. This section presents the 
empirical results from the joint estimation of a log demand function (equation 4.7), 
a trans-log cost system (equation 4.8 and 4.9), and a pricing equation (equation 
4.12) using non-linear 3SLS and GMM approaches.  
 
4.4.2 Empirical results  
The log demand function (equation 4.7), trans-log cost system, including the share 
equations (equation 4.8 and 4.9) and the pricing equation (equation 4.12), are 
jointly estimated using the non-linear 3SLS and GMM approach. In order to solve 
the endogeneity problem, the endogenous variables in the model bank loans ( tiy .,1 ), 
the interest rate on loans( tip , and tiRp ,
_
) are instrumented by real GDP, inflation 
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rate, Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) rate, wage index of Hong Kong, 
one lag of interest rate on loans, one lag of log interest rate on loans, and average 
costs. Empirical results using the non-linear 3SLS approach are presented in Table 
4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Empirical results of estimating conjectural variation parameter 
using non-linear 3SLS. Included observation=275. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis 79 
 
Variable Parameter Coefficient Variable Parameter Coefficient 
Demand equation (equation 4.7): 
 Dependent Variable 𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾13 0.1103*** 
(0.0372) 
Constant 𝜑0 -20.4057** 
(9.5679) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽1 0.1498*** 
(0.0160) 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑡 𝜑1 -1.0778*** 
(0.3246) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽2 0.1507*** 
(0.0172) 
𝑙𝑛p𝑖,𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝜑2 0.8243 
(0.5901) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽3 0.6995*** 
(0.0143) 
𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝜑3 1.7298** 
(0.7495) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽11 0.0934*** 
(0.0203) 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝜑4 0.8249*** 
(0.0401) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽22 0.0830*** 
(0.0185) 
Trans-log cost system 
(equation 4.8 and 4.9): 
Dependent Variable 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽33 0.2002*** 
(0.0071) 
Constant 𝛽0 9.0595*** 
(0.0603) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽12 0.0119 
(0.0157) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛿1 0.7111*** 
(0.0742) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽13 -0.1053*** 
(0.0089) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛿11 -0.0692*** 
(0.0175) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽23 -0.0949*** 
(0.0087) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾11 -0.0523*** 
(0.0004) 
Pricing equation (equation 4.12): 
Dependent variable 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾12 -0.0580*** 
(0.0225) 
Conjectural 
variation 
parameter 
𝜆 0.3452 
(0.2291) 
                                                          
79 Note: 1: * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, ***indicates 1%    
significance level. Note 2: The restrictions for symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 =
1; ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 = 0 ; ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙 = 0  are imposed. Note 3: Since the above restrictions are imposed directly 
into the Eviews files, therefore the standard errors of coefficients of lny1,i,tlnw1,i,t , 
lnw3,i,t,
𝟏
𝟐
lnw𝟏,𝐢,𝐭
𝟐 ,
𝟏
𝟐
lnw𝟐,𝐢,𝐭
𝟐 ,
𝟏
𝟐
lnw𝟑,𝐢,𝐭
𝟐  are calculated by hand. In the Eviews, the standard errors of 
the reported coefficients are the square roots of the diagonal elements of the coefficient covariance 
matrix. The formula of calculating standard error for sum of two variables is se1+2 =
√se1
2 + se2
2 + 2covarince1,2. The covariance matrix is shown in Appendix B.1. 
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In the demand equation, the coefficients of 𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛p𝑖,𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  have the expected 
sign. The own-price elasticity, 𝜑1,  is negative and significant at -1.0778.
80  It 
confirms a downward slopping demand curve for the Hong Kong bank loans 
market. The cross-price elasticity, 𝜑2, is positive and significant at 0.8243, which 
implies that loans offered by different banks are substitutes. Since the elasticity of 
demand is larger than 1, the demand for loans seems to be elastic. Similar to the 
results of Wong et al. (2007) and Coccorese (2005), the absolute value of  own-
price elasticity is larger than the absolute cross-price elasticity, which indicates 
that the loan demand is more sensitive to the variation in the price offered by the 
bank in which the customers currently bank with, 𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑡. However, the difference 
between the two values of elasticity is small. The coefficient of real GDP is 
positive and significant at 1.7298, as expected, which shows a positive relationship 
between real GDP and loan demand. Then, looking into the bank characteristics, 
the coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝜑4, is positive and significant at 0.8249. This shows that 
customers prefer to borrow from large banks than small banks. Therefore, it 
presents a good proxy of the banks’ network size effect over the loan demand.     
    In the trans-log cost system, similar results are obtained as in Chapter 3. All the 
coefficients have the same sign as before, except for the coefficient of  
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
2 . 
According to the results from Table 4.3, the coefficient of bank loans 𝛿1 is positive 
                                                          
80 As a robustness check, I substitute the estimated sensitivity of the transition probability to the 
bank’s own interest rate 𝛼1  in Chapter 3, which is equal to -4.7367 in equation 4.14. The average 
own-price elasticity can be calculated equal to -1.3953, which is negative, as expected. It is not far 
away from the own-price elasticity estimated in this chapter.   
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and significant at 0.7111, which indicates the existence of economic of scale. All 
of the coefficients of exogenous input prices are positive and significant.   
According to the results, the value of the conjectural variation parameter 𝜆 is 
0.3452 but insignificant. This suggests that there is no evidence of oligopolistic 
coordination between banks in Hong Kong bank loans market during 1997 to 2012. 
The market behaviour is coherent with a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in prices. 
These findings are consistent with Wong et al. (2006, 2007), who shows that the 
market can neither be classified as a monopoly nor be considered as perfect 
competition. Ho (2010) also indicates that the Hong Kong bank loans market is 
regarded as a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. Compared with the findings of 
Coccorese (2005) for the Italy banking industry, the Hong Kong bank loans market 
is less competitive than Italy. The value of the average conjectural variation 
parameter is always negative and significant for the case of Italy. This is mainly 
due to the banking industry being well regulated in Hong Kong, hence the interest 
rate regulations and entry restrictions are stronger. The market size in Hong Kong 
is relative small therefore not all banks can fully exercise economics of scale. This 
is the reason Hong Kong banking industry is considered more concentrated and 
less competitive.  
    Both retail and wholesale banking market in Hong Kong are already well 
developed and dominated by several large banks like HSBC, Bank of China, 
Standard Chartered and Bank of East Asia. HSBC accounts for the largest market 
share, as measured by bank loans in the Hong Kong market which reached to 27% 
in 2012.  The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 has put more pressure on banks in 
             
145 
 
Hong Kong to find new ways to enhance revenue and reduce cost. In a competitive 
banking market like Hong Kong, it is difficult for banks to increase market share 
or margins, therefore it is becoming more likely that banks will seek to expand and 
cut costs by mergers and acquisitions. In addition, environmental factors such as 
market liberalization, technological development, globalisation and the pressure 
from shareholder also boosted the merger and acquisitions activities in Hong Kong 
(BIS, 2001; Jiang et al. 2004). The major reason for the decline of the number of 
authorized institutions in Hong Kong from 1997 to 2012 was bank consolidation 
through mergers and acquisitions. Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 summarises the major 
mergers and acquisitions activities taken place in Hong Kong after 1997. One of 
the representative deals is the consolidation of the ten banks in Hong Kong that 
originally belonged to the Bank of China Group into the Bank of China (Hong 
Kong) in 2001. Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2 describes the trend of 3-bank concentration 
ratio and 5-bank concentration ratio of Hong Kong. It can be seen from the figure 
that these two ratio sharply increased from 2001, largely reflecting merger and 
acquisition activity. According to the theory, interest spread is wider through 
merger and acquisition activities which will result in the decrease of interest 
elasticity demand for loans, may lead to collusive and non-competitive behaviour 
(Freixas and Rochet, 1997). But according to the results from Chapter 4, the 
estimated conjectural variation parameter is insignificant, which suggests there is 
no significant evidence of collusion on pricing in the market during the period 
1997 to 2012. It can be argued that the merger and acquisition activity of banks in 
Hong Kong has had little effect on the collusive behaviour of Hong Kong banks.   
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Table 4.4 Empirical results of the conjectural variation parameter using 
GMM. Included observation=274. Standard errors are in parenthesis 81 
 
Variable Parameter Coefficient Variable Parameter Coefficient 
Demand equation (equation 4.7): 
 Dependent Variable 𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾13 0.1252*** 
(0.0376) 
Constant 𝜑0 -16.9352* 
(8.8185) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽1 0.1462*** 
(0.0148) 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑡 𝜑1 -0.8263*** 
(0.2567) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽2 0.1478*** 
(0.0181) 
𝑙𝑛p𝑖,𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝜑2 0.3753 
(0.4032) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽3 0.7060*** 
(0.0137) 
𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝜑3 1.4485** 
(0.6861) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽11 0.0905*** 
(0.0202) 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝜑4 0.8170*** 
  (0.0365) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽22 0.0804*** 
(0.0178) 
Trans-log cost system 
(equation 4.8 and 4.9): 
Dependent Variable 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛽33 0.2089*** 
(0.0073) 
Constant 𝛽0 9.0937*** 
(0.0640) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽12 0.0190 
(0.0159) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛿1 0.7075*** 
(0.0653) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽13 -0.1095*** 
(0.0085) 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
2  
𝛿11 -0.0931* 
(0.0188) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 𝛽23 -0.0994*** 
(0.0086) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾11 -0.0623 
(0.0598) 
Pricing equation (equation 4.12): 
Dependent variable 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 𝛾12 -0.0629*** 
(0.0236) 
Conjectural 
variation 
parameter 
𝜆 0.6001 
(0.5895) 
 
                                                          
81 Note: 1: * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, ***indicates 
1%    significance level. Note 2: The restrictions for symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices 
∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 = 1; ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 = 0 ; ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙 = 0 are imposed. Note 3: Since the above restrictions are 
imposed directly into the Eviews files, therefore the standard errors of coefficients of 
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡,
𝟏
𝟐
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝟏,𝒊,𝒕
𝟐 ,
𝟏
𝟐
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝟐,𝒊,𝒕
𝟐  𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝟏
𝟐
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝟑,𝒊,𝒕
𝟐  are calculated by hand. In the Eviews, 
the standard errors of the reported coefficients are the square roots of the diagonal elements of the 
coefficient covariance matrix. The formula of calculating standard error for sum of two variables 
is se1+2 = √𝑠𝑒1
2 + 𝑠𝑒2
2 + 2𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒1,2. The covariance matrix is shown in Appendix B.1. 
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Moreover, this model is estimated using the GMM approach as a robustness check. 
The results are shown in Table 4.4. According to Table 4.4, although some 
parameters are not significant using the GMM approach, all of the estimated 
coefficients have the same signs as the non-linear 3SLS results. The conjectural 
variation parameter is positive and not significant at 0.6001, which is larger than 
using the non-linear 3SLS approach.  These results are mainly due to the relative 
low cross-price elasticity obtained using GMM approach, although this coefficient 
is not significant using the GMM approach. Banks tend to rely more on market 
power to make profit. These estimation results confirm that there is no evidence of 
oligopolistic coordination between banks in the Hong Kong bank loans market. 
The market can be considered as a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium for the period 1997 
to 2012. The market structure of the Hong Kong banking industry can be 
considered as oligopolistic competition. These results are consist with the findings 
of Ho (2010), in which the conduct parameter is positive but insignificant at 0.7. 
In addition, these findings are also consistent with Wong et al. (2007), in that the 
conjectural variation parameter is -0.0023 and is not significant. 
 
4.4.3 Marginal costs: A comparison between Chapter 3 
and 4 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depict the general trend in marginal costs of three bank groups 
from year 1997 to year 2012 based on the model of Chapter 3 and the model of 
this chapter, respectively. The classification of these three groups is the same as 
that used in Chapter 3, as follows. According to the market shares, as measured by 
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banks loans in 2012, all of the banks are divided into three groups. I then use the 
top three banks (i.e. HSBC, Bank of China and Hang Seng) to represent large 
banks, three middle banks (i.e. Nanyang Commercial Bank, Wing Hang and CITIC) 
to express the middle banks, and three bottom banks (i.e. Fubon, Chiyu and Public) 
to represent the small banks. Although in general the marginal costs obtained using 
conjectural variation approach are relatively smaller than that using the model to 
estimate switching costs, there is not much difference in the overall pattern 
between the two models. Therefore, the results obtained in this chapter are robust. 
Figure 4.1 Marginal costs of three bank groups in Chapter 3 using non-
linear 3SLS 
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Figure 4.2 Marginal costs of three bank groups using non-linear 3SLS 
approach 
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Figure 4.3 provides the price cost margin of three bank groups for the period 1997 
to 2012. For the entire sample, the values of price cost margin range from 0.68% 
to 6.50%. The average price cost margin based on the entire sample is 3.27%. 
Compare with the case of Italy (Coccorese, 2005) and Turkish (Aydemir, 2013), 
the price cost margin in Hong Kong is much smaller.  
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Figure 4.3 Price cost margin 
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4.4.4 Summary  
This chapter measures the degree of collusion and the nature of competitive 
condition among the 18 Hong Kong banks during 1997 to 2012 using a conjectural 
variation approach. The empirical results suggest that the bank behaviour is 
coherent with a Nash- Bertrand equilibrium in the Hong Kong bank loans market 
in which the conjectural variation parameter λ is insignificant at 0.3452 using a 
non-linear 3SLS approach.  In addition, there is no significant evidence of 
collusion on pricing in Hong Kong bank loans market. As a robustness test, using 
the GMM approach the conjectural variation parameter is positive and 
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insignificant at 0.6001, which is relatively larger than using non-linear 3SLS 
approach. These findings are consistent with Wong et al. (2007) and Ho (2010). 
The trend of marginal costs and price-cost margins of banks presented in this 
section is consistent with the results in Chapter 3.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
By using the conjectural variation approach, this chapter measured the degree of 
collusion and competitive condition among the 18 banks incorporated in Hong 
Kong during 1997 to 2012. The evidence from the empirical results suggests that 
Hong Kong banking is characterized by oligopolistic competition and the bank 
behaviour is coherent with a Nash- Bertrand equilibrium in which the conjectural 
variation parameter is insignificant at 0.3452 using a non-linear 3SLS approach 
while the number is 0.6001 using a GMM approach. In addition, the pattern of 
marginal costs and price cost margins is consistent with that of Chapter 3. 
Therefore, the empirical results are robust.  
    Hong Kong banks face fierce competition. The Hong Kong government is 
committed to promote competition in order to enhance economic efficiency and 
free trade, and thereby also improve consumer welfare. Before 1997, there was no 
competition policy in Hong Kong. After the Competition Policy Advisory Group 
(COMPAG), which was supervised by the Financial Secretary, was established in 
December 1997, the first Statement on Competition Policy was promulgated in 
May 1998 to provide a policy framework to guide the market and to promote 
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competition. From the view of the consumer, the experience of competition policy 
in the Hong Kong banking industry is that it leads to lower prices, product 
innovation, more choices and improved services. But from the view of the banks, 
this policy also increases the competition in the banking market. Many strategies 
have been adopted by banks to beat the increasing level of competition. For 
example, they may increase their share in the mortgage market while some banks 
offer cast rebates to mortgage borrowers up to 8%. Since the interest-earning 
business is becoming more difficult, banks are increasingly relying on non-interest 
earning business, such as insurance, stock transactions, bonds sale.  
    Shanghai’s new free-trade zone (FTZ), which launched on September 2013, 
may also bring competitive pressure to bear on the Hong Kong banking industry. 
Although there is no immediate competition from the FTZ, Hong Kong banks 
should not relax. Over the past few decades, Hong Kong has enjoyed considerable 
benefits as a gateway for foreign investors wanting to invest in mainland China. 
Following the launch of the Hong Kong-like free trade area in Shanghai, Hong 
Kong will no longer be able to maintain the same status as a gateway to the 
Mainland and, therefore, Hong Kong banks should introduce new services and 
products to compete in this rapidly evolving environment.  
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Chapter 5 
Competitive Condition in the Hong 
Kong Banking Sector:  
The Panzar-Rosse Approch 
5.1 Introduction 
As one of the most important international financial centres, Hong Kong has one 
of the most concentrated82 and competitive banking industries in the world. In the 
past two decades, the operating environment in Hong Kong’s banking sector has 
experienced great changes, such as regulatory liberalisation. Since 1999, a Bank 
Sector Reform Programme has been undertaken by the HKMA, The HKMA has 
gradually removed several barriers to competition, including regulated interest 
rates, branching restrictions for foreign banks, and limited access of restricted 
licence banks to the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system83. The relaxation 
of economic policy can increase market competition, and consequently improve 
economic efficiency in Hong Kong. However, it may also reduce the market power 
                                                          
82 Reflecting this, as discussed in chapters 1 and 2, the 3-bank concentration ratio and the 5-bank 
concentration ratio of Hong Kong calculated by World Bank are high at 72.15 and 81.39 
respectively in 2011. According to the half-year monetary and financial stability report from 
HKMA 2006, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the banking sector in Hong Kong is 
around 0.14 in 2005. In addition, I have also calculated the HHI of 18 licensed banks in Hong Kong 
during 1997 to 2012, and found that the HHI of this sample ranges from 0.19 to 0.22. 
83 The detail of policies responses after the Asian financial crisis can be found in Chapter 2 (p.35). 
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and profitability of Hong Kong’s banks. Therefore, it is important for 
policymakers to understand the competition in banking sector and how it has 
evolved over time.   
    In the previous chapter, in order to assess the market conduct of Hong Kong 
banks for the period 1997 to 2012, a structural model formed by a log demand 
equation (equation 4.7), a trans-log cost system (equation 4.8 and 4.9), and a 
pricing equation (equation 4.12) was estimated using a conjectural variation 
approach. The results suggest that banks behaviour in Hong Kong bank loans 
market is consist with a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. Banks in Hong Kong operated 
in a competitive fashion in the loan market during the period 1997 to 2012, with 
no significant evidence of collusion on pricing. As pointed by Shaffer (2004a, b), 
the conjectural variation approach has a number of disadvantages: firstly, it is 
sensitive to market definition; secondly, it requires non-linear system estimation; 
thirdly, it can be subject to multicollinearity; fourthly, the requirements of data are 
higher; and lastly, it can be fooled by expense preference behaviour. Using 
simulation experiments, Hyde and Perloff (1995) conclude that the structural 
model requires more data and more explicit assumptions than the other two 
methods. If the specification is correct, then it is the most accurate approach, 
although there is no way to know whether or not it is correctly specified.  
    In this chapter, I aim to examine the competitive conditions in Hong Kong’s 
banking sector using the Panzar-Rosse (P-R) approach. To do this estimation, I 
have estimated two equations jointly that use the SUR approach: the first is a 
reduced form revenue equation and the second is an equilibrium condition 
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equation84. The findings show that banks in Hong Kong can be characterised as 
monopolistically competitive, the H- statistic is equal to 0.5069 using total revenue 
as dependent variable. Moreover, I use interest income and non-interest income as 
dependent variables of the reduced form revenue equations and compare the 
degree of competition between interest earnings part and non-interest earnings part 
of the bank’s revenue stream. The results suggest that the degree of market 
competition of interest earnings area is slightly higher than that of non-interest area. 
In addition, in order to consider the time evolution of competition for interest and 
non-interest streams, I estimate the P-R model for a six years rolling sample. The 
results show that in the interest stream there is a gradual declining trend in the 
values of the H-statistics. Compared with the bad times, the Hong Kong bank 
interest earnings stream is more competitive during the good times. For the non-
interest case, the values of the H-statistic have fluctuated sharply over the period. 
    This chapter contributes to the extant literature in banking competition in Hong 
Kong in several ways. First, I extend the period to 2012 using a P-R approach. 
Second, due to the system residuals, I estimate the model as a system using the 
SUR approach. This has not been previously done in the P-R literature. Third, by 
estimating the model for a six year rolling sample, the results show the evolvement 
of competition for both interest and non-interest markets.  
    The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the related 
literature using P-R approach and outlines the P-R empirical model; Section 5.3 
                                                          
84 When interest income and non-interest income are used as dependent variables of the reduced 
form revenue equations, there are two revenue equations in the system. Therefore, in total, three 
equations are jointly estimated using SUR approach.  
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shows the data and variables used in empirical estimation; Section 5.4 details the 
econometric methods and presents the empirical results using total revenue, 
interest income or non-interest income as dependent variable of reduced from 
revenue equation; and finally, Section 5.5 summaries the findings and concludes 
the chapter.  
 
5.2 Literature reviews and methodology 
5.2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, many methods have been developed to measure market 
competition. These methods can be divided into two main streams: structural and 
non-structural approaches. The Panzar-Rosse (P-R) approach is a non-structural 
method that is widely used in empirical banking studies. In this section I focus on 
the literature using a P-R approach, I will also present P-R’s empirical model for 
testing market competition.  
 
5.2.2 Literature reviews  
5.2.2.1 The Panzar and Rosse approach 
The P-R model, which was developed by Rosse and Panzar (1977), and Panzar 
and Rosse (1982, 1987), is regarded as a key method of measuring the degree of 
competition in the new empirical industrial organization literature. This approach, 
which can be formally derived from profit-maximizing equilibrium conditions, 
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estimates a reduced form revenue equation. The H-statistic, which is a measure of 
bank competition, can be obtained as the sum of the elasticities of a bank’s revenue 
with respect to input prices. This statistic ranges from minus infinity to unity. 
Panzar and Rosse (1977, 1987) show that banks are in a pure monopoly market 
when this statistic is negative or zero. This situation includes collusive oligopoly 
and may also include conjectural variation short run oligopoly (Shaffer 1982, 
1983). An increase of input prices, which shifts average cost curve and marginal 
cost curve upward, will result in no change or decrease in revenue. One unit 
increase in input prices will result in more than one unit fall in output sold. When 
the H-statistic equal to one, the market is under perfect competition. In this case, 
an increase in both average cost and marginal cost due to an increase in input prices 
will lead to a one-to one increase in revenues without altering the optimal output 
of individual firms. For intermediate cases where the H-statistic is between zero 
and one, the market is characterized by monopolistic competition. An increase of 
input prices increases the average and marginal costs. This leads to the exit of loss-
making banks and a subsequent increase in revenue.  
It is worth noting that an important condition to get accurate results, especially 
for perfect competition and monopolistic competition conclusion based on the H-
statistic, is that the market should be in a long-run equilibrium (Panzar and Rosse, 
1987). This means that the number of banks needs to be endogenous to the model. 
Shaffer (1982) regressed Return on Asset (ROA)85  on input prices and some 
control variables, and indicates that in the long-run equilibrium the dependent 
                                                          
85 The case is same if using Return on Equity (ROE) as dependent variable. 
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variable should not be correlated with input prices. In addition, the extension of 
the P-R method to banking requires some further assumptions about the banks’ 
production activity. De Bandt and Davis (2000) point out that the banks need to be 
assumed to be a single product firm. Under this assumption, the banks are viewed 
mainly as financial intermediaries that produce intermediation services by using 
elements such as labour, capital and deposits as inputs. Molyneux et al. (1996) 
show that one assumes that there is no causal relationship with input prices and 
services quality because such a correlation may bias the H-statistic. Moreover, the 
model assumes that the banks are profit maximizing firms while the performance 
of banks needs to be influenced by the actions of other market participants.  The 
price elasticity of demand need to be greater than one, and the cost structures of 
banks are homogenous (Bikker, 2004). 
 
5.2.2.2 Some earlier studies using P-R approach  
Shaffer (1982) observes a monopolistic competitive banking behaviour of New 
York banks for 1979. This was a pioneering study on bank competition using the 
P-R method. Some earlier studies, such as Nathan and Neave (1989), applied the 
P-R model to the Canadian financial system and found that Canada’s banking 
market is characterized by  monopolistic competition for the period 1983 and 1984, 
but is characterized by perfect competition in 1982. In addition, Molyneux et al. 
(1994) suggested that major European Community banking markets in Germany, 
the UK, France, and Spain operated under conditions of monopolistic competition 
between 1986 and 1989. But for Italy, the H-statistic is negative and significant, 
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hence it seems to operate under monopoly or conjectural variations short-run 
oligopoly conditions. Moreover, Vesala (1995) tested the competitive condition in 
the Finnish banking industry over the period 1985 to 1993, and found monopolistic 
competitive behaviour, except for 1989 and 1990, where the banking market is 
characterized by perfect competition. In addition, Molyneux et al. (1996) tested 
the P-R statistic on a sample from Japan and indicate that these banks behaved as 
monopoly or conjectural variation short-run oligopoly in 1986 but as under 
monopolistic competition in 1988. Some other researchers have used the P-R 
method for a single country, such as Coccorese (1998, 2004) for Italy, Shaffer 
(2004b) for United States, Matthews et al. (2007) for the UK. There have also been 
some cross-country studies, including: Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) for 15 EU 
countries; De Bandt and Davis (2000) for France, Germany and Italy; Bikker and 
Haaf (2002a) for 23 OECD countries; Clasessens and Leaven (2004) for 50 
countries; Goddard and Wilson (2009) for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
UK, and US; Schaeck et al. (2009) for 45 countries; and, Carbo et al. (2009) for 
14 EU countries.  Bikker et al. (2012) summarizes most of the published studies 
that have used the P-R method to the banking industry up to 2009.  
 
5.2.2.3 Recent studies using P-R approach  
It is noted that many of the earlier applications of the P-R model were conducted 
in western and developed countries, such as EU and US banks. However, more 
recent studies have extended the literature by applying the P-R model in other 
markets; for example, Africa and Asia. Hamza (2011) uses a comprehensive panel 
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dataset of Tunisian banks covering the period 1999 to 2008 to investigate the 
market structure of the banking industry in Tunisia. The results imply that the 
banks in Tunisia are under monopolistic competition. Abdelkader and Mansouri 
(2013) obtain the same results by using the dataset of 2000 to 2008. Using both 
static and dynamic version of the P-R model, Fosu (2013) examined the extent of 
banking competition in African sub-regional markets over the period 2002 to 2009. 
The results suggest that African banks generally demonstrate monopolistic 
competitive behaviour consistent with other emerging economies. He also finds 
that, compared with dynamic P-R, the H-statistic of static P-R is downward biased.  
    The number of empirical studies on banking competition in China that have used 
the P-R model is limited. Yuan (2006) used the P-R model to assess the 
competition in the banking industry in China from 1996 to 2000. Their evidence 
shows that the banking system in China was near a state of perfect competition 
before foreign banks entered into China’s financial market. Using similar 
specifications as Yuan (2006), Xu et al. (2013) found that the market structure of 
the Chinese loan market can be characterized by monopolistic competition for the 
period 1996 to 2008. Then, Park (2013) compared the market concentration and 
competition in the South Korean and Chinese commercial banking market for the 
period 1992 to 2008. He shows that the Korean banking industry has been 
monopolistically competitive for the whole sample but the Chinese banking 
industry is highly concentrated and its behaviour is close to oligopolistic 
competition. For other recent banking literatures of the P-R model, see: Bikker et 
al. (2012) for 63 countries; Shaffer and Spierdijk (2013) for Dewey County (South 
Dakota, USA); Owusu-Antwi and Antwi (2013) for Ghanaian banks; Olszak et al. 
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(2014) for Poland; Najarzadeh et al. (2013), and  Kashi and Beynabadi (2013) for 
Iran’s banking system; and, Fadzlan and Muzafar Shah (2013) for the Malaysian 
banking sector.  
 
5.2.2.4 The case of Hong Kong  
The P-R model has been employed in a small number of empirical studies on bank 
competition in Hong Kong.  Using the P-R approach, Jiang et al. (2004) show that 
the Hong Kong banking sector remains highly competitive, which can be regarded 
as perfect competition for the period 1992 to 2002. Then, Wong et al. (2006) 
confirmed the findings of Jiang et al. (2004) that the degree of competition was 
fairly high during the period 1992 to 2002. By extending the sample period to 2005, 
they suggest that the Hong Kong market can be characterized as monopolistic 
competition during the period 1991 to 2005. They also show that competitive 
pressure was higher among larger banks and lower among smaller banks. In line 
with previous findings, Chu et al. (2013) shows that the banking sector in Hong 
Kong is under a monopolistic competition, and the large banks and small banks 
face equally competitive pressures based on 20 major banks from 1998 to 2011. 
They also deduce that the market seems to be very competitive and is dominated 
by a large amount of banks at the same time. 
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5.2.2.5 Non-banking studies 
The application of P-R method is much broader and can be also used in non-
banking studies. For instance, Tsutsui and Kamesaka (2005) investigated the 
competitive condition of the Japanese securities industry over the period 1983 to 
2001 using the P-R approach. Their results indicate that the Japanese securities 
market was in monopolistic competition during 1983 to 1988 and 1997 to 2002, 
but in monopoly equilibrium during 1991 to 1996. Coccorese (2012) applied the 
P-R method in the Italian car insurance market. He showed that the group of firms 
which including 30 companies by Italian Antitrust Authority in 2000 is under 
monopoly or collusive oligopoly conditions. Sepúlveda (2012) estimates the 
degree of competition among Pension Fund Administrators (PFAs) in the Chilean 
private pension system for the period 1996 to 2008. The results indicate that the 
market can be described as a cartel (or monopoly) during that period. For some 
other literature, see: Wong (1996) for a sample of physicians; Fischer and 
Kamerschen (2003) for the US airline industry; and, Liu et al. (2013) for China’s 
construction industry, among others. 
 
5.2.2.6 The advantages and disadvantages of the P-R approach 
The P-R method has a large number of advantages, which is the reason for its 
popularity in the empirical literature. First, it has lower data requirements, the P-
R method only involves firm-level data and it requires only a few variables. 
Secondly, it can be estimated by simple, single and linear equations. Lastly, it is 
robust to the geographic extent of the market (Shaffer, 2004b). As pointed out by 
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Shaffer (2004a, b), compared with the Bresnahan-Lau model, the P-R method has 
certain shortcomings. The main disadvantage is that the H-statistic can yield a 
spurious indication of market power if the sample is not in long-run equilibrium.   
    Since the market is not always in equilibrium, Goddard and Wilson (2009) 
modified the static P-R model to allow for partial adjustment towards equilibrium. 
They proposed a dynamic version of the P-R model, which included a lagged 
dependent variable in the right hand side of the equation. They used a Monte Carlo 
simulation to show that the H-statistic of a static P-R model is biased when the 
market is under disequilibrium.  Another concern of the P-R method is caused by 
the econometric identification problem.86 Using simulation experiments, Hyde and 
Perloff (1995) demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the P-R, Hall and 
structural approaches to estimating market power. They conclude that the 
structural model requires more data and more explicit assumptions than the other 
two methods. If the specification is correct, then it is the most accurate approach, 
but there is no way to know whether it is correctly specified. The P-R method is 
easier to use than the structural model approach, but for many models the P-R 
method cannot distinguish between collusion and competition.  
    Although the P-R model has been used in various modified forms, some of the 
modified forms have been criticized in the literature. According to the choice of 
dependent variable, the empirical P-R model can be classified into two categories. 
                                                          
86 Panzar and Rosse (1987, p.452) show that in a neoclassical competitive industry with a horizontal 
long-run industry supply curve, the market demand will not affect a firm’s reduced-form revenues. 
Therefore, the market demand need not be estimated in the empirical model. On the other hand, if 
the assumption of perfectly elastic aggregate supply is violated, the input prices will increase 
endogenously as the industry expands, then the empirical model should be modified for this 
situation.  
             
164 
 
Some studies use total income or interest income as dependent variables; for 
example, Bikker and Haaf (2002a). Other studies have used a scaled version of 
bank income that takes total income or interest income divided by total assets as a 
dependent variable. In this case, the logarithm of income divided by total assets 
can be considered as a proxy of the output price. Then, the equation becomes a 
log-log price equation instead of a revenue equation; for example, De Bandt and 
Davis (2000) and Olszak et al. (2014). The latter modified form is criticized by 
Bikker et al. (2006), who suggest that a pricing equation changes the nature of the 
model, which will lead to a biased H-statistic in the measurement of competition.  
They further suggest that only an unscaled revenue equation, which does not 
include total assets as a control variable,87 yields a valid measure for competitive 
conduct (Bikker et al., 2012). This conclusion is confirmed by an empirical study 
based on a sample containing more than 17,000 banks in 63 countries during 1994 
to 2004.  
 
5.2.3 Methodology 
The P-R model assumes that banks can enter or leave any market quickly without 
losing their capital. Banks are single product firms and there is no causal 
relationship with input prices and services quality. Moreover, the model assumes 
that the banks are profit maximizing firms while the performance of banks needs 
to be influenced by the actions of other market participants.  The price elasticity 
                                                          
87 In some literature, total assets is used to control for the firms size. For instance, Nathan and 
Neave (1989), Molyneux et al. (1996), Coccorese (2009).  
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of demand needs to be greater than one and the cost structures of banks are 
homogenous. Then, bank i maximises it profits when marginal revenue is equal to 
marginal cost: 
                                           𝑚𝑟𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑛, 𝒛𝑖) = 𝑚𝑐𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝒘𝑖, 𝒕𝑖)                              (5.1) 
where 𝑚𝑟𝑖  and 𝑚𝑐𝑖  are the marginal revenue and marginal costs of bank i, 
respectively, 𝑦𝑖 is the output of bank i, n is the number of banks, 𝒛𝑖 is a vector of 
exogenous variables that influence the bank i’s revenue, 𝒘𝑖 is a vector of m input 
prices of bank i, and 𝒕𝑖 is a vector of exogenous variables that shifts the bank i’s 
cost function.  
    Then, in the long-run equilibrium, there are no excess profits or entry in the 
market, a zero profit constraint holds: 
                                            𝑅𝑖
∗(𝑦𝑖
∗, 𝑛, 𝒛𝑖) = 𝐶𝑖
∗(𝑦𝑖
∗, 𝒘𝑖, 𝒕𝑖)                              (5.2) 
where the variables marked with an asterisk (*) express the equilibrium values.  
    The market power can be measured as the extent to which a change in factor 
input prices is reflected in the equilibrium revenues of bank i. Therefore, the H-
statistic is derived as the sum of input price elasticities: 
                                                     𝐻 = ∑
𝜕𝑅𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑤𝑘𝑖
𝑤𝑘𝑖
𝑅𝑖
∗
𝑚
𝑘=1                                         (5.3) 
When 𝐻 ≤ 0 , banks are in a pure monopoly market. This situation includes 
collusive oligopoly and may include a conjectural variation short run oligopoly 
(Shaffer 1982, 1983). When H=1, the market is under perfect competition. Finally, 
when 0<H<1, the market is characterized by monopolistic competition.  
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Followed by Bikker and Haaf (2002a), the empirical application of the P-R 
approach assumes a log-linear marginal revenue and cost function: 
               𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑚
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝜐𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑐𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=1     (5.4) 
and  
                               𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜒0 + 𝜒1𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜉𝑟𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑟𝑟,𝑖,𝑡
𝑞
𝑟=1                      (5.5) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑘,𝑖,𝑡  are the natural logarithms of factor input k of bank i at time t, 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑐𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑟𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 are the natural logarithms of exogenous control variables 
related to the bank cost function and bank-specific demand function.  
    In equilibrium the marginal costs are equal to marginal revenues. Then, the 
equilibrium value for output can be written as 
    𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖
∗ = (𝜌0 − 𝜒0 + ∑ 𝜋𝑖𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝑚
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝜐𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑐𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
𝑝
𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝜉𝑟𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑟𝑟,𝑖,𝑡
𝑞
𝑟=1 )/(𝜒1 −
                    𝜌1)                                                                                                     (5.6)                                                                                                                          
The reduced-from revenue equation of bank i is the product of the equilibrium 
values of output of bank i and the common price level, which is determined by 
the inverse demand equation.88 This is shown in the following equation: 
    𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜁 + ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜐𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝜏𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛,𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1 + 𝜚𝑖,𝑡 (5.7) 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑣 is either total revenue, interest income, or non-interest income; and 𝑤𝑗 
are the input prices. Consistent with Chapter 3 and 4, I use a three-dimensional 
vector of input prices. 𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡, 𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 are three exogenous input prices on 
                                                          
88 𝑙𝑛𝑝 = 𝜂 + 𝜛𝑙𝑛 (∑ 𝑦𝑖
∗
𝑖 ) 
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labour, capital and deposits respectively. A are bank-specific variables that affect 
the bank’s revenue and cost functions, M are the macroeconomic variables that 
affect the banking market, and 𝜚 is a stochastic disturbance term.  
    The H-statistic can be calculated as the sum of elasticities of revenue with 
respect to each of the bank’s J input prices, as follows: 
                                               𝐻 = ∑ 𝜋𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1                                                 (5.8) 
As discussed in literature review, an important condition to get accurate results, 
especially for a perfect competition or monopolistic competition conclusion based 
on the H-statistic, is that the market should be in a long-run equilibrium (Panzar 
and Rosse, 1987). Consistent with literature, such as Shaffer (1982), Molyneux et 
al. (1996) and Günalp and Celik (2006), the equilibrium test is performed by 
replacing the dependent variable in equation (5.7) with the logarithm of return on 
assets (lnROA), as shown in the following equation: 
     𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜁′ + ∑ 𝜋𝑗′𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜐𝑘′𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝜏𝑛′𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛,𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡  
(5.9) 
The E-statistic is the sum of the elasticity of returns with respect to input prices 
                                                𝐸 = ∑ 𝜋𝑗′
𝐽
𝑗=1                                              (5.10) 
When E=0, the market is in the long-run equilibrium, while E<0 indicates 
disequilibrium.  
    Since the revenue equation (equation 5.7) and equilibrium condition equation 
(equation 5.9) contain exactly the same set of regressors on the right hand side. 
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The error term is equation 5.7, 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 , seems correlated with the error term in 
equation 5.9, 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 . Therefore, equations 5.7 and 5.9 should be estimated jointly 
using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). Both models use bank fixed effect 
dummies89 𝐷𝑖 to control for heterogeneity across banks. The average differences 
across banks in any observable or unobservable predictors are controlled.  
 
5.2.4 Empirical model 
In the empirical analysis, the following revenue equation is used: 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜁 + 𝜋1𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋2𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋3𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐1𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐2𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
                     +𝜐3𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐4𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏1𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑡 + 𝜊𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝜚𝑖,𝑡         (5.11)            
where TA is total assets to control for bank size, NLTA is the ratio of loans to total 
assets, which account for credit risk exposure, EQTA is the ratio of equity to total 
assets, which accounts for the leverage, reflecting differences in the risk 
preferences across banks, PRTA is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets, 
which controls for bank default risk, rgdpg is the growth rate of real GDP, which 
affects the banking market, 𝐷𝑖 is the bank dummies, measured by 1 for bank i, 0 
for the other banks. 𝜚 is an error term.  
    Similarly, the equilibrium condition is modelled as  
                                                          
89 One dummy variable is omitted to avoid the “dummy variable trap”.  
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        ln (𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 1)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜁
′ + 𝜋1
′ 𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋2
′ 𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋3
′ 𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐1
′ 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
                                          𝜐2′𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐3′𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐4′𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
                                          𝜏1′𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑡 + 𝜊𝑖′𝐷𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                                               (5.12) 
Followed by Claessens and Laeven (2004), the adjusted return on 
assets, ln (𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 1), is used as a dependent variable because some values of return 
on assets are negative. Then, equations 5.11 and 5.12 are jointly estimated using 
the SUR approach. I then use a Wald test to test whether E = 𝜋1
′ + 𝜋2
′ + 𝜋3
′ = 0. 
If the hypothesis is rejected, then the market is assumed not to be in equilibrium.  
 
5.2.5 Summary  
One of the most popular methods that is used to measure competition in the 
empirical literature is the P-R model. This approach estimates a reduced form 
revenue equation to obtain an H-statistic, which can be used to identify the extent 
of competition in a market. A great number of empirical studies have attempted to 
measure competition by using the P-R approach. This section has reviewed the 
earlier and recent literature using P-R model, especially that related to the banking 
industry. Furthermore, I have summarised the advantages and disadvantages of the 
P-R model. In addition, several modified forms of the P-R model and their 
criticisms have also been discussed here. The P-R model has been presented in this 
section in order to measure the degree of competition in the Hong Kong banking 
industry. Considering the correlation of residuals between reduced-from revenue 
equation (5.11) and equilibrium condition equation (5.12), the innovation of this 
chapter is jointly estimating these two equations using the SUR approach.  
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5.3 Data and variables 
5.3.1 Introduction  
The same dataset is used to test the market competition of the Hong Kong banking 
industry using the P-R approach. This section provides a relevant definition, 
measurement, and summary statistics for dependent variables and control variables, 
while the details of input prices are introduced in Chapter 3.  
 
5.3.2 Data 
Consistent with Chapters 3 and 4, the empirical part of this chapter uses an 
unbalanced panel of Hong Kong bank-level data set taken from Bankscope and the 
Annual Reports of individual banks, covering the period 1997 to 2012. The data 
are annual and cover 18 licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong.90 I use data 
from unconsolidated statement to avoid redundant information, if available, 
otherwise a consolidated statement is selected. All of the nominal data used for 
measuring the degree of competition is deflated by the CPI (2009M10-
2010M9=100), which is collected from DataStream.91 A few bank observations 
with negative values of non-interest income are dropped from the data.92The 
details of data cleaning rules can be found in section 3.3.3 (p.94) of Chapter 3.  
                                                          
90 The sample of banks is listed in Appendix A.2.  
91 Data Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong.  
92 The non-interest income of BOEA in 2008 which is equal to -210.63, CITIC in 2007 which is 
equal to  -101.17 and Wing Lung in 2008 which is equal to -634.25 are dropped from the data.  
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The bank-level data used in both reduced-form revenue equation (equation 5.11) 
and the equilibrium condition (equation 5.12) contains total revenue, interest 
income, non-interest income, total assets, bank loans, equity and loan loss 
provisions.93 The definition, measurement and summary of three exogenous input 
prices94 is presented in Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 of Chapter 3. Macroeconomic 
variable include real GDP growth rate is also collected from DataStream.95 The 
summary statistics of real GDP growth rate are presented in Table 4.2 of Chapter 
4. Table 5.1 gives the definition and measurement of major variables, which are 
not shown in previous chapters. The summary statistics of these variables over the 
whole sample are presented in Table 5.2.   
Table 5.1 The definition and measure of variables (apart from the variables 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4) 
 
Variable name Definition of each variables 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 The total bank revenue of bank i at time t, measured by total 
income (𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡) or interest income (𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡) or non-interest income 
(𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡). 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The total assets of bank i at time t. 
𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of bank loans to total assets of bank i at time t. 
𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of equity capital to total assets of bank i at time t. 
𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets of bank i at 
time t. 
𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑡 Real GDP growth rate in Hong Kong.  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 Return on assets measured by profits after tax divided by total 
assets.  
                                                          
93 The bank level data include personal expenses, number of labours, total operating expenses, 
personal expense, interest expense, and deposits, which are used to calculate three input prices. 
94 W1 is the unit price of labour which is equal to personal expense divided by numbers of labour. 
W2 is the unit price of capital which can be calculated as non-personal expenses divided by fix 
assets. W3 is the unit price of deposits which is equal to interest expense divided by total deposits.  
95 Data Source: Oxford Economics. 
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Table 5.2 Summary statistics (HKD million) 
 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 272 14598.20 27002.14 462.43 177322.00 
𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 272 10411.37 16764.29 401.23 103091.70 
𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 269 4237.04 12971.16 44.11 96786.04 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 272 327184.30 589309.70 10696.36 3536541.00 
𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 272 0.51 0.11 0.25 0.80 
𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 272 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.22 
𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 271 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.04 
𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑡 288 0.0357 0.0387 -0.0588 0.0870 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 272 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03 
 
Note: all the nominal data in the table is deflated by CPI. 
In order to find out the variation of all of the variables over time, I will break the 
whole period down year by year. Table 5.3 below shows the summary of above 
variables for year 1999, 2007 and 2012, which represent the early, middle and late 
years for the whole sample, respectively. It can be seen from the statistics that the 
average total income is HKD 11053.71 million (USD 1425.9286 million96), the 
average interest income is HKD 9788.3890 million (USD 1262.7022 million), and 
the average non- interest income is HKD 1265.3260 (USD 163.2271 million) in 
1999. From 1999 to 2007, a considerable increase occurred of these numbers 
especially for the average non-interest income. In the year 2007, the average total 
income went up to HKD 23079.68 million (USD 2977.2787 million), which is 
                                                          
96 In order to be consistent with previous chapters, I use the exchange rate of 1HKD=0.1290 USD. 
Data source: Bloomberg. Date: 4th June 2014.  
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more than twice as the number of 1999. The average interest income increased to 
HKD 16675.3700 million (USD 2151.1227 million) and the non-interest income 
sharply increased to HKD 6786.9870 million (USD 875.5213 million). But it can 
be seen from the statistics of 2012 that the US subprime crisis has had a certain 
effect on Hong Kong banking industry. The values of total income and interest 
income reduced in different degree compare with the values in 2007. The main 
reason is due to the decline of the lending rate from 2007. Since the Hong Kong 
dollar is pegged with the US dollar under the linked exchange rate system, HKD 
interest rates track closely with the US interest rates.   
Table 5.3 Summary statistics- year 1999, 2007 and 2012 (HKD million) 
 
 
Variable 
1999 2007 2012 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 11053.71 21916.45 23079.68 41657.85 18171.48 32555.54 
𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 9788.38 18891.69 16675.37 25108.92 10192.46 11685.42 
𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 1265.32 3045.78 6786.99 17681.80 7979.02 22451.33 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 145232.30 283079.70 403433.70 701401.90 533596.10 85830.40 
𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 0.51 0.10 0.48 0.10 0.54 0.10 
𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.02 
𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
Note: all the nominal data in the table is deflated by CPI. 
After the subprime crisis broke out in August 2007, an influx of hot money into 
Hong Kong following the Fed’s quantitative easing policy. The lending rate then 
began to decline from 2007. The rate of growth of non-interest income began to 
shift to a significantly slower level from 2007, the number of non-interest income 
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is HKD 7979.022 million (USD 1029.2938 million) in 2012. There is an 
interesting phenomenon in that the structure of bank revenues is changing. The 
portion of non-interest income increased. In the year 1999 the average non-interest 
income accounts for 11.45% of the average of banks ’total revenues, and then in 
2007 the number increased to 29.41%. In 2012, this ratio went up to 43.91%. 
Nowadays, the banks rely more on non-interest income, which could reduce risk 
by giving the banks a more diversified portfolio of revenue producing activities. 
This explains the increasing competition in the non-interest market in recent years.  
5.3.3 Summary  
In order to ensure consistency with the previous chapters, the database consists of 
an unbalanced panel of annual observations for the Hong Kong banking industry, 
covering 16 years from 1997 to 2012. The definition, measurement and summary 
statistics used to estimate the P-R model are presented in this section. Moreover, I 
split the whole period year by year, and the descriptive statistics of variables for 
year 1999, 2007 and 2012 are also provided.  
 
5.4 Empirical results  
5.4.1 Introduction 
This section presents the estimation results of the P-R model for the Hong Kong 
banking industry. From these estimation results, the H-statistics and E-statistics 
using total revenue, interest income or non-interest income as dependent variable 
are computed. I also present the results from P-R H-statistics estimation by six 
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years rolling to consider the time evolution of competition in the interest market 
and the non-interest market.  
 
5.4.2 Empirical results: total revenue as a dependent 
variable  
The reduced form revenue equation (equation 5.11) and equilibrium condition 
(equation 5.12) are jointly estimated using the SUR approach. The results of the 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence explain the reason why these two equations 
should be estimated jointly. Table 5.4 shows the correlation matrix of residuals 
between two equations and the Breusch-Pagan chi-squared statistic. The Breusch-
Pagan chi-squared statistic is equal to 17.215, which suggests that the residuals of 
the two equations are significantly correlated with each other.  
    Table 5.5 presents the estimation results using total revenue as dependent 
variable. As discussed in the previous section, the P-R model is only valid if the 
market is in long run equilibrium. Based on the Wald tests results, in which 
𝜒2(1) = 1.96 and prob=0.1637, the hypothesis on the long-run equilibrium in the 
Hong Kong banking industry (E = 𝜋1
′ + 𝜋2
′ + 𝜋3
′ = 0) is not rejected,97 which 
means that the banks are observed under long-run equilibrium. The H-statistic 
which can be calculated as the sum of elasticities of revenue with respect to each 
of the bank’s input prices is equal to 0.5069. The Wald tests results confirms that 
the hypothesis H=0 as well as the hypothesis H=1 are rejected. These findings 
                                                          
97  The Critical Value of chi-squared with degree of freedom 1 at 5% significance level is 
𝜒2(1, 0.05) = 3.84. 
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suggest that the Hong Kong banking markets can be characterised by monopolistic 
competitive behaviour. These findings are consistent with the results of Jiang et al. 
(2004), Wong et al. (2006), Chu et al. (2013), and Clasessens and Laeven (2004)98. 
    It can be seen from Table 5.5 that the coefficient of unit price of capital (𝑙𝑛𝑤2) 
is positive and significant at 0.0455, as expected. Likewise, the coefficient of unit 
price of deposit ( 𝑙𝑛𝑤3 ) is positive and significant at 0.3848. Although the 
coefficient of unit price of labour (𝑙𝑛𝑤1) is not significant, it is also positive at 
0.0766. The price of the deposits seems to be the biggest contributor to the H-
statistic for Hong Kong bank market. This proves the strong effect of deposit rate 
deregulation in Hong Kong. The coefficients of all input prices are in line with 
both the theory and the previous studies (e.g. Wong et al., 2006, Chu et al., 2013). 
Then, for the control variables, the coefficient of total assets (lnTA) is positive and 
significant at 0.8072. Total assets are a proxy of bank size. This strong positive 
coefficient of total assets suggests the existence of economies of scale that 
maintain large bank size should lead to an increase in total income. The sign of 
lnNLTA is positive, as expected, in the revenue equation (Bikker et al. 2012, Bikker 
and Haaf, 2002a). Generally, banks compensate themselves for credit risk by 
means of a surcharge on the lending rate, which increases the interest income and 
bank’s revenue. Also, in line with Molyneux et al. (1994), the coefficient of 
lnEQTA is negative at -0.004, which shows a negative impact on total revenue. A 
lower equity assets ratio implies more leverage and, therefore, increases interest 
                                                          
98 Clasessens and Laeven (2004) apply the P-R model to estimate the degree of competition of the 
banking systems of 50 countries. The H-statistic of Hong Kong based on the data of 1999 is 0.7, 
which indicates the monopolistic competition for Hong Kong bank market.  
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income. lnPRTA is a control for default risk. The coefficient of lnPRTA is positive 
and significant at 0.0247, which implies a higher default risk higher return for the 
banks. As for the macroeconomic variable, the coefficient of lnrgdpg is positive 
and significant at 0.0308, which indicates a positive relationship between 
economic growth and bank total revenue. Overall, all of the signs of the variables 
are as expected and they are in line with the literature.  
Table 5.4 Correlation matrix of residuals between equations 
 
Dependent Variable 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑂𝐴 lnRev 
LnROA 1  
LnRev 0.2905 1 
Breusch-Pagan test of Independence: chi2(1)=17.215, Pr=0.0000 
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Table 5.5 Panzar-Rosse H-statistic using total revenue as dependent variable 
1997-2012:  SUR estimation. Included observation= 204. Standard errors 
are in parenthesis 99 
 
Reduced-form revenue equation (equation 
5.11). Dependent Variable  𝒍𝒏𝑻𝑰 
Equilibrium condition (equation 5.12). 
Dependent variable 𝐥𝐧 (𝑹𝑶𝑨 + 𝟏) 
Variable  Parameter Coefficient Variable  Parameter Coefficient 
Constant ζ 1.5743*** 
(0.4686) 
Constant 𝜁′ 0.0424*** 
(0.0160) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1 𝜋1 0.0766 
(0.0517) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1 𝜋1′ 0.0001 
(0.0017) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2 𝜋2 0.0455*** 
(0.0169) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2 𝜋2′ 0.0013** 
(0.0006) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤3 𝜋3 0.3848*** 
(0.0129) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤3 𝜋3′ 0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
lnTA 𝜐1 0.8072*** 
(0.0327) 
lnTA 𝜐1′ -0.0010 
(0.0011) 
lnNLTA 𝜐2 0.1435** 
(0.0682) 
lnNLTA 𝜐2′ 0.0065*** 
(0.0023) 
lnEQTA 𝜐3 -0.0040 
(0.0334) 
lnEQTA 𝜐3′ 0.0026** 
(0.0011) 
lnPRTA 𝜐4 0.0247*** 
(0.0086) 
lnPRTA 𝜐4′ -0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
Lnrgdpg 𝜏1 0.0308*** 
(0.0114) 
Lnrgdpg 𝜏1′ 0.0006 
(0.0004) 
H-statistic          0.5069 E-statistic                 0.0027 
Wald Chi-squared 
statistic H=0  
𝜒2(1) = 84.5*** Wald Chi-squared 
statistic E=0 
𝜒2(1) = 1.96 
 
Wald test H=0 P-value      0.0000 Wald test E=0 P-value 0.1637 
Wald Chi-squared 
statistic H=1 
𝜒2(1) = 80.02***   
Wald test H=1 P-value      0.0000   
𝑅2      0.9918 𝑅2   0.5588 
                                                          
99 Note: * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, *** indicates 1% 
significance level.  
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5.4.3 Empirical results: interest income and non-interest 
income as dependent variable 
Interest-generating activities have been traditional in Hong Kong’s commercial 
banking sector for many years. Not surprisingly, most banks still rely mainly on 
income from traditional banking but non-interest activates, which may increase 
return and diversify risks, have risen rapidly in recent years. The sources of non-
interest income mainly comes from securitisation and other major off balance sheet 
activities. In general, the securitisation is a process whereby individual bank loans 
and other financial assets are bundled together into tradable securities that are sold 
to the secondary market (Altunbas, 2009). Hong Kong has a low level of 
securitisation activity. This mainly due to inexpensive rates of the ready 
availability of other more conventional types of funding in Hong Kong. During the 
global financial crisis, the securitisation activity in Hong Kong has remained 
relatively inactive. And the HKMA has not formally introduced any liquidity 
schemes to support the securitisation market (Chen et al., 2010). The non-interest 
income mainly comes from fees and commissions, and income from foreign 
exchange and derivatives operations. In order to find the degree of competition of 
the interest and non-interest market, interest income and non-interest income are 
used as separate dependent variables of the reduced form revenue equation. Table 
5.6 presents the correlation matrix of residuals between three equations. The 
estimation results are provided in Table 5.7. 
    The Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared statistic from Table 5.6 is equal to 11.099 and 
the prob=0.0112, which states the residuals between the three equations are 
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correlated. It also shows the evidence for the use of the SUR approach in 
estimation. The results of Table 5.7 show that the H-statistic is 0.5052 using 
interest-income as dependent variable, while the H-statistic is 0.4542 using non-
interest income as dependent variable. The Wald test is conducted to verify if the 
H-statistics are significantly different from zero or unity. The results reject 
hypotheses H=0 and H=1 in both cases, and indicate that both interest market and 
non-interest market can be described as monopolistic competition. Although the 
difference is not large, the value of the H-statistic using interest income as a 
dependent variable is slightly higher than that using non-interest income as a 
dependent variable. This means that the level of market competition of the interest 
market seems higher than the competition level of the non-interest market. These 
results explain the behaviour of banks that move into investment banking-type 
activities, the fee based business, and related activities. Since the competition level 
of the interest market is high, the banks come to rely more on non-interest income 
activities. Moreover, the existence of long-run equilibrium is not rejected. The E-
statistic is equal to 0.005. According to the Wald chi-squared statistic, which is 
equal to 0.09, and the probability, which is equal to 0.7617, hypothesis E=0 cannot 
be rejected.  
    As for input prices using interest income as dependent variable, the unit price of 
capital (𝑙𝑛𝑤2) and deposits (𝑙𝑛𝑤3) are positive and significant at 0.0625 and 
0.4882, respectively, but the unit price of labour (𝑙𝑛𝑤3) is negative at -0.0455; 
however, it is not significant. All of the coefficients of control variables have the 
same sign as the case of using total revenue as dependent variable, except for 
lnEQTA. The coefficient of lnEQTA is positive and significant at 0.0537, which 
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is consistent with Bikker and Haaf (2002). They think that the capital requirements 
increase proportionally with the risk on loans and investment portfolios, and then 
the coefficient of lnEQTA is suggested as positive.  
Based on the results using the logarithm of non-interest income as dependent 
variable, the coefficient of unit price of labour and deposits are positive and 
significant. However, although the unit price of capital has a positive sign, it is not 
significant. As for the estimated coefficients of other bank-specific factors, the 
coefficient of lnTA is positive and significant at 0.7716, which shows that 
economies of scale also exist in the non-interest market. The coefficients of 
lnNLTA and lnEQTA are not significant, as expected, since the bank loans and 
equity seem to have no considerable effect on non-interest income. The coefficient 
of lnrgdpg is positive and significant at 0.0554, which shows that real GDP growth 
has a positive effect on the banks’ non-interest income.  
Table 5.6 Correlation matrix of residuals between equations 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝐼 𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐼𝐼 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑂𝐴 1   
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝐼 0.2025 1  
𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐼𝐼 0.1178 -0.0181 1 
Breusch-Pagan test of Independence: chi2(3)=11.099, Pr=0.0112 
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Table 5.7 Panzar-Rosse H-statistic using interest income and non-interest income as dependent variable 1997-2012:  SUR 
estimation. Included observation= 201. Standard errors are in parenthesis 100 
Reduced-form revenue equation (equation 5.11). 
Dependent Variable  𝒍𝒏𝑰𝑰 
Reduced-form revenue equation (equation 5.11). 
Dependent Variable  𝒍𝒏𝑵𝑰𝑰 
Equilibrium condition (equation 5.12). Dependent 
variable 𝐥𝐧 (𝑹𝑶𝑨 + 𝟏) 
Variable Parameter Coefficient Variable Parameter Coefficient Variable Parameter Coefficient 
Constant 𝜁𝐼𝐼  1.4804*** 
(0.3536) 
Constant 𝜁𝑁𝐼𝐼  -1.6855* 
(0.9464) 
Constant 𝜁′ -0.0026 
(0.0054) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1 𝜋1,𝐼𝐼 -0.0455 
(0.0396) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1 𝜋1,𝑁𝐼𝐼 0.3186*** 
(0.1053) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤1 𝜋1′ -0.0013 
(0.0016) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2 𝜋2,𝐼𝐼 0.0625*** 
(0.0130) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2 𝜋2,𝑁𝐼𝐼 0.1272*** 
(0.0347) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤2 𝜋2′ 0.0004 
(0.0004) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤3 𝜋3,𝐼𝐼 0.4882*** 
(0.0099) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤3 𝜋3,𝑁𝐼𝐼 0.0084 
(0.0263) 
𝑙𝑛𝑤3 𝜋3′ 0.0014*** 
(0.0005) 
lnTA 𝜐1,𝐼𝐼 0.8328*** 
(0.0247) 
lnTA 𝜐1,𝑁𝐼𝐼 0.7716*** 
(0.0662) 
lnTA 𝜐1′ 0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
lnNLTA 𝜐2,𝐼𝐼 0.1761*** 
(0.0519) 
lnNLTA 𝜐2,𝑁𝐼𝐼 -0.1829 
(0.1383) 
lnNLTA 𝜐2′ -0.0045** 
(0.0019) 
lnEQTA 𝜐3,𝐼𝐼 0.0537** 
(0.0255) 
lnEQTA 𝜐3,𝑁𝐼𝐼 -0.1008 
(0.0677) 
lnEQTA 𝜐3′ 0.0034*** 
(0.0012) 
lnPRTA 𝜐4,𝐼𝐼 0.0262*** 
(0.0066) 
lnPRTA 𝜐4,𝑁𝐼𝐼 -0.0321* 
(0.0175) 
lnPRTA 𝜐4′ -0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
lnrgdpg 𝜏1,𝐼𝐼 0.0128 
(0.0088) 
lnrgdpg 𝜏1,𝑁𝐼𝐼 0.0554** 
(0.0233) 
lnrgdpg 𝜏1′ 0.0004 
(0.0004) 
H-statistic                       0.5052 H-statistic                    0.4542 E-statistic 0.0005 
Wald Chi-squared statistic H=0 142.88*** Wald Chi-squared statistic H=0 16.31*** Wald Chi-squared statistic E=0 0.09 
Wald test H=0 P-value       0.0000 Wald test H=0 P-value 0.0001 Wald test E=0 P-value 0.7617 
Wald Chi-squared statistic H=1 137.00*** Wald Chi-squared statistic H=1     23.57***   
Wald test H=1 P-value         0.0000 Wald test H=1 P-value  0.0000   
𝑅2            0.9945 𝑅2                0.9781 𝑅2 0.2338 
                                                          
100 Note: * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, *** indicates 1% significance level.  
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5.4.4 Development of H-statistic overtime 
In order to consider the time evolution of competition for the interest and non-
interest markets, the results from P-R H-statistics estimation by six years101 rolling 
are presented in Table 5.8. There is a gradual declining trend in the values of the 
H-statistics for the interest market. From year 1997 to 2005, the H-statistics are 
relatively high. The main reason for this is that the interest rate deregulation was 
fully completed by July 2001, with interest rate restrictions on current and savings 
account removed. These deregulations lead to a high degree of competition in the 
interest market. Secondly, the restriction on the number of branches and offices 
for foreign banks was completely removed in 2001. The market entry criteria have 
been relaxed since 2002, which also increased the market competition. Thirdly, 
most major bank consolidations took place in 2001 and 2002; for example, the 
Bank of China Group. Lastly, the Asia financial crisis has had a certain effect on 
the interest market in Hong Kong. In Chapter 3, I compare the magnitude of 
switching costs during the good times and bad times and find that the magnitude 
of estimated switching costs during the bad time is slightly higher than that in the 
good time. In order to investigate the linkage between market competition and 
switching costs, I also compare the degree of market competition for the same 
periods. The period 2002-2007 is considered as a good time, and the period 2007 
to 2012 is considered as a bad time.102 From the values of the H-statistic using 
                                                          
101  In order to assess changes in H-statistic over time, many studies provide rolling-window 
estimates of H-statistic and E-statistic. Daley and Matthews (2012) estimates the P-R E-statistic by 
six years rolling for Jamaican banking sector. Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) estimate yearly and 
rolling-window H-statistic for eleven major industrial economies and two regions. The number of 
observations ranges from 66 to 95 in this rolling estimation.  
102 The reason of choosing these two periods is explained in Chapter 3 (p.103).  
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interest income as dependent variable, the H-statistic for the period 2002 to 2007 
is 0.5724 and the H-statistic for the period 2007 to 2012 is 0.4822. These results 
suggest that the Hong Kong bank interest market is more competitive during the 
good times. These findings are reasonable. During the bad times, the demand for 
loans goes down because of an economic recession. Then, in order to maintain 
profits, the banks will behave anti-competitively and raise switching costs to help 
lock in their good customers. Because of the anti-competitive behaviour of banks, 
the interest market during a bad time is less competitive than in a good time.  
For the non-interest market, the values of the H-statistic fluctuated sharply over 
the period. In general, there is an upward trend in the value of H-statistic from 
1997 to 2007 but it then fell sharply after that, except for the period from 2007 to 
2012. Since the period 2007 to 2012 covers the year 2007 and 2008, when there 
was a global financial crisis, it is very difficult to assess competition during the 
market turmoil.  Upon analysis of these results, one can conclude that competition 
in the non-interest market evolved differently over the years in Hong Kong. In 
some periods, competition was very high; for example, the H-statistic reached a 
level of 0.8073 for the period 2001 to 2006. This is not significant from unity, 
which shows that the market was under perfect competition during that period. The 
H-statistic is also not significant from unity at 0.9608 for the period 2007 to 2012. 
In some other periods, such as 1997 to 2002, 2003 to 2008, 2004 to 2009 and 2006 
to 2011, the H-statistics are not significant from zero, which indicates that the non-
interest market can be considered as a monopoly during these periods. The main 
reason for this large fluctuation is due to competition from outside the bank market. 
In the non-interest market, the banks are facing competition from other financial 
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and non-financial institutions. Since these effects are not included in the model, 
the results seem to be less reliable.  
Table 5.8 Panzar-Rosse H-statistic using interest income and non-interest 
income as dependent variable for rolling sample103 
 
 
Period 
Dependent variable 
Interest income: 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝐼 Non-interest income 𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐼𝐼 
1997-2002 0.6964a 0.1492c 
1998-2003 0.6614a 0.3543a 
1999-2004 0.6924a 0.3894a 
2000-2005 0.7040a 0.5388a 
2001-2006 0.5921a 0.8073b 
2002-2007 0.5724a 0.5184a 
2003-2008 0.4493a 0.0452c 
2004-2009 0.5315a 0.1529c 
2005-2010 0.3552a 0.5070d 
2006-2011 0.3034a 0.3757c 
2007-2012 0.4822a 0.9608b 
 
5.4.5 Summary  
This section presents the estimates of competition in the banking markets in Hong 
Kong using a P-R approach. Unlike previous studies, in order to solve the problem 
of residuals correlation I have jointly estimated a reduced form revenue equation 
and an equilibrium condition equation using the SUR approach. The results 
suggest that the Hong Kong bank market can be considered as monopolistic 
competition.  These results are consistent with several previous studies for the 
Hong Kong banking industry.  Furthermore, I compare the level of competition 
                                                          
103  Note: a means significantly different from both zero and unity on Wald test; b means 
significantly different from zero but not significant different from unity on Wald test; c means 
significantly different from unity but not significant different from zero on Wald test; d means not 
significantly different from both zero and unity on Wald test. 
             
186 
 
between interest market and non-interest markets, and find that the degree of 
market competition of the interest market is slightly higher than that of the non-
interest market. In addition, in order to consider the time evolution of competition 
for the interest and non-interest markets, I estimate the P-R model for a six year 
rolling sample. The results show that in the interest market there is a gradual 
decline trend in the values of H-statistics. Compared with bad times, the Hong 
Kong bank interest market is more competitive during the good times. For the non-
interest market, the values of the H-statistic have fluctuated sharply over the period. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the degree of competition in the Hong Kong banking 
sector during 1997 to 2012 using the P-R approach that was proposed by Roose 
and Panzar (1997), and Panzar and Rosse (1987). The results suggest that Hong 
Kong’s banking industry is monopolistically competitive. In addition, the market 
is under long-run equilibrium during this period. These results are consistent with 
previous studies for the Hong Kong banking market. Although traditional banking 
is still the major activity in most banks, non-interest income (for instance, fees, 
commissions, income from foreign exchange and derivative operations) play an 
increasingly important role in the banks’ revenue. In order to find the degree of 
competition of the interest and non-interest market, I have estimated the P-R model 
using interest income and non-interest income as the dependent variable of reduced 
form revenue equation. The evidence from the H-statistics suggests that the degree 
of market competition of interest market is slightly higher than that of non-interest 
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market. These findings have policy significance to policymakers. Cross-selling has 
become a strategic priority for many banks in recent years. By cleverly combining 
different bank services to create a package, the banks have one of the most 
powerful levers available to increase customer lock-in. In order to improve the 
efficiency of non-interest market, the policymakers need to focus on the non-
interest bank activities and improve the transparency of bank non-interest earning, 
which may reduce the barriers of customers’ switching. In addition, increasing the 
competition of the non-interest market may attract more new entrants and improve 
market efficiency.  
    Furthermore, I estimate the P-R model over a six year rolling sub-sample. The 
results show that in the interest market, there is a gradual declining trend in the 
values of H-statistics. Compared with the bad times, the Hong Kong bank interest 
market is more competitive during the good times. These results are consistent 
with the findings of Chapter 3. According to the results from Chapter 3, the 
magnitude of estimated switching costs during the bad time is slightly higher than 
that in the good time. During the bad times, the demand for loans goes down 
because of economic recession. Then, in order to maintain profits, the banks will 
behave anti-competitively and raise switching costs to help lock in good customers. 
Because of the anti-competitive behaviour of banks, the interest market during the 
bad time is less competitive than in good times. For the non-interest market, the 
values of the H-statistic have fluctuated sharply over the period. The implications 
of these results suggest that the banks need to pay more attention to competition 
from other financial institutions. After the financial crisis of 2008, in order to boost 
the economy, the regulations have gradually been relaxed. Therefore, a higher 
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level of competition is expected in Hong Kong’s banking sector. Hence, market 
competition needs to be closely monitored in the future.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis is an empirical study that investigates bank competition issues in the 
Hong Kong banking sector. It begins with an overview of the Hong Kong banking 
industry in Chapter 2, and includes three self-contained empirical chapters related 
to switching costs, collusion and competition, in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively. 
By using a sample of 18 licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong from 1997 to 
2012, this thesis provides answers to the following research questions, which also 
presented in Chapter 1: 
1. The significance and magnitude of switching costs in Hong Kong bank loan 
market and their impacts on prices. Chapter 3 extracts information on both the 
significance and magnitude of switching costs in Hong Kong bank loan market 
by applying an empirical model, which is based on Kim et al.’s (2003). My 
findings suggest that switching costs are significant in the bank loan market of 
Hong Kong.  By comparing the price-most margin with and without switching 
costs, the results provide empirical evidence to the conventional wisdom that 
switching costs make markets less competitive. The price-cost margin was 
raised by the presence of switching costs in Hong Kong’s bank loan market. I 
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also find that the magnitude of estimated switching costs during a bad time is 
slightly higher than that in a good time due to the “Lemons Problems”.  
2. Bank collusion and competitive condition in Hong Kong bank loan market. 
Chapter 4 examines the degree of collusion and competition in Hong Kong’s 
banking sector based on the conjectural variation approach. The empirical 
results suggest that banks in Hong Kong operated in a competitive fashion in 
the loan market and the behaviour can be characterized by Nash-Bertrand 
equilibrium in prices with no significant evidence of collusion on pricing.  
3. The degree of competition in Hong Kong banking sector. Chapter 5 assesses 
the level of competition in Hong Kong banking sector using the P-R approach. 
My findings suggest that banks in Hong Kong can be characterized as 
monopolistically competitive. There is also a negative relationship between the 
magnitude of switching costs and the level of competition.  
This chapter concludes this thesis. It is organized as follows. Section 6.2 
summarizes the main empirical results of each chapter. Section 6.3 discusses the 
policy implication of the main research findings. Section 6.4 states the limitations 
of this thesis. Finally, section 6.5 offers suggestion for future research. 
 
6.2 Summary of the empirical results  
This section summarizes the main empirical results presented in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5. In order to keep consistency, the same dataset is used in three empirical 
chapters. I have collected an unbalanced panel of Hong Kong bank level data for 
             
191 
 
the period of 1997 to 2012 from Bankscope and the banks’ Annual Reposts. The 
data are annual and cover 18 licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong.  
    Chapter 3 investigates the significance and the magnitude of switching costs 
in Hong Kong’s bank loan market. I use the empirical model presented by Kim 
et al. (2003) to estimate the magnitude of switching costs in Hong Kong for the 
period 1997 to 2012. Overall, the point estimates of the switching costs based on 
the entire sample are significant at 0.1947, using the non-linear 3SLS approach. 
The estimates on the slope of the transition probability function for the entire 
sample are negative and significant at -4.7367. This negative slope ensures a 
downward sloping demand curve for bank loans. The conventional view in 
economic theory suggests that switching costs make markets less competitive 
(Farrell and Shapiro 1998, Beggs and Klemperer 1992, Padilla 1995 and 
Anderson et al. 2004). The findings provide evidence of this conventional view. 
In general, the average price-cost margin is low, which satisfies the Bertrand 
behaviour of the market. The effect of the existence of switching costs raises the 
price-cost margin by 0.52% (52bps)104. Compared with the results of Kim et al. 
(2003) for the Norwegian banking industry, the magnitude of estimated switching 
costs in the Hong Kong bank loan market is higher. According to Liu et al. (2010), 
Norway appears to be the most competitive banking system in the European 
                                                          
104 According to the results of Chapter 4, the own price elasticity,𝜑1, is negative and significant at 
-1.0778 using non-linear 3SLS approach. Therefore the changes of aggregate loans can be 
calculated as 0.0052*(-1.0778) which is about -0.56%. Since the total loans of the whole sample is 
4,730,545 HKD million in 2012. Then, the existence of switching costs decreases the total loans 
by 4,730,545*(-0.56%), which is about 26,512.62 HKD million.   
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country, where the Panzar-Rosse H statistic is highly at 0.83 for the period 1997 
to 2008. Therefore, it is not surprising that switching costs in Norway are low.  
My results also show that the magnitude of estimated switching costs during 
the bad times is slightly higher than that in good times. Two time periods have 
been picked up. One period is year 2002 to year 2007, the other period is year 
2007 to year 2012. According to the statistics of real GDP growth rate and 
unemployment rate, the period 2002 to 2007 is considered as a good time and the 
period 2007 to 2012 can be considered as a bad time. During the bad times, the 
issue of the “Lemons Problem” is more serious. Banks will be more willing to 
lend money to creditable customers. For the new borrowers, banks will charge a 
much higher risk premium or even reject their application. It is most likely that 
higher estimated switching costs exist during the bad times. Moreover, on 
average, 2.54% of the customer’s added value is attributed to the lock-in effect 
generated by switching costs. Utilizing the results from trans-log cost function, I 
compute AC-MC over the sample period to gauge the economies of scale. 
Although the value of AC-MC is small, it is positive, which shows that the banks 
are in the range of economies of scale. These findings are in line with Ho (2010). 
The GMM approach is applied to the same model as a robustness check. Similar 
results have been obtained, which indicates that the findings from non-linear 
3SLS approach are robust.   
In Chapter 4, the degree of collusion and competition in Hong Kong bank loan 
market is examined using the conjectural variation approach. A conjectural 
parameter, which is often defined as the bank’s expectation about its rivals’ price 
             
193 
 
responses to changes in its own price, is used to identify the degree of collusion. 
The specification and estimation of the model follows Coccorese (2005), who 
uses a price-setting model in a duopolistic market, which has heterogeneous 
products. The results of this study show that the value of the conjectural variation 
parameter is insignificant at 0.3452 using the non-linear 3SLS approach. This 
suggests that banks in Hong Kong operated in a competitive fashion in the loan 
market and the behaviour is coherent with a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in prices 
with no significant evidence of collusion on pricing during the period 1997 to 
2012. As a robustness check, by using GMM approach the conjectural variation 
parameter is insignificant at 0.6001, which is relatively higher than using non-
linear 3SLS approach. These findings are consistent with previous studies (Wong 
el al. 2008, Ho 2010). 
Chapter 5 investigates the competitive condition in the Hong Kong banking 
sector using the P-R approach. The novelty of this chapter is to solve the problem 
of residual correlation between reduced form revenue equation and equilibrium 
condition equation by jointly estimating these two equations using the SUR 
approach. The estimated value of H-statistics using total revenue as a dependent 
variable is equal to 0.5069. These results suggest that Hong Kong banking is 
monopolistically competitive and the hypothesis on the long-run equilibrium in 
the Hong Kong banking sector is not rejected. These findings are consistent with 
evidence from previous research (Jiang et al 2004, Wong et al. 2006, Chu et al. 
2013 and Clasessens and Laeven 2004). Furthermore, in order to find the degree 
of competition of interest and non-interest market, interest income and non-
interest income are used as the dependent variable of reduced form revenue 
             
194 
 
equation. The results exhibit that the value of H-statistic is 0.5052 for interest 
market and 0.4542 for non-interest market. These results suggest that both the 
interest and non-interest markets can be described as monopolistic competition. 
It also reveals that the level of competition of interest market is slightly higher 
than that of non-interest market. In addition, in order to consider the time 
evolution of competition of interest and non-interest market, I estimate the H-
statistic over a moving sub-sample window of six years duration. The results 
show that in the interest market there is a gradual decline trend in the values of 
the H-statistics. They also indicate that Hong Kong’s bank interest market is more 
competitive during the good times. Therefore, by taking the results of Chapter 3 
into account, these results verified the presumption that switching costs make 
markets less competitive. There is a negative relationship between the magnitude 
of switching costs and the level of competition. But for the non-interest market, 
the values of the H-statistic have fluctuated sharply over the period.  
The findings from various chapters are consistent with each other. I have 
summarized the major findings of three empirical chapters in Table 6.1. Although 
compared with the results of Kim et al. (2003) for the Norwegian banking 
industry, the estimated switching costs in Hong Kong bank loan market are higher, 
it only increases the price-cost margin by 0.52% (52bps). There are two major 
switching patterns in the loan market. One is a borrower who may terminate the 
loan agreement when sufficiently better loan contracts are provided by a rival 
bank. Another is a borrower who may consider switching to other banks after 
maturity of the loan. The reasons why switching costs have a low effect may be 
because the empirical model proposed by Kim et al. (2003) only takes the loan 
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market into account. Bundled products and services (Llewellyn, 2005) are a 
successful strategy deployed by banks to increase profits, which increased the 
magnitude of switching costs to lock-in customers. The bundling products and 
services may mean that the purchase of one bank service may be dependent on 
the purchase of another (Llewellyn, 2005). If the lending rates are same across 
banks, then loans can be considered as homogenous products. However, 
borrowers are heterogeneous. Banks lock customers in by differently customizing 
other financial services according to individual the customers’ needs.  Hence, the 
different “bundled products” may create high switching costs in the whole market 
and different customers may face different switching costs. Based on the findings 
of Chapter 5, the non-interest market in the Hong Kong banking sector lacks a 
competitiveness compared with the interest market. In recent years, non-interest 
activities have increase rapidly. These findings provide support for the idea of 
bundled products. Since customers purchase a bundle of products, the purchase 
of bank loans may be dependent on the purchase of other financial services. Thus, 
limited competition in the non-interest market may lock-in customers’ demand 
for other financial services, as well as the demand for loans. Bundling can deter 
customers switching to the best individual products. In addition, the results from 
Chapter 4 show that there is no significant evidence of collusive behaviour in 
Hong Kong bank loan market, reflecting the existence of switching costs in some 
way and fitting in with the supposition of bundled products. 
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Table 6.1 Banking performance in Hong Kong: A summary of the empirical results 
 
 
Type of 
issues 
Type of Measures  Interpretation  Estimated value  Results  
Switching 
costs  
s index presented 
by Kim et al. 
(2003) 
A positive s indicates the existence of 
customer switching costs in the bank loan 
market  
s = 0.1947 Switching costs are significant in the 
Hong Kong bank loan market. 
Collusion  Conjectural 
variation 
parameter λ 
𝜆 = 1                  Perfectly collusive  
 
𝜆 = −∞              Perfect competition 
  
−∞ < 𝜆 < 1     Oligopolistic competition. 
In particular when 𝜆 = 0 the behaviour is 
regarded as Nash  Bertrand equilibrium in 
prices 
λ = 0.3462  (3SLS) 
λ = 0.6001  (GMM) 
 
Both parameters are 
insignificant 
No significant evidence of collusion 
on pricing and the banks behaviour is 
consistent with a Nash Bertrand 
equilibrium in prices in Hong Kong 
bank loan market.  
Competition Panzar-Rosse  
H statistic  
H ≤ 0            Monopoly or collusive 
oligopoly and may include conjectural 
variation short-run oligopoly 
 
H = 1           Perfect competition 
 
0 < 𝐻 < 1    Monopolistic competition 
H=0.5069 (total revenue as 
dependent variable) 
 
H=0.5052 (interest income 
as dependent variable) 
 
H=0.4542  (non-interest 
income as dependent 
variable) 
Monopolistic competition in Hong 
Kong banking sector. The degree of 
competition of interest market is 
slightly higher than that of non-
interest market.   
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6.3 Policy implication of the thesis 
Financial reform has been an ongoing feature of Hong Kong’s financial sector 
during the past 50 years. Some financial reforms are crisis-induced, notably the 
pack of seven technical measures 105  to strengthen the monetary system and 
stabilize the interbank market and interest rates as a result of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. However, there are more financial reforms that are not due to the 
financial crisis. For example, since the 1990s the HKMA has used macro-
prudential tools extensively to supervise banking. In addition, the introduction of 
the Hong Kong dollar Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system in 1996 has 
enabled a safe and efficient interbank market. In 2012, the HKMA and the 
Treasury Bureau revised the Banking Ordinance again to update certain market 
entry criteria for the banking sector in Hong Kong to reduce the entry barriers. The 
previous section has discussed the major findings of this thesis. These findings 
offer important implications for the bank regulators and policy makers in Hong 
Kong, relating to the design and formulation of regulatory changes and 
competitive policies to help promote bank efficiency, financial stability, customer 
welfare, and maintain economic growth. These findings also have an implication 
for bank management and strategy.   
                                                          
105 HKMA announced a package of seven technical measures on 5 September 1998 to strengthen 
the currency board arrangements and stabilize the conditions in the interbank market and interest 
rates. 
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The results from Chapter 3 show that switching costs are significant in Hong 
Kong’s bank loan market. Switching costs hinder banking competition. But the 
question is whether or not the significant switching costs in loan market reduce 
customer welfare? Should the government encourage policies that lower switching 
costs and reduce barriers to entry? Klemeperer (1995), and Farrell and Klemperer 
(2007) suggest that the existence of switching costs generally raise prices, increase 
deadweight loss, and discourage market entry. Park (2011) agrees with their ideas 
and shows that in the wireless industry a reduction in switching costs increases 
market competition and lowers prices. The reduction in switching costs has had 
positive welfare benefits in the wireless industry. However, Pesic (2010) 
investigates the impact of switching costs and market entry in the mortgage 
industry, and suggests that lower switching costs exacerbate adverse selection 
problem. Therefore, government policies should solve this market failure before 
encouraging activates that reduce switching costs. Since the research on switching 
costs in the loan market is a partial analysis, the significant switching costs I found 
in the Hong Kong loan market are not necessarily welfare reducing. Although 
some evidence has found that the switching costs in the deposit market are low 
(Ho, 2014), no research has been done for the financial services market. As a result, 
policy makers should focus on issues of consumer welfare due to the switching 
costs in the whole market before implementing policies that encourage activities 
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which reduce switching costs. Such as, improving transparency106 by publishing 
information on the prices of other financial services (e.g. bank fees) or reducing 
the consumer inertia that arises from the banks’ “bundled products” (Matthews et 
al. 2007).   
Furthermore, the results from Chapter 4 and 5 suggest that Hong Kong banking 
is monopolistically competitive with no significant evidence of collusion on 
pricing during 1997 to 2012. A series of financial reform measures, such as 
deregulation interest rate and relaxation barriers to new entry implemented by 
HKMA to promote the market competition in the banking industry in Hong Kong, 
have also increased pressure on the banks’ interest margin. As a result, increasing 
non-interest income has become an attractive strategy for the banks to maintain 
profits. In order to further promote market competition in the current ongoing 
bank consolidation, policymakers could focus on improving transparency 
between customers and banks (BIS, 2001). From the banks’ aspect, better 
information flows between customers and banks may also help enhance the banks’ 
credit risk management (Jiang, 2004).    
Although most commercial banks still mainly rely on income from traditional 
banking, non-interest activities that may increase return and diversify the income 
                                                          
106 However, it is worth noting that improving transparency is not always a good thing. Improving 
transparency may also accelerate collusion among banks (Pomp et al. 2005). Therefore, this risk 
should be considered when making the policies.  
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structure have increased rapidly in recent years. Take HSBC as an example, there 
was a dramatic increase in the ratio of non-interest income to total revenue from 
1997 to 2012. In 1997, the ratio was 15% but in 2012 the number sharply rose to 
69%. In general, non-interest income can be divided into two components: 
trading income and fee and commission income. Although the banks continued 
to look for opportunities to grow their income from sales of wealth management, 
higher operational and reputational risks may be associated with the sales of 
wealth management products (KPMG, 2013). In addition, Köhler (2014) 
indicates that increasing the share of non-interest income only makes retail-
oriented banks more stable. For investment-oriented banks, since they already 
have a large non-interest income share and engage in different activities than 
retail-oriented banks, increasing their share of non-interest income will make 
these banks significantly less stable. Thus, bank managers should consider the 
possible risks brought by increasing non-interest activities when developing their 
bank’s strategies. 
In addition, the results of AC-MC from Chapter 3 suggest that banks are in the 
range of economies of scale. The strong positive coefficient of total assets in 
Chapter 5 proves this point of view. These findings suggest that an increase in 
bank size should lead to an increase in total income. Therefore, the managers of 
small banks could encourage consolidation through mergers and acquisitions in 
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order to improve the profits of banks. However, mergers and acquisitions may 
increase bank concentration, which may lead to a decrease in bank competition.  
    Since China adopted its ‘open door’ policy in 1978, Hong Kong and Mainland 
China, especially the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region in Guangdong province, 
rapidly developed a close economic relationship. The model “front shop, back 
factory” describe the economic relationship between Hong Kong and the PRD. 
This is an effective division of labour between them which marketing, financing, 
design and administration took place in front shop in Hong Kong, but 
manufacturing and labour-intensive assembly activities were completed in the 
back factory in PRD (So et al., 2001). After more than three decades of cooperation, 
both Hong Kong and Mainland China have experienced dramatic economic 
changes. With the rapid growth of the Mainland economy, the costs of labour, land 
and materials in PRD became expensive and the previous “front shop, back factory” 
cooperation model has been challenged. One of the most important factors which 
influence the development of Hong Kong banking industry is its relationship with 
Mainland China. There are many events that affected the economic relationship 
between Hong Kong and Mainland China, the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, 
Asian Financial Crisis, China entered WTO in 2001, Mainland and Hong Kong 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) in 2003 are several typical 
events.  
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Hong Kong has long served as the bridge between the Mainland China and 
international markets. Foreign companies use Hong Kong’s financial services to 
invest in China since Hong Kong offers them something that no mainland city does: 
a free market system, a stable investment environment, well-educated labour force, 
and a sound legal and institutional frameworks. According to the statistics from 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, Hong Kong was reported as the largest 
source of FDI flows to China in 2012, followed by Virgins Islands, Japan and 
Singapore. After the handover in 1997, The FDI flow to Hong Kong from 
Mainland China continued growth which showed an enhanced economic 
integration between Hong Kong and Mainland China. According to the statistics 
from Census and Statistic Department of Hong Kong,  Mainland China replaced 
the UK as the largest source of direct investment in Hong Kong in 2006 which 
contributed 35.1% of the total inward direct investment to Hong Kong in that year. 
And in 2013, Mainland China contributed 31.9% of the total inward direct 
investment to Hong Kong. The close economic integration between Hong Kong 
and Mainland China also provided the opportunities for Hong Kong banks.  
By the end of 2013, there were 13 Hong Kong-incorporated banks with business 
operations on the Chinese mainland, maintaining over 440 branches or sub-
branches in Mainland107. In this sense, Mainland China plays an important role in 
the development of Hong Kong banking industry. However, with the development 
                                                          
107 Data Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council 
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of Chinese economy, China opened its borders to the global economy. It is clearly 
that Hong Kong became less important than in the past. Hong Kong also has its 
own advantages, such as its stock market, is significantly more reliable and better 
developed than the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. According to the 
statistics from Dealogic, since 2002, Chinese companies have raised USD 43 
billion in initial public offering in Hong Kong, but only USD 25 billion on 
mainland Stock Exchanges. If the relationship between Hong Kong and Mainland 
China becomes not smooth, a series of policies favouring economic integration 
between them such as CEPA, the individual travel scheme and the Pan-PRD 
regional cooperation framework will not be introduced. The decline of investment 
from Mainland will direct result the decrease of demand of loans in Hong Kong. 
In order to lock-in creditable customer, the switching costs in the Hong Kong loan 
markets may become higher. And the degree of competition in the Hong Kong 
bank market may be affected as well.  
    Hong Kong has one of the largest representation of international banks in the 
world. More than 70 of the world’s 100 largest banks have an operation in Hong 
Kong. As of end 2013, there was 156 licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong. 
Of these, 21 are locally incorporated and the rest 135 are branches of foreign banks. 
The large foreign participation in Hong Kong banking market make international 
banking markets has a certain influence in Hong Kong banks. Some foreign banks 
like DBS (Hong Kong) which is a subsidiary of DBS bank headquartered in 
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Singapore started their operation in Hong Kong many years ago. And these foreign 
banks carry on both retail and wholesale banking business through their extensive 
network of branches in Hong Kong. The large number of foreign banks in the Hong 
Kong bank market gives rise to the concern that foreign banks will be less 
determined to engage in the domestic economy, and therefore will reduce their 
activity more abruptly during downturns or more likely to cut back if head office 
change the operation strategy (Lopez et al.,2008). For instance, during the Asian 
Financial Crisis, Japanese banks reduced both their physical presence and their 
lending in Hong Kong (Carse, 2001). According to the statistics from HKMA, in 
March 1997, there were 91 Japanese authorised institution in Hong Kong. But by 
June of 2000, the number has been reduced by about 60% to 35. And between 
March 1997 and June 2000, the total lending of the Japanese banks in Hong Kong 
fell from just over HKD 2000 billion to HKD 643 billion, a decline of almost 70%.  
This cut back affected the volatility of the supply of credit in Hong Kong bank 
market. Since the credit are hardly to get, switching costs in the loan market may 
become higher since banks will be more willing to lend money to creditable 
customers. For the new customers, banks will charge a much higher risk premium 
or even reject loan applications. The empirical results from Chapter 3 suggest that 
the switching costs during the financial crisis periods were slightly higher, 
consistent with this view.  
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6.4 Limitations of this thesis 
Before moving into some possible recommendations for future research, it is 
important to mention several limitations and methodological problems that this 
thesis has observed.  
The first limitation concerns the limited number of observations. This is mainly 
due to the small number of banks included in the sample and the relatively short 
sample period of these banks.  According to the statistics from the HKMA, the 
number of all authorized institutions in Hong Kong was 200 in 2013. Until June 
2013, there were 21 licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong. However, the 
sample of this thesis only covers 18 licensed banks for the period 1997 to 2012. 
The main reason why only these 18 commercial banks were included in the 
sample was because the data availability for other banks is limited. In addition, 
the annual reports of banks incorporated outside Hong Kong are not released by 
HKMA. In the loan market, wholesale banks offer heterogeneous products for 
different people. In order to estimate the switching costs in the bank loan market, 
retail banks which offer homogenous products are better choices. And the level 
of competition may also differ for the retail banking market and other banking 
market.  Moreover, Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) show that different types of banks 
compete differently. This indicates that switching costs for borrowers from 
commercial banks may differ from those from other types of banks. The level of 
competition may also differ for the commercial banking market and other 
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banking markets. In addition, these 18 banks dominate the market. The statistics 
from HKMA show that the total assets of these 18 banks was HKD 11,681,441 
million (which at that time was equal to USD 1,506,699 million)108 which 
accounted for 78.62% of the whole market in 2012. This data limitation may lead 
to a bias in the estimators of 3SLS and GMM (Nagar, 1959). To avoid the loss of 
degrees of freedom, especially for the small sample, some external instrumental 
variables have been chosen for the system estimation of Chapters 3 and 4.  
Secondly, the panel data used for estimation is unbalanced because the data for 
some banks are missing for some years. Analysing unbalanced panel data may 
raise a few additional issues compared with the analysis of balanced data (Baltagi 
2008). The major drawback of an unbalanced panel is that people may mistake 
changes resulting from differences in the sample of banks for true changes in the 
parameter values over time (Hirsch and Morgan 1994).  
Thirdly, since the lending rates are not reported in bank statements and other 
databases, I calculate the interest rate on loans by using equation 3.32 (p.95) 
presented in Chapter 3. The 91-day exchange fund bill rates are used as a proxy 
of interest rate on other earning assets. Therefore, the calculated lending rates 
may have some differences from the real lending rates. Similarly, due to the lack 
                                                          
1081 HKD= 0.1290 USD. Data source: Bloomberg. Date: 4 June 2014. 
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of data, the number of employees is also calculated, which may exhibit certain 
deviations.  
Finally, considering the empirical model provided by Kim et al. (2003), 
concerns about the magnitude and significance of switching costs mean that a 
considerable drawback of this model is that it only takes the loan market into 
account. The bundled products may create high switching costs in the whole 
market and the switching costs from the non-interest market are not accounted 
for in the model. As a result, the magnitude of estimated switching costs may be 
much less than the magnitude of real switching costs in the whole market. 
Another methodological issue is the use of a trans-log cost system. Although 
when compared with the Cob-Douglas function form the trans-log cost function 
has less restrictions on elasticities, which allows economies of scale to change 
with output, the trans-log cost function has certain drawbacks. The main 
disadvantage is that it can be difficult to interpret the coefficient estimates due to 
the quadratic terms and cross terms, it also requires the estimation of more 
parameters.  
 
6.5 Suggestions for further research 
This section makes a number of suggestions for further research.  
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Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, Kim et al. (2003)’s model is the only 
structural model available for econometric estimation of the magnitude and 
significance of switching costs that uses an aggregated panel data that does not 
contain customer-specific information. Ho (2014) argues the model presented by 
Kim et al. (2003) do not model consumer preferences, therefore the model is 
unable to analyse consumer willingness to pay for bank attributes, quantify 
switching costs and examine the impacts of switching costs on the price elasticity 
of demand. And as discussed in the previous section, a considerable drawback of 
this model is that it only takes the loan market into account. Further research can 
focus on these shortcomings and estimate the switching costs of the deposit and 
the whole market. Ho (2014) develops and estimates a dynamic structural model 
of consumer deposits demand, in which service quality and switching costs are 
important factors in their decision. This empirical model can be used as a 
reference to develop new model.  
Secondly, a new method of modelling switching costs can be developed based 
on Kim et al. (2003)’s model in order to take non-interest activities into account. 
Although the magnitude of switching costs in the Hong Kong bank loan market 
is estimated in this thesis, it does not explain which variables have direct impacts 
on switching costs. Further work can be undertaken to explore the relationship 
between switching costs and several impact factors, such as market concentration. 
In addition, the relationship between the switching costs and the macro or 
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financial variables that measures informational asymmetries between borrowers 
and lenders can be estimated in the further work.  
Thirdly, the sample of this thesis only covers 18 licensed banks for the period 
1997 to 2012. The major reasons why only these 18 retail banks were included in 
the sample were because the data availability. And in the loan market, wholesale 
banks offer heterogeneous products for different client. In order to estimate the 
switching costs in the bank loan market, retail banks which offer homogenous 
products are better choices. However, a larger data set may be used in further 
research to produce more accurate results. And a balanced panel data can be used 
if the data is available  
Finally, this thesis makes a contribution to the literature by extending the 
limited number of studies analysing the competitive condition in Hong Kong’s 
banking sector. An interesting avenue for further research might involve the use 
of other methods, such as the Boone indicator, which was introduced by Boone 
(2008) to measure the degree of competition. Furthermore, bank efficiency is 
another popular topic in banking research. Although a large number of literatures 
study the bank efficiency in Hong Kong, there has been limited study on the 
relation between bank competition and efficiency. This may suggest an 
interesting direction for further research. The uniqueness of Hong Kong mainly 
due to its close relationiship with Mainland China. Its advantage to act as the 
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bridge for linking Chinese mainland and international markets. The close 
economic integration between Hong Kong and China boots Hong Kong’s 
economic development and increased Hong Kong’s welfare. The impact of 
Mainland China and other regional markets on Hong Kong bank competition can 
be further discussed in future research.  
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Appendix A  
Chapter 3 Appendix 
 
Appendix A.1 The derivation of the optimal interest rate 
strategy (equation 3.24) 
 
As shown in equation 3.23 (p.83), the optimal interest rate charged by bank i at 
period 𝜏: 
                              
𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
= ∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝜏
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
∞
𝑡=𝜏 = 0                                 (A.1)                  
Then, by substituting equation (3.22) (p.83) into (A.1), equation (A.1) becomes 
                       
𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
= ∑ 𝛿𝑡−𝜏
𝜕(𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡∗𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
∞
𝑡=𝜏  
= 𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏 + ∑ 𝛿
𝑡−𝜏 (
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
𝑝𝑖,𝑡 −
𝜕𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝑡
) = 0∞𝑡=𝜏            (A.2) 
or 
                    
𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
= 𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏 + ∑ 𝛿
𝑡−𝜏 (𝑝𝑖,𝑡 −
𝜕𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
)
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
= 0∞𝑡=𝜏                 (A.3) 
where the effect of the current interest rate on the quantity demanded kt periods 
ahead is 
                  
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+𝑘𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
=
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+𝑘𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+𝑘𝑡−1
∙
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+𝑘𝑡−1
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+𝑘𝑡−2
… …
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
  for kt=t-τ              (A.4) 
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For similar arguments, another requirement for the bank’s optimal behaviour is 
that the derivative of (3.21) (p.83) w.r.t. the time τ + 1 interest rate, 𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1 , is zero 
along the optimal path: 
          
𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1
= 𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+1 + ∑ 𝛿
𝑡−𝜏+1 (𝑝𝑖,𝑡 −
𝜕𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
)
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1
= 0∞𝑡=𝜏            (A.5) 
where 
              
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+𝑘𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1
=
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+𝑘𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+𝑘𝑡−1
∙
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+𝑘𝑡−1
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+𝑘𝑡−2
… …
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+1
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1
  for k=t-τ               (A.6) 
Since both (A.3) and (A.5) are necessary conditions, any linear combination of 
them should hold as well. Thus, for any 𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏 and 𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1, the following should 
hold: 
                               
𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏 +
𝜕𝑉𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1
 𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1 = 0                               (A.7) 
In particular, Kim et al. (2003) choose the differentials 𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏 and 𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1 that keeps 
y1,i,τ+1 constant: 
                               
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+1
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏 +
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+1
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1
 𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1 = 0                           (A.8) 
or 
                                        d𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1 = −
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+1
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
/
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+1
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1
𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏                                    (A.9) 
Substituting  
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𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+1
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
= −𝑦1,𝑡−1𝛼1
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝛼1𝑠𝑔𝑡𝑔𝑡+1  and 
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝜏+1
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1
= −𝑦1,𝑡−1𝛼1𝑠𝑔𝑡𝑔𝑡+1109  into 
(A.9),then 
                                         𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1 = 𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝜏
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝛼1𝑠                                       (A.10) 
Since 𝑦𝑖,𝜏+1 is unchanged, the condition (A.7) becomes: 
                 (
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1
+ 𝛿
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
) 𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝜏+1
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏+1
𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0                    (A.11) 
Furthermore, as 𝑦𝑖,𝜏+1 is constant, (A.11) becomes: 
                                    
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝜏+1𝑑𝑝𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0                              (A.12) 
Inserting (A.10) into (A.12) and rearranging: 
                                                          
109 The demand faced by the bank, after substituting the linear transition probabilities is 
y1,i,t = (y1,i,t−1 (α0
i + α1(pi,t − p̅i R,t − s)) + y1,iR,t−1 (α0
i + α1 (pi,t − p̅i R,t +
s
n−1
))) gt or 
y1,i,t = (−y1,i,t−1
n
n−1
sα1 + y1,t−1α0
i + y1,t−1α1(pi,t − p̅i R,t +
s
n−1
))gt where y1,t−1 = ∑ y1,i,t−1 
 
Differentiating w.r.t the bank’s interest rate and rivals’ average interest rate gives 
 
∂y1,i,t
∂pi,t
= y1,t−1α1gt     and    
∂y1,i,t
∂p̅i R,t
= −y1,t−1α1gt 
 
The time t+1 demand is  
 
y1,i,t+1 = (−y1,i,t
n
n−1
sα1 + y1,tα0
i + y1,tα1 (pi,t+1 − p̅i R,t+1 +
s
n−1
)) gt+1  
 
Differentiating w.r.t. the bank’s time t interest rate and rivals’ time t+1 average interest rate gives 
 
∂y1,i,t+1
∂pi,t
=
− ∂y1,i,t
∂pi,t
n
n−1
sα
1
gt+1 = −y1,t−1α1
n
n−1
sα
1
gtgt+1    and     
∂y1,i,t+1
∂pi,t+1
= y1,t−1α1gtgt+1 
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𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
+ 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝜏+1
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝛼1𝑠 = 0                                  (A.13) 
Writing the derivative of the time τ profit explicitly, yields 
                        𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + (𝑝𝑖,𝑡 −
𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦𝑖,𝑡
)
𝜕𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝛼1𝑠 = 0                   (A.14) 
As 
𝜕𝑦𝑖,𝜏
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝜏
= 𝑦𝑡−1𝛼1𝑠𝑔𝑡, equation A.14 can be expressed as  
                                  𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = −𝛿 ∙ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝑔𝑡+1 −
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
𝛼1
                          (A.15) 
where 𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is the price-cost margin in period t.  
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Appendix A.2 Sample of banks110 
 
Bank Name   Short Name  Data Missing Periods  
Bank of China (Hong Kong) 
Limited 
BOC 1997-1999 
Bank of East Asia, Limited (The) BOEA NA 
China Construction Bank (Asia) 
Corporation 
CCB NA 
Chiyu Banking Corporation Limited CHIYU Personal expense in 2001 
Chong Hing Bank Limited CH 1997 
CITIC Bank International  CITIC NA 
Dah Sing Bank DS NA 
DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited DBS 1997 
Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) FUBON 1997 
Hang Seng Bank Limited HS NA 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (The) 
HSBC NA 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (Asia) 
ICBC 1997 
Nanyang Commercial Bank NY 1997 
Public Bank (Hong Kong) PUBLIC NA 
Shanghai Commercial Bank Limited SHANGHAI NA 
Standard Chartered Bank 
 (Hong Kong) Limited 
SCB 1997-1999 
Wing Hang Bank WH 1997 
Wing Lung Bank WL 1997 
                                                          
110 Note 1: DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited merged with DBS Kwong On Bank in 2003.  
Note 2: Wing Hang acquired Chekiang First Bank in 2003. 
Note 3: Public Bank (Hong Kong), originally named Asia Commercial Bank Limited, was     
acquired by Public     Financial Holdings Limited.  It was renamed in 2006.  
Note 4: Chong Hing Bank Limited was renamed from Liu Chong Hing Bank Limited in 2006. 
Note 5: China Construction Bank (Asia) was renamed from Bank of Amercia (Asia) in 2007. 
Note 6. DBS Bank lists in Stock Exchange of Singapore.  
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Appendix A.3 Coefficients interpretations of normalized 
trans-log cost function  
 
The one output, three inputs translog cost function of bank i at diffierent time is as 
follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2
𝛿11𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛾11𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡+𝛾12𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 
           +𝛾13𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 +
1
2
𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
2
 
          +
1
2
𝛽22𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
2  +
1
2
𝛽33𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 
          +𝛽23𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡                                                                             (A.16) 
 
where ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘 = 1; ∑ 𝛾1𝑘𝑘 = 0 ;  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑙 = 0, ∀𝑘, 𝑙 = 1,2,3 are imposed. 
 
If all of the explanatory variables are normalized by their sample mean, then the 
equation (A.16) can be changed into 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1 ln (
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
) +
1
2
𝛿11 ln (
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
)
2
+ 𝛾11 ln (
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
) ln (
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
) 
            +𝛾12𝑙𝑛(
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)𝑙𝑛(
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)+𝛾13𝑙𝑛(
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)𝑙𝑛(
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
) + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛(
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)+𝛽2 ln (
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
) +
               𝛽3ln (
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
) +
1
2
𝛽11𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)
2
+
1
2
𝛽22𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)
2
+
1
2
𝛽33𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)
2
+
               𝛽12𝑙𝑛(
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)𝑙𝑛(
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
) + 𝛽13𝑙𝑛(
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)𝑙𝑛(
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
) + 𝛽23𝑙𝑛(
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)𝑙𝑛(
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
) 
(A.17) 
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where 𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the sample mean of bank loans, y1. 𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are sample 
means of input price on labors, input price on capitals and input price on deposits, 
respectively.  
    Then, the elasticity of total cost w.r.t. output is given by: 
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
=
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
∗
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛿1+𝛿11𝑙𝑛 (
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)                (A.18) 
Note that at the means of the conditioning variables, 𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , then ln (
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
) = 0, 
therefore, 
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
|
𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡=𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
= 𝛿1                                   (A.19) 
So 𝛿1 is the elasticity of total cost w.r.t. output, at the means of the data. 
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Appendix A.4 Coefficient variance-covariance matrix  
 
Table A.1 Coefficient variance-covariance matrix of system estimation of trans-log cost system  
and switching costs equations using non-linear 3SLS approach 
 
Coefficient  𝜷𝟎 𝜹𝟏 𝜹𝟏𝟏 𝜸𝟏𝟐 𝜸𝟏𝟑 𝜷𝟏 𝜷𝟐 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝜷𝟐𝟑 s 𝜶𝟏 
𝜷𝟎 0.002462 0.002336 -0.00024 0.000218 -2.86E-05 -6.34E-05 9.44E-05 0.000259 -0.00014 -5.47E-05 -2.59E-05 0.002775 
𝜹𝟏 0.002336 0.003374 -0.00033 0.000288 -0.00014 -0.00016 2.41E-05 0.000226 -0.00017 -6.97E-05 -2.50E-05 0.002224 
𝜹𝟏𝟏 -0.00024 -0.00033 0.000106 -0.00015 0.000278 -9.94E-05 -9.66E-05 3.48E-06 -4.08E-05 -3.97E-05 1.50E-05 -0.00138 
𝜸𝟏𝟐 0.000218 0.000288 -0.00015 0.000348 -0.00049 0.000147 0.000196 7.56E-05 6.33E-05 0.000119 -1.59E-05 0.000454 
𝜸𝟏𝟑 -2.86E-05 -0.00014 0.000278 -0.00049 0.001082 -0.00044 -0.00036 0.000101 -0.00023 -0.0002 3.19E-05 -0.00104 
𝜷𝟏 -6.34E-05 -0.00016 -9.94E-05 0.000147 -0.00044 0.000288 0.000121 1.08E-07 0.000128 5.66E-05 -1.19E-05 0.000462 
𝜷𝟐 9.44E-05 2.41E-05 -9.66E-05 0.000196 -0.00036 0.000121 0.000196 -8.19E-05 5.75E-05 7.71E-05 -1.19E-05 0.000316 
𝜷𝟏𝟐 0.000259 0.000226 3.48E-06 7.56E-05 0.000101 1.08E-07 -8.19E-05 0.000329 -5.47E-05 -1.59E-05 1.53E-06 1.74E-05 
𝜷𝟏𝟑 -0.00014 -0.00017 -4.08E-05 6.33E-05 -0.00023 0.000128 5.75E-05 -5.47E-05 0.000103 5.15E-05 -4.32E-06 0.000171 
𝜷𝟐𝟑 -5.47E-05 -6.97E-05 -3.97E-05 0.000119 -0.0002 5.66E-05 7.71E-05 -1.59E-05 5.15E-05 7.13E-05 -4.04E-06 3.11E-05 
s -2.59E-05 -2.50E-05 1.50E-05 -1.59E-05 3.19E-05 -1.19E-05 -1.19E-05 1.53E-06 -4.32E-06 -4.04E-06 0.004552 0.002053 
𝜶𝟏 0.002775 0.002224 -0.00138 0.000454 -0.00104 0.000462 0.000316 1.74E-05 0.000171 3.11E-05 0.002053 0.440645 
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Table A.2 Coefficient variance-covariance matrix of system estimation of trans-log cost system 
and switching costs equations using GMM approach 
 
Coefficient 𝜷𝟎 𝜹𝟏 𝜹𝟏𝟏 𝜸𝟏𝟐 𝜸𝟏𝟑 𝜷𝟏 𝜷𝟐 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝜷𝟐𝟑 s 𝜶𝟏 
𝜷𝟎 0.002238 0.001712 -0.00027 0.000315 -0.00034 0.00018 0.000276 0.00022 -8.82E-05 -3.31E-05 -0.00016 -0.00753 
𝜹𝟏 0.001712 0.001837 -0.00025 0.000272 -0.0003 5.51E-05 0.000159 0.000176 -0.00011 -4.33E-05 -5.08E-05 -0.00433 
𝜹𝟏𝟏 -0.00027 -0.00025 9.10E-05 -0.00013 0.000239 -0.0001 -9.11E-05 -1.23E-05 -3.05E-05 -2.97E-05 -1.63E-05 -0.00031 
𝜸𝟏𝟐 0.000315 0.000272 -0.00013 0.000304 -0.00041 0.000139 0.00017 9.83E-05 5.04E-05 0.0001016 7.34E-05 -0.00257 
𝜸𝟏𝟑 -0.00034 -0.0003 0.000239 -0.00041 0.000885 -0.00038 -0.00031 4.69E-05 -0.00018 -0.000148 -9.65E-05 0.005661 
𝜷𝟏 0.00018 5.51E-05 -0.0001 0.000139 -0.00038 0.000246 0.000123 7.33E-06 0.000102 5.16E-05 5.42E-06 -0.00282 
𝜷𝟐 0.000276 0.000159 -9.11E-05 0.00017 -0.00031 0.000123 0.000178 -5.66E-05 5.71E-05 5.92E-05 1.04E-05 -0.00326 
𝜷𝟏𝟐 0.00022 0.000176 -1.23E-05 9.83E-05 4.69E-05 7.33E-06 -5.66E-05 0.000286 -4.68E-05 6.53E-06 1.27E-05 0.000614 
𝜷𝟏𝟑 -8.82E-05 -0.00011 -3.05E-05 5.04E-05 -0.00018 0.000102 5.71E-05 -4.68E-05 8.39E-05 4.18E-05 2.17E-05 -0.00147 
𝜷𝟐𝟑 -3.31E-05 -4.33E-05 -2.97E-05 0.000102 -0.00015 5.16E-05 5.92E-05 6.53E-06 4.18E-05 6.04E-05 4.00E-05 -0.00067 
s -0.00016 -5.08E-05 -1.63E-05 7.34E-05 -9.65E-05 5.42E-06 1.04E-05 1.27E-05 2.17E-05 4.00E-05 0.001326 0.000414 
𝜶𝟏 -0.00753 -0.00433 -0.00031 -0.00257 0.005661 -0.00282 -0.00326 0.000614 -0.00147 -0.000675 0.000414 0.948827 
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Appendix A.5 Derivation of equation (3.37) 
  
𝒎𝒗𝒍𝒊,𝒕
𝝏𝑷𝑽𝒊,𝒕/𝝏𝒚𝟏,𝒊,𝒕
= −𝜹
𝒏
𝒏−𝟏
𝒔𝜶𝟏 
The derivation is based on Kim et al. (2003). The marginal value of a locked-in 
customer, 𝑚𝑣𝑙𝑖,𝑡, is equal to the discounted marginal increase in the firm’s present 
value due to an additional locked-in customer in the next period.       
                   𝑚𝑣𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛿
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡+1
∗
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
                          (A.20) 
If growth rate is not changing over times, 𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡+1 ≈ 𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 , therefore 𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1/
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡+1 ≈ 𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡 . Then, equation (A.20) becomes  
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
=
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛿
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
=
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛿
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡+1
∗
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
≈
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛿
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
∗
              
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
                                                                                                 (A.21) 
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
 can be obtained from equation (3.18) which equal to  −
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝛼1, then  
                           
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
=
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
(1 + 𝛿
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝛼1)
−1                         (A.22) 
Therefore, a proportion of the added value of an additional customer is  
                        
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
= (1 + 𝛿
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝛼1)                           (A.23) 
And the marginal value of a locked-in customer as a proportion of the marginal 
increase in the firm’s present value due to an additional locked-in customer is 
                        
𝑚𝑣𝑙𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡/𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
= (1 −
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑃𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
) = −𝛿
𝑛
𝑛−1
𝑠𝛼1                   (A.24)
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Appendix B  
Chapter 4 Appendix 
Appendix B.1 Coefficient variance-covariance matrix 
Table B.1 Coefficient variance-covariance matrix of system estimation of trans-log cost system, demand equation and 
pricing equation using non-linear 3SLS 
Coefficient 𝜷𝟎 𝜹𝟏 𝜹𝟏𝟏 𝜸𝟏𝟐 𝜸𝟏𝟑 𝜷𝟏 𝜷𝟐 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝜷𝟐𝟑 
𝜷𝟎 0.003633 0.003512 -0.00045 0.00048 -0.00041 5.21E-06 0.000359 0.000187 -9.66E-05 -3.39E-05 
𝜹𝟏 0.003512 0.005511 -0.00026 0.000921 -0.00113 0.00012 0.000515 0.000129 -3.27E-05 6.77E-05 
𝜹𝟏𝟏 -0.00045 -0.00026 0.000305 -2.89E-05 8.89E-06 2.02E-05 -1.26E-05 -1.44E-05 2.39E-05 2.11E-05 
𝜸𝟏𝟐 0.00048 0.000921 -2.89E-05 0.000504 -0.00075 0.000214 0.000327 3.71E-05 8.53E-05 0.000148 
𝜸𝟏𝟑 -0.00041 -0.00113 8.89E-06 -0.00075 0.001384 -0.00049 -0.00055 0.000105 -0.00023 -0.00024 
𝜷𝟏 5.21E-06 0.00012 2.02E-05 0.000214 -0.00049 0.000256 0.000174 -8.55E-06 0.00011 7.21E-05 
𝜷𝟐 0.000359 0.000515 -1.26E-05 0.000327 -0.00055 0.000174 0.000295 -7.56E-05 7.31E-05 0.000101 
𝜷𝟏𝟐 0.000187 0.000129 -1.44E-05 3.71E-05 0.000105 -8.55E-06 -7.56E-05 0.000247 -4.39E-05 -1.91E-05 
𝜷𝟏𝟑 -9.66E-05 -3.27E-05 2.39E-05 8.53E-05 -0.00023 0.00011 7.31E-05 -4.39E-05 7.98E-05 5.16E-05 
𝜷𝟐𝟑 -3.39E-05 6.77E-05 2.11E-05 0.000148 -0.00024 7.21E-05 0.000101 -1.91E-05 5.16E-05 7.56E-05 
𝝋𝟎 0.057194 0.056299 -0.01889 0.011941 0.005801 -0.01411 0.005109 0.005943 -0.00873 0.000885 
𝝋𝟏 0.000588 -0.00365 -0.00236 -0.00163 0.002966 -0.00102 -0.00114 0.000196 -0.00054 -0.00062 
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𝝋𝟐 -0.00034 0.004594 0.002662 0.001872 -0.00413 0.001805 0.00146 -0.00038 0.00098 0.000625 
𝝋𝟑 -0.004 -0.00375 0.001391 -0.00079 -0.00065 0.001151 -0.0003 -0.00046 0.000704 -5.98E-05 
𝝋𝟒 -1.80E-06 -2.00E-05 -6.15E-06 -6.72E-06 2.18E-05 -9.56E-06 -8.60E-06 8.05E-06 -5.39E-06 -1.71E-06 
𝝀 -0.00013 -0.00175 -0.00084 -0.00058 0.001347 -0.00062 -0.00047 0.000131 -0.00034 -0.00017 
 
Coefficient 𝝋𝟎 𝝋𝟏 𝝋𝟐 𝝋𝟑 𝝋𝟒 𝝀 
𝜷𝟎 0.057194 0.000588 -0.00034 -0.004 -1.80E-06 -0.00013 
𝜹𝟏 0.056299 -0.00365 0.004594 -0.00375 -2.00E-05 -0.00175 
𝜹𝟏𝟏 -0.01889 -0.00236 0.002662 0.001391 -6.15E-06 -0.00084 
𝜸𝟏𝟐 0.011941 -0.00163 0.001872 -0.00079 -6.72E-06 -0.00058 
𝜸𝟏𝟑 0.005801 0.002966 -0.00413 -0.00065 2.18E-05 0.001347 
𝜷𝟏 -0.01411 -0.00102 0.001805 0.001151 -9.56E-06 -0.00062 
𝜷𝟐 0.005109 -0.00114 0.00146 -0.0003 -8.60E-06 -0.00047 
𝜷𝟏𝟐 0.005943 0.000196 -0.00038 -0.00046 8.05E-06 0.000131 
𝜷𝟏𝟑 -0.00873 -0.00054 0.00098 0.000704 -5.39E-06 -0.00034 
𝜷𝟐𝟑 0.000885 -0.00062 0.000625 -5.98E-05 -1.71E-06 -0.00017 
𝝋𝟎 91.54552 0.984838 -4.41358 -7.16163 0.084315 0.825914 
𝝋𝟏 0.984838 0.105355 -0.14852 -0.07832 0.001044 -0.03233 
𝝋𝟐 -4.41358 -0.14852 0.348167 0.352166 -0.00419 -0.00643 
𝝋𝟑 -7.16163 -0.07832 0.352166 0.561811 -0.0074 -0.06617 
𝝋𝟒 0.084315 0.001044 -0.00419 -0.0074 0.001609 0.000636 
𝝀 0.825914 -0.03233 -0.00643 -0.06617 0.000636 0.052496 
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Table B.2 Coefficient variance-covariance matrix of system estimation of trans-log cost system, demand equation and 
pricing equation using GMM 
 
Coefficient 𝜷𝟎 𝜹𝟏 𝜹𝟏𝟏 𝜸𝟏𝟐 𝜸𝟏𝟑 𝜷𝟏 𝜷𝟐 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝜷𝟐𝟑 
𝜷𝟎 0.004094 0.003371 -0.00042 0.000781 -0.00093 0.000262 0.000704 0.000214 -4.61E-05 2.09E-05 
𝜹𝟏 0.003371 0.004259 2.58E-05 0.001092 -0.00151 0.000378 0.000791 0.000157 5.38E-05 0.00016 
𝜹𝟏𝟏 -0.00042 2.58E-05 0.000352 3.20E-05 -7.73E-05 4.25E-05 1.28E-05 -1.95E-05 5.01E-05 5.43E-05 
𝜸𝟏𝟐 0.000781 0.001092 3.20E-05 0.000558 -0.0008 0.00023 0.000364 7.69E-05 8.48E-05 0.00016 
𝜸𝟏𝟑 -0.00093 -0.00151 -7.73E-05 -0.0008 0.001412 -0.00047 -0.00059 5.71E-05 -0.00022 -0.00024 
𝜷𝟏 0.000262 0.000378 4.25E-05 0.00023 -0.00047 0.00022 0.00018 4.60E-06 9.70E-05 7.40E-05 
𝜷𝟐 0.000704 0.000791 1.28E-05 0.000364 -0.00059 0.00018 0.000328 -5.75E-05 7.78E-05 1.00E-04 
𝜷𝟏𝟐 0.000214 0.000157 -1.95E-05 7.69E-05 5.71E-05 4.60E-06 -5.75E-05 0.000254 -4.20E-05 4.27E-06 
𝜷𝟏𝟑 -4.61E-05 5.38E-05 5.01E-05 8.48E-05 -0.00022 9.70E-05 7.78E-05 -4.20E-05 7.22E-05 4.65E-05 
𝜷𝟐𝟑 2.09E-05 0.00016 5.43E-05 0.00016 -0.00024 7.40E-05 1.00E-04 4.27E-06 4.65E-05 7.39E-05 
𝝋𝟎 0.115809 0.094389 -0.02562 0.004272 0.0172 -0.01946 0.00466 0.004267 -0.01722 -0.01075 
𝝋𝟏 0.000668 -0.00452 -0.00261 -0.00123 0.002254 -0.00074 -0.00091 0.000459 -0.00059 -0.00071 
𝝋𝟐 -0.00205 0.003697 0.003092 0.001882 -0.00443 0.002054 0.001667 -0.00093 0.001466 0.001202 
𝝋𝟑 -0.00831 -0.00652 0.001889 -6.86E-05 -0.00176 0.001642 -0.00012 -0.00038 0.001376 0.000872 
𝝋𝟒 -0.0003 -0.00061 1.09E-05 -0.00022 0.000258 -3.45E-05 -0.00013 -2.13E-05 1.24E-05 -4.17E-05 
𝝀 0.000946 -0.00212 -0.00228 -0.0032 0.007055 -0.00334 -0.00265 0.000546 -0.00193 -0.00142 
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Coefficient 𝝋𝟎 𝝋𝟏 𝝋𝟐 𝝋𝟑 𝝋𝟒 𝝀 
𝜷𝟎 0.115809 0.000668 -0.00205 -0.00831 -0.0003 0.000946 
𝜹𝟏 0.094389 -0.00452 0.003697 -0.00652 -0.00061 -0.00212 
𝜹𝟏𝟏 -0.02562 -0.00261 0.003092 0.001889 1.09E-05 -0.00228 
𝜸𝟏𝟐 0.004272 -0.00123 0.001882 -6.86E-05 -0.00022 -0.0032 
𝜸𝟏𝟑 0.0172 0.002254 -0.00443 -0.00176 0.000258 0.007055 
𝜷𝟏 -0.01946 -0.00074 0.002054 0.001642 -3.45E-05 -0.00334 
𝜷𝟐 0.00466 -0.00091 0.001667 -0.00012 -0.00013 -0.00265 
𝜷𝟏𝟐 0.004267 0.000459 -0.00093 -0.00038 -2.13E-05 0.000546 
𝜷𝟏𝟑 -0.01722 -0.00059 0.001466 0.001376 1.24E-05 -0.00193 
𝜷𝟐𝟑 -0.01075 -0.00071 0.001202 0.000872 -4.17E-05 -0.00142 
𝝋𝟎 77.7656 0.279074 -2.89375 -6.04363 0.106364 4.161947 
𝝋𝟏 0.279074 0.065895 -0.07747 -0.02195 0.000314 -0.00935 
𝝋𝟐 -2.89375 -0.07747 0.201436 0.229468 -0.003 -0.17063 
𝝋𝟑 -6.04363 -0.02195 0.229468 0.4708 -0.00874 -0.33099 
𝝋𝟒 0.106364 0.000314 -0.003 -0.00874 0.00133 0.005024 
𝝀 4.161947 -0.00935 -0.17063 -0.33099 0.005024 0.347456 
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Appendix C 
List of Symbols 
Symbol Meaning 
 
 A 
 
 
Bank-specific variables that affect the bank’s revenue and 
cost functions 
𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 Average cost of bank i at time t 
α0
i  Coefficient which represents the bank-specific heterogeneity 
α1 Coefficient which measures the sensitivity of the transition 
probability to the bank’s own interest rate 
α2 Coefficient which measures the sensitivity of the transition 
probability to another bank’s price  
𝛽0 The constant of trans-log cost equation  
𝛽1 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛽2 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛽3 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛽11 The coefficient of 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡
2  (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛽12 The coefficient of  𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛽13 The coefficient of  𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛽22 The coefficient of 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡
2  (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛽23 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛽33 The coefficient of 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡
2  (Trans-log cost function) 
C𝑖,𝑡 Total costs of bank i at time t 
CPI Consumer price index  
D𝑖,𝑡 The deposits of bank i at time t. 
𝑫𝑴𝒊𝒕 A vector of exogenous factors affect quantity demand 
∆ First-order difference 
δ The one-period discount factor 
𝛿1 The coefficient of  𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡 (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛿11 The coefficient of 
1
2
𝑙𝑛𝑦1,𝑖,𝑡
2  (Trans-log cost function) 
𝐸 E-statistic 
𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of equity capital to total assets of bank i at time t 
𝜖𝑖,𝑡 An error term of equation 3.26 
𝜖𝑖,𝑡′ An error term of equation 3.27 
𝜀𝑖𝑖 The own-price elasticity of demand 
𝜀𝑖𝑗 The cross-price elasticity of demand 
FA𝑖,𝑡 The fix assets of bank i at time t 
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gt The market growth rate at period t 
𝛾11 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛾12 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 (Trans-log cost function) 
𝛾13 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 (Trans-log cost function) 
H The Panzar-Rosse H statistic  
HIBOR𝑡 Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate 
𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Interest income 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑐𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 The natural logarithms of exogenous control variables related 
to the bank cost function 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑟𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 The natural logarithms of exogenous control variables related 
to the bank-specific demand function.  
infl𝑡 Inflation rate in Hong Kong 
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 The natural logarithms of factor input k of bank i at time t 
𝜅𝑖,𝑡 An error term of equation 4.8 
L𝑖,𝑡 The number of labour of bank i at time t 
λ conjectural variation parameter 
M The macroeconomic variables that affect the banking marke 
𝑚𝑐𝑖,𝑡 The marginal cost of bank i in period t  
𝑚𝑣𝑙𝑖,𝑡 The marginal value of a locked-in customer 
𝜇𝑖,𝑡 An error term of equation 4.12 
n The number of banks in the sample  
𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Non-interest income 
𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of bank loans to total assets of bank i at time t 
𝜐1 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡(equation 5.11) 
𝜐2 The coefficient of𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 (equation 5.11) 
𝜐3 The coefficient of𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 (equation 5.11) 
𝜐4 The coefficient of𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡(equation 5.11) 
𝜐1′ The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡(equation 5.12) 
𝜐2′ The coefficient of𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 (equation 5.12) 
𝜐3′ The coefficient of𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 (equation 5.12) 
𝜐4′ The coefficient of𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡(equation 5.12) 
O The other earning assets 
𝜊𝑖 The coefficient of𝐷𝑖(equation 5.11) 
𝜊𝑖′ The coefficient of𝐷𝑖(equation 5.12) 
𝑝 The interest rate on loans 
𝑝𝑖,𝑡 The interest rate charged by bank i in period t 
p̅i R,t The average interest rate charged by the rival banks 
𝒑𝒊𝑹,𝒕 the alternative interest rate charged by bank i’s rivals 
𝑝𝑙 The labour price  
𝑝𝑐𝑚𝑖,𝑡 The price-cost margin of bank i in period t 
PE the personal expenses 
𝑃𝑟𝑖→𝑖,𝑡 The probability that a customer who borrowed in period t-1 
from bank i will continue to borrow from the same bank in 
the subsequent period 
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Pri R→i,t The probability that a customer who borrowed from the bank 
i’s rivals will switch to borrow from bank i in current period 
𝑃𝑟𝑗→𝑖,𝑡 The probability that a customer who previously borrow from 
bank j will switch to borrow from bank i in the subsequent 
period 
𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets of bank i at time 
t. 
πi,t the bank’s profit in period t. 
𝜋1 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑤1 (equation 5.11) 
𝜋2 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑤2 (equation 5.11) 
𝜋3 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑤3 (equation 5.11) 
𝜋1′ The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑤1 (equation 5.12) 
𝜋2′ The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑤2 (equation 5.12) 
𝜋3′ The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑤3 (equation 5.12) 
𝜋𝑖𝑘 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑝𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 (equation 5.4) 
rE Interest rate on earning assets 
𝑟𝑂 Interest rate on other earning assets 
𝑅𝑒𝑣 Either total revenue, interest income, or non-interest income 
rgdp𝑡 Real GDP in Hong Kong  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 Return on assets of bank i at time t 
𝜌0 The constant of equation 5.4 
𝜌1 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡 (equation 5.4) 
s The mean switching costs 
s s ≡ s I, here I is an (n-1) unity vector 
𝒔𝑗 an (n-1) vector in which each of the elements equals s , 
except for the jth element, which is zero 
𝑆ℎ𝑘,𝑖 the share of the kth factor in bank i’s period t production cost 
𝑆ℎ1,𝑖 The labour costs share in bank i’s time t 
𝑆ℎ2,𝑖 The capital costs share in bank i’s time t 
𝑆ℎ3,𝑖 The deposits costs share in bank i’s time t 
σi.t The market share of bank i in period t 
𝒕𝑖 A vector of exogenous variables that shifts the bank i’s cost 
function 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 The total assets of bank i at time t. 
TE The total earning assets 
𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑡 Total income 
τ Time period  
𝜏𝑛 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑛,𝑡 
𝜏1 The coefficient of𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑡(equation 5.11) 
𝜏1′ The coefficient of𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑡(equation 5.12) 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 An error term of equation 3.25 
𝜐𝑘 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑐𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 (equation 5.4) 
Vi,τ The present value of bank i’s profit  
𝒘𝑖,𝑡 A vector of input prices of bank i in period t 
𝑤1,𝑖,𝑡 The exogenous input prices on labour. 
𝑤2,𝑖,𝑡 The exogenous input price on capital.  
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𝑤3,𝑖,𝑡 The exogenous input price on deposits.  
wage𝑡 Wage rate in Hong Kong 
𝑋 Bank-specific variables that affect the bank’s revenue and 
cost functions 
𝜉𝑟 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑋𝑟𝑟,𝑖,𝑡 (equation 5.5) 
Y Loans 
𝑦𝑖 The total loan of bank i 
y1,i,t The bank i’s total loan at period t 
y1,j,t−1 Bank j’s total loans in period t-1 
y1,j,t−1
∑ y1,k,t−1k≠i
 
The probability that a randomly selected rival’s borrower is 
one who borrows from bank j in the previous period 
𝑦2 Bank other earning assets 
𝑦3 Net fees and commissions 
𝒛𝑖 A vector of exogenous variables that influence the bank i’s 
revenue 
𝜁 The constant of equation 5.11 
𝜁′ The constant of equation 5.12 
𝜑0 The constant of equation 4.7 
𝜑1 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑡 which representing the own price 
elasticity (equation 4.7) 
𝜑2 The coefficient of  𝑙𝑛p𝑖,𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ,which representing the cross-price 
elasticity (equation 4.7) 
𝜑3 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 (equation 4.7) 
𝜑4 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 (E\equation 4.7) 
𝜒0 The constant of equation 5.5 
𝜒1 The coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡 (equation 5.5) 
𝜗𝑖,𝑡 An error term of equation 4.7 
𝜔𝑖,𝑡 An error term of equation 3.28 
 
 
